Brown v. Gaydos

306 A.3d 883

John BROWN, Appellant

v.George GAYDOS, an Individual, t/d/b/a Gaydos Construction

No. 1132 WDA 2021

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 3, 2023

Filed: December 7, 2023

Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 16, 2021, In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Civil Division, at No(s): No. GD18-006991, Alan David Hertzberg, J.

David Kennedy Houck, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Dennis J. Geis Jr., Pittsburgh, for appellees.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY McCAFFERY, J.:

John Brown (Brown) appeals from the order entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of George Gaydos (Gaydos), as an individual and doing business as Gaydos Construction, in this negligence action seeking damages for a work-related injury Brown suffered while operating a skid loader owned by Gaydos. Because we conclude the record contains genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Gaydos is statutorily immune from liability under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA)¹ as Brown’s employer or co-employee, we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The relevant facts underlying this matter are summarized by the trial court as follows:

In 2007 or 2008, … Gaydos began doing construction work as a sole proprietor using the name Gaydos Construction. [Gaydos], as a sole proprietor, did general construction work with a focus on heating, air conditioning, concrete and masonry. For [the] business, [Gaydos] purchased two dump trucks, a utility truck, a skid loader and an assortment of tools. On April 9, 2016[, Gaydos] and his cousin, Mark Raymond, signed a partnership agreement to operate a business under the name American Concrete Solutions[ (ACS)]. A few months later[, they] filed a Certificate of Organization Domestic Limited Liability Company with the Pennsylvania Department of State[.]

[Gaydos], on occasion, continued to bid on heating and air conditioning jobs as a sole proprietor. But, all concrete and masonry jobs were bid and performed by [ACS]. The construction equipment and tools owned by [Gaydos], including the skid loader, continued to be owned by him. [Gaydos] and [Raymond], who also owned construction equipment and tools, agreed that each of them would furnish any equipment or tools they owned individually that were needed to perform the work on [ACS’s] jobs. They agreed that [ACS] would not own those tools and equipment and would not compensate either of them for use of those tools and equipment.

[Brown] began working as an [ACS] employee on September 1, 2016. On that day, [ACS] was preparing to pour a flat slab of concrete inside a pole building located in the City of Pittsburgh. [Gaydos] was at the job site "first thing in the morning, and then … left to go pay a vendor for some stone." The skid loader owned by [Gaydos] was at the site. At approximately 11:00 a.m., as [Brown] "attempted to enter the subject skid loader, the arm of the skid loader caught[Brown’s] body, crushing him between the top of the cab and the arm of the bucket and subsequently, dropped [him] to the ground." [Brown] was seriously injured and thereafter made a claim for workers compensation benefits from [ACS]. The workers compensation claim was not disputed, and as of June of 2019, approximately $561,000 had been paid to [Brown] for lost wages and to medical providers for medical treatment.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/13/21, at 1-2 (footnote, some quotation marks, & record citations omitted).

On May 31, 2018, Brown initiated this civil action against Gaydos, alleging his negligence in improperly maintaining the skid loader and failing to supervise or train Brown on its use.² On January 5, 2021, Gaydos filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, inter alia, that Brown’s claims were barred by the WCA.³ Brown filed both a response to Gaydos’ motion, and a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting Gaydos was not his employer as defined in the WCA and, therefore, not immune from suit. See Brown’s Response & Brief in Opposition to [Gaydos’] Motion for Summary [Judgment], 3/3/21, at 3-4; Brown’s Motion for Summary [Judgment], 3/3/21, at 5, 7-8. Thereafter, Gaydos filed a brief in support of his motion, again asserting he was immune from liability as Brown’s employer, or, alternatively, that he was immune as Brown’s co-employee pursuant to Section 72 of the WCA.⁴ On March 18, 2021, the trial court entered an order denying both motions for summary judgment. See Order, 3/18/21.

Eight days later, on March 26, 2021, Gaydos requested the trial court amend its order to permit an interlocutory appeal by permission pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1311(a); Brown opposed the request. Thereafter, on April 16, 2021, the trial court entered the following order: (1) denying Gaydos’ request to certify the March 18th interlocutory order as appealable; (2) granting Gaydos’ request to reconsider the cross-motions for summary judgment;⁵ (3) denying Brown’s motion for summary judgment; (4) granting Gaydos’ motion for summary judgment; and (5) entering judgment in favor of Gaydos and against Brown. See Order, 4/16/21.

Brown filed two notices of appeal, one challenging the order denying his motion for summary judgment (docketed at 591 WDA 2021), and the other challenging the order granting Gaydos’ motion for summary judgment (docketed at 592 WDA 2021).⁶ On August 6, 2021, this Court, by per curiam order, quashed both appeals, concluding they were "duplicative of each other" and interlocutory since "claims remained against Gaydos Construction & Asphalt Paving Co., Inc. …" 591 & 592 WDA 2021, Order, 8/6/21.

On September 8, 2021, Brown requested the trial court correct the case caption to reflect that he was suing Gaydos personally and to the extent he was operating a sole proprietorship, Gaydos Construction. See Motion to Correct Case Caption, 9/8/21, at 4, 6-8. Although Gaydos opposed the motion, on September 8, 2021, the trial court entered an order which: (1) dismissed Gaydos Construction & Asphalt Paving Co. Inc. as a defendant "[b]y consent of counsel[;]" and (2) granted Brown’s motion to correct the caption to reflect the defendant as "George Gaydos, Individually and t/d/b/a Gaydos Construction." Order, 9/8/21. This timely appeal followed.

When the matter was first before this Court, a divided three-judge panel determined that although there was a genuine issue of material fact whether Gaydos was Brown’s employer under Section 481(a) of the WCA, the record supported the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Gaydos as Brown’s co-employee under Section 72. Thus, the panel affirmed the judgment in favor of Gaydos. Brown requested en banc review, which we granted, and now presents the following claim:

Whether the Majority erroneously concluded Gaydos/[Gaydos Construction] was immune from third-party liability as Brown’s co-employee?

Brown’s Substitute Brief at 3 (some capitalization omitted).

[1] When considering an order granting summary judgment, we may reverse only "if there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion." In re Risperdal Litigation, 656 Pa. 649, 223 A.3d 633, 639 (2019).

[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court must take all facts of record and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. In so doing, the trial court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party, and, thus, may only grant summary judgment where the right to such judgment is clear and free from all doubt.

Id. (citations & quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). See also Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(1). Thus, "if there is relevant evidence that a jury could reasonably credit that would allow the non-moving party to prevail, then judgment as a matter of law would be inappropriate." Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., 592 Pa. 458, 926 A.2d 899, 902 (2007). When, as here, the issue concerns whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we review a question of law so that "our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary." Risperdal Litigation, 223 A.3d at 639 (citation omitted).

[2] By way of background, the WCA requires employers to pay employees who are injured on the job workers’ compensation benefits regardless of negligence. Dobransky v. EQT Prod. Co, 273 A.3d 1133, 1134 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), appeal denied, 284 A.3d 1188 (Pa. 2022).

In exchange for receiving these benefits without having to prove negligence, employees may not sue their employers in tort for injuries they incurred in the course of their employment. See 77 P.S.

§ 481(a). In other words, with respect to work-related injuries, the employers have immunity from tort liability.

Id.

Employer immunity is codified at Section 481, which provides, in relevant part:

The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employes, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death … or occupational disease[.]

77 P.S. § 481(a) (footnotes omitted). See also 77 P.S. § 411(1)-(2) (defining "injury," "personal injury," and "injury arising in the course of his employment").

[3] Nevertheless, the courts of this Commonwealth have recognized the "dual capacity" doctrine, which provides:

[A]n employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive remedy principle may become liable in tort to his own employee if he occupies, in addition to his capacity as employer, a second capacity that confers on him obligations independent of

...