Brown v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole

1

Jamie Brown, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, Respondent

No. 312 M.D. 2022

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

February 1, 2024

OPINION NOT REPORTED

Submitted: May 12, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LORI A. DUMAS, JUDGE

Jamie Brown (Brown) has filed a petition for review purporting to seek mandamus relief in this Court's original jurisdiction. Brown contends that the 2020 amendment of the Prisons and Parole Code, Section 6139(a)(3.3),^[1] constitutes a violation of the ex post facto clause of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions,^[2] and he further challenges various procedural aspects of the Pennsylvania Parole Board's (the Board)^[3] February 3, 2022 decision. In response, the Board has filed preliminary objections asserting that it is not a proper party, that Brown failed to exhaust statutory remedies, and by demurrer.^[4] We overrule the Board's preliminary objections averring that it is not a proper party and that Brown failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and we sustain the objection by demurrer. Accordingly, we dismiss Counts I and IV from Brown's petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND ^[5]

In 2001, Brown was convicted of third-degree murder and received a sentence of 20 to 40 years of incarceration.^[6] He is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution Forest (SCI-Forest) in Marienville, Pennsylvania.^[7] He has extensively but unsuccessfully litigated his conviction in both state and federal courts. According to Brown, he has served his minimum sentence and is eligible for parole. However, the Board has repeatedly denied Brown's parole request based on the nature of the charges, his refusal to accept responsibility for the crime, and his lack of remorse.^[8]

The Board denied Brown's application for parole on December 17, 2020. See Notice of Bd. Decision, 12/17/20, at 1. This denial informed him that he could apply for parole one year after the date of the denial. At some point, Brown filed a petition for administrative review because the Board informed Brown that the decision was a parole refusal, and there is no right to request administrative review of a parole decision. See Bd. Correspondence, 3/2/21.

Brown again applied for parole in January 2022. However, the Board responded by letter dated February 3, 2022, and informed him that the Board was not required to consider his application until three years from the date of the prior denial, citing in support 61 Pa.C.S. § 6139(a)(3.3).^{[9], [10]} On February 23, 2022, Brown filed a timely petition with the Board, purporting to seek administrative relief.^[11] It is unclear from the petition for review or the documents provided whether the Board responded to that petition.

Brown then filed this petition for review, asserting four counts: (1) 61 Pa.C.S. § 6139(a)(3.3) constitutes an ex post facto punishment; (2) the Board mailing its decision to a third-party address in Florida violated Department of Corrections policies and deprived him of the right to timely challenge the decision; (3) the Board's decision did not contain findings and reasoning for the denial in violation of "existing laws requiring agencies to place reasons" in writing and that such a failure prevents an appellate tribunal from making an appropriate determination; and (4) the Board's denial unlawfully compelled Brown to continue serving his term, unlawfully extended his sentence, and deprived him of the enjoyment of parole, in violation of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. See Pet. for Rev., ¶¶ 7-21. The Board filed preliminary objections, which we address seriatim.^[12]

II. DISCUSSION

When reviewing preliminary objections to petitions for review in our original jurisdiction, we "must treat as true all well-pleaded, material and relevant facts together with any reasonable inference[s] that can be drawn from those facts." Cnty. of Berks v. Pa. Off. of Open Recs., 204 A.3d 534, 539 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citations omitted). We are not required to accept as true "conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, expressions of opinion or argumentative allegations." See id. "[W]here any doubt exists as to whether the preliminary objections should be sustained, the doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary objections." Pa. State Lodge, Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Dep't of Conservation & Nat. Res., 909 A.2d 413, 416 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

A. Improper Party^[13]

Initially, the Board objects that it is an improper party to this action. See Prelim. Objs., ¶¶ 8-10. According to the Board, it lacks any interest in implementing the law, pointing to the statutory language used in the amended Section 6139, which provides that the Board "shall not be required to consider nor dispose of an application by an offender" for a specified period. See id.

A "demurrer is a preliminary objection to the legal sufficiency of a pleading and raises questions of law[.]" Raynor v. D'Annunzio, 243 A.3d 41, 52 (Pa. 2020) (cleaned up). "When ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to the [petition for review]." Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). The demurrer "admits every well-pleaded fact in the [petition for review] and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom." Id. "Thus, the court may determine only whether, on the basis of the [petitioner's] allegations, he or she possesses a cause of action recognized at law." Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No. 5 by McNesby v. City of Philadelphia, 267 A.3d 531, 541 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). We sustain a demurrer only when the law undoubtedly precludes recovery; if doubt exists, we should overrule the demurrer. Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. 2005).

The interest in enforcing and defending a statute "belongs to the government official who implements the law." Allegheny Sportsmen's League v. Ridge, 790 A.2d 350, 355 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). In this context, our courts have interpreted "implements the law" as the party who has "a duty or obligation" to enforce or defend the challenged statute. See City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 535 A.2d 680, 683 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), aff'd, 559 A.2d 513 (Pa. 1989).

In Allegheny Sportsmen's League, several petitioners filed a petition for review seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the state was violating the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995^[14] by maintaining a handgun sales database. See Allegheny Sportsmen's League, 790 A.2d at 351-52. The petition for review named, as respondents, the Governor of Pennsylvania in his official capacity, the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police in his official capacity, and the Pennsylvania State Police. See id. The Commonwealth filed preliminary objections, asserting that the Governor was not a proper party to the action because, although he is charged with "the broad enforcement responsibility" to ensure that the laws of this Commonwealth are "faithfully executed, the interest in enforcing and defending the act in question belongs to the government official who implements the law." See id. at 355. This Court sustained the objection and dismissed the Governor from the suit, holding that the State Police were charged with administering and enforcing the Firearms Act. See id. Further, the Court noted that the "executive interest" was adequately represented by the State Police Commissioner as an authorized delegate. See id.

Instantly, the Board is an independent administrative board established for the purpose of granting and revoking paroles to certain offenders in the Commonwealth. See 61 Pa.C.S. § 6111(a). The Board consists of nine members appointed by the Governor, presided over by a Board chairperson. See id. §§ 6111-6112. The Board is charged, with respect to offenders, with the exclusive power to (1) "parole and reparole, commit and recommit for violations of parole and to discharge from parole all persons sentenced by any court at any time to imprisonment in a State correctional institution"; (2) establish "special conditions of supervision for paroled offenders"; and (3) "promulgate regulations establishing general conditions of supervision applicable to every paroled offender." See id. § 6132(a)(1)-(4).

Although it is correct that Section 6139(a)(3.3) provides that the Board need not consider an offender's application for three years following its last parole decision, if the offender has been convicted of certain enumerated offenses, the Board retains the exclusive power of enforcement and implementation of parole and the regulations thereof. See id. § 6132(a)(1)-(4). Thus, the Board is the "government official" charged with the ultimate responsibility of enforcing and administering the provisions of the Code relating to parole "as well as defending the act." See Allegheny Sportsmen's League, 790 A.2d at 355. Accordingly, we overrule the objection as stated. Pa. State Lodge, Fraternal Ord. of Police, 909 A.2d at 416.

B. Failure to Exhaust Statutory Remedies

Next, pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(7), the Board objects that Brown has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Prelim. Objs., ¶¶ 11-13. According to the Board, the plain language of the Code provides the Board with six months to dispose of "an application." See id. (citing 61 Pa.C.S. § 6139(a)(7)).^[15]The Board suggests that because six months had not elapsed between Brown's filing of his petition for administrative relief on February 23, 2022, and his petition for review to this Court, filed May 27, 2022, Brown has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.^[16] See id. ¶¶ 11-13.

This...