Brown v. Lee

JOHN W. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. BILL B. LEE, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:20-cv-00916

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

December 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

John W. Brown filed a pro se Complaint against Governor Bill B. Lee, Tennessee Bureau of Investigation ("TBI") Director David B. Rausch, the State of Tennessee, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County ("Metro"), and John and Jane Does. (Doc. No. 1.) Brown has also filed an application to proceed in this Court as a pauper. (Doc. No. 2.) The case is before the Court for a ruling on the application and initial review of the Complaint.

I. Application for Leave to Proceed as a Pauper

The Court may authorize a person to file a civil suit without paying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Brown is 69 years old and has a small monthly disability income that is exceeded by his basic expenses. (See Doc. No. 2.) Furthermore, he reports no significant discretionary expenses, cash reserves, or assets. (Id. at 2-3.) It appears that Brown cannot pay the full civil filing fee in advance without undue hardship. Accordingly, the application will be granted.

II. Initial Review of the Complaint

The Court must conduct an initial review of the Complaint and dismiss any action filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Ongori v. Hawkins, No. 16-2781, 2017 WL 6759020, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2017) ("[N]on-prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis are still subject to the screening requirements of § 1915(e).").

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing the Complaint, the Court applies the same standard as under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, the Court "must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true." Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). The Court must then consider whether those factual allegations "plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief," Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)), that rises "above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Court need not accept as true "unwarranted factual inferences," DirectTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000)), and "legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice." Eidson v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007).

"Pro se complaints are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and should therefore be liberally construed." Williams, 631 F.3d at 383; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). Even under this lenient standard, however, pro se plaintiffs must meet basic pleading requirements and are notexempted from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004).

B. Factual Background

Liberally construing the Complaint, Brown makes the following allegations.¹ In December 1985, Brown, a Black man, was convicted of aggravated rape by an all-white jury in the Circuit Court of Hickman County, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) Brown's appeal was denied by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals ("TCCA") on the ground that the issues were waived when his trial counsel failed to file a motion for a new trial. (Id.) In December 1987, Brown's state petition for post-conviction relief was granted based on ineffective assistance of counsel, and Brown was allowed to file a motion for a new trial. (Id. at 4-5.) In March 1988, the trial court held a hearing and denied the motion for a new trial. (Id. at 5.) In April 1989, the TCCA denied Brown's appeal. (Id.) In June 1989, the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review. (Id.)

In 2001 or 2002, the Hickman County Circuit Court appointed an "inept jailhouse lawyer" to help Brown seek further redress from his "unjust sentence and conviction." (Id.) Brown does not know the nature of the petition that this attorney filed on his behalf. (Id.) Brown later hired private counsel and professed to him "absolute innocence" of the charge. (Id.) However, this counsel "abandoned [Brown's] cause." (Id. at 6.) In 2012-13, Brown made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain records related to his criminal investigation from the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC"), the 21st Judicial District, and the TCCA. (Id. at 6-8.) In March 2013, Brown received a memorandum from the TDOC Deputy Commissioner stating the requested records were confidential under the Tennessee Public Records Act. (Id. at 7.) Brown maintains his innocence of the aggravated rape charge, asserts that he has been unable to obtain relief through the judicialprocess, and claims that "numerous substantive constitutional failures" occurred. (Id.) He contends that he is "deserving of relief" because his conviction and sentence are manifestly unfair. (Id.)

On June 3, 2015, Brown was released on parole after serving 30 years of his 40-year sentence of imprisonment. (Id.) He was told to report to the Davidson County Sheriff's Office ("DCSO") to register as a sex offender. (Id. at 9.) On September 2, 2020, Brown wrote to the TBI requesting to be removed from Tennessee's sex offender registry ("SOR"). (Id.) The TBI denied Brown's request on the ground that Tennessee law imposes lifetime registration and monitoring requirements upon persons convicted of a sexually violent offense. (Id. at 8-9.) The TBI stated that it would not respond to further requests for removal from the SOR unless Brown's conviction for aggravated rape was overturned or Brown received exoneration. (Id.) Brown alleges that his placement on the SOR occurred as a result of systemic racial discrimination against Black men. (Id. at 10.) He also alleges that placement on the SOR has resulted in injury including denial of employment and housing opportunities. (Id.)

C. Analysis

The Court liberally construes the Complaint² to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, as well as the Tennessee constitution. The Complaint also references 38 U.S.C. §§ 511(a) and 5301. Brown seeks damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. The Court addresses each claim in turn.

1. Claims Under 38 U.S.C. §§ 511(a) and 5301

The Complaint invokes, but does not discuss, 38 U.S.C. §§ 511(a) and 5301. (See Doc. No. 1 at 1.) To the extent Brown intends to bring a claim under either of these provisions, the claims must be dismissed. These statutory provisions concern veteran's benefits. Section 511(a) vests determinations of veteran's benefits in the Secretary of Veteran's Affairs and review of those determinations in the Board of Veteran's Appeals. See Brent v. Dep't of Veterans Affs. Debt Mgmt. Ctr., No. 19-CV-2446-TLP-DKV, 2020 WL 1889008, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 11, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 917288, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 26, 2020). Section 5301 exempts veteran's benefits from the judicial process. See Mack v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:18-CV-01382, 2019 WL 4342975, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2019). Here, however, Brown makes no factual allegations concerning veteran's benefits. Thus, any purported claim under these statutes must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

2. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985

A Section 1985 claim requires, among other things, that the accused conspirators enter the conspiracy "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws." Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United Bd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, a plaintiff is required to "allege both a conspiracy and some class-based discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Pahssen v. Merrill Cmty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 367 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 886 (6th Cir. 1992)). Furthermore, a plaintiff must allege "that the alleged conspirators shared a common discriminatory objective." Id. at 368 (emphasis in original). The question at this stage is, therefore, whether Brown has pled that Defendants' concerted actions were motived by "some racial, or perhaps otherwiseclass-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." Vakilian, 335 F.3d at 519 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Brown must allege that Defendants "possessed discriminatory intent" based upon a class protected by the Equal Protection Clause, and acted together to treat Brown differently "from another class that was similarly situated." Id. (citing Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio St. Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 534 (6th Cir. 2002)).

Here, the Complaint alleges that Defendants conspired together in a common scheme or plan and that SOR is racially discriminatory. These two allegations in isolation, however, are insufficient to state a Section 1985 conspiracy claim. The Complaint does not contain the required allegation that Defendants were motivated by a shared racial animus and, based upon that animus, acted together to treat Brown differently from another similarly-situated person. The Court cannot insert such allegations for Brown. Thus, while the Complaint raises the spectre of discrimination, it does not plausibly allege that Defendants acted together with the purpose of discriminating against Brown. Because there is no colorable claim that Defendants conspired with the...