Brown v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

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MELINDA BROWN, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, sued as Martin O'Malley, Commissioner of Social Security,^[1] Defendant.

No. 2:23-cv-00025-SLC

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division

March 28, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

SUSAN COLLINS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Melinda Brown appeals to the district court from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application under the Social Security Act (the “Act”) for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (ECF 1). On June 30, 2023, Brown filed her opening brief (ECF 13), to which the Commissioner timely responded (ECF 18). Brown filed a reply brief on November 16, 2023, making the matter ripe for review. (ECF 23). For the following reasons, the Commissioner's decision will be REMANDED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Brown applied for DIB in November 2020, alleging disability as of August 18, 2020. (ECF 10 Administrative Record (“AR”) 23, 194).^[2]Brown's claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (AR 23, 63, 72). After a timely request (AR 99-100, 117), a hearing was held on February 18, 2022, before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Marc Jones, at which Brown, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. (AR 38-62). On March 16, 2022 the ALJ rendered an unfavorable decision to Brown, concluding that she was not disabled because she could perform past relevant work, in addition to a significant number of other light-exertional jobs in the national economy, despite the limitations caused by her impairments. (AR 23-31). Brown's request for review was denied by the Appeals Council (AR 6-10), at which point the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.

Brown filed a complaint with this Court on January 19, 2023, seeking relief from the Commissioner's decision. (ECF 1). In her appeal, Brown alleges that: (1) the ALJ erred in evaluating her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) under SSR 85-15 and 96-8p; and (2) the ALJ's evaluation of Brown's symptoms violated SSR 16-3p and was not supported by substantial evidence. (ECF 13 at 7).

At the time of the ALJ's decision, Brown was forty-two years old (AR 29, 194, 206), had a high school education and some trade school education as an administrative assistant (AR 29, 45, 210), and had past relevant work experience as a cashier, customer service clerk, and data entry clerk (AR 29, 211). In her application, Brown alleged disability due to diabetes; vertigo; severe neuropathy; neuropathy-related pain in both hips but mainly the left hip, in both legs and feet, and in both arms and hands; and depression. (AR 209).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 405(g) of the Act grants this Court the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner . . ., with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court's task is limited to determining whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, which means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The decision will be reversed “only if [it is] not supported by substantial evidence or if the Commissioner applied an erroneous legal standard.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

To determine whether substantial evidence exists, the Court “review[s] the entire administrative record, but do[es] not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Id. (citations omitted). “Rather, if the findings of the Commissioner . . . are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive.” Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “In other words, so long as, in light of all the evidence, reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the claimant] is disabled, we must affirm the ALJ's decision denying benefits.” Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 1996).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Law

Under the Act, a claimant seeking DIB must establish “an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. § 423(d)(3).

The Commissioner evaluates disability claims pursuant to a five-step evaluation process, requiring consideration of the following issues, in sequence: (1) whether the claimant is currently unemployed in substantial gainful activity, (2) whether she has a severe impairment, (3) whether her impairment is one that the Commissioner considers conclusively disabling, (4) whether she is incapable of performing her past relevant work, and (5) whether she is incapable of performing any work in the national economy. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.^[3]“[A]n affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “A negative answer at any point, other than Step 3, ends the inquiry and leads to a determination that a claimant is not disabled.” Id. (citation omitted). The burden of proof lies with the claimant at every step except the fifth, where it shifts to the Commissioner. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.

B. The Commissioner s Final Decision

On March 16, 2022, the ALJ issued a decision that ultimately became the Commissioner's final decision. (AR 23-31). As a threshold matter, the ALJ noted that Brown was insured for DIB through December 31, 2025. (AR 25). At step one, the ALJ concluded that Brown had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 18, 2020, her alleged onset date. (Id.). At step two, the ALJ found that Brown had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease (“DDD”) of the cervical spine, diabetes, neuropathy, and obesity. (Id.).

At step three, the ALJ concluded that Brown did not have an impairment or combination of impairments severe enough to meet or equal a listing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR 26). The ALJ then assigned Brown the following RFC:

[T]he claimant has the [RFC] to perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that she can frequently reach and occasionally operate foot controls. She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, as well as occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, never work at unprotected heights, never work around dangerous machinery with moving mechanical parts, never operate a motor vehicle as part of her work-related duties, and never balance, as the term is defined in the [Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles].

(AR 27).

The ALJ found at step four that Brown was able to perform her past work as a data entry clerk as generally and actually performed, and as a cashier and customer service clerk as generally performed. (AR 29). Alternatively, the ALJ found that given her age, education, work experience, and RFC, Brown could perform other light-exertional jobs that exist in substantial numbers in the national economy, including inspector/packer, mail clerk, and recreation aide. (AR 30). As such, Brown's application for DIB was denied. (AR 30-31).

C. RFC

Brown challenges the ALJ's RFC assessment, both physical and mental, on several grounds. She argues that the ALJ erred in crafting the RFC because he failed to consider medical evidence supporting leg elevation and handling restrictions, he failed to properly consider her obesity in combination with other impairments, and he failed to discuss medical evidence supporting greater limitations relating to her mental impairments.

The RFC is “the individual's maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis,” meaning eight hours a day, for five days a week. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (July 2, 1996) (bold emphasis omitted).

That is, the “RFC does not represent the least an individual can do despite his or her limitations or restrictions, but the most.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (7th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).

The [RFC] assessment is based upon consideration of all relevant evidence in the case record, including medical evidence and relevant nonmedical evidence, such as observations of lay witnesses of an individual's apparent symptomatology, an individual's own statement of what he or she is able or unable to do, and many other factors that could help the adjudicator determine the most reasonable findings in light of all the evidence.

SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2, 1996); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). When determining the RFC, the ALJ must consider all medically determinable impairments, mental and physical, even those that are non-severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2); see also Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008).

The ALJ penned a two-page RFC analysis summarizing a 1512-page record (AR 28-29), beginning with Brown's testimony. The ALJ relayed Brown's...