Brown v. Roanoke Rehab. & Healthcare Ctr.

586 F.Supp.3d 1171

Lucious BROWN, Plaintiff,

v.ROANOKE REHABILITATION & HEALTHCARE CENTER, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 3:21-CV-00590-RAH

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division.

Signed February 22, 2022

Cynthia Forman Wilkinson, Wilkinson Law Firm PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Cecily Linne Kaffer, The Kullman Firm, Mobile, AL, Mary Rebecca Cooper, Pro Hac Vice, The Kullman Firm, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

R. AUSTIN HUFFAKER, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic has ushered in a new wave of legal issues, not the least of which relate to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. This case presents one such issue at the intersection of COVID-19 and the ADA. The question here is one several courts in this Circuit have recently confronted:

whether COVID-19 can be a disability under the ADA, and if so, has the plaintiff sufficiently pled a COVID-19 related disability?

In the summer of 2020, during the early days of the pandemic, Plaintiff Lucious Brown was terminated for failing to report to work while she was in the 13th day of her 14-day COVID-19 isolation and while she continued to suffer from severe weakness, fatigue, brain fog, high blood pressure, cough, difficulty breathing, fever, and swollen eyes, all of which she alleges were caused by COVID-19. Brown subsequently filed this suit against her employers, Roanoke Rehabilitation & Healthcare Center (Roanoke Rehab) and Ball Healthcare Services, Inc. (Ball Healthcare), for violations of the ADA, race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the tort of outrage under Alabama law.

Pending before the Court is the Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16), which seeks dismissal of Brown's ADA claim. Upon reviewing the Amended Complaint and the parties’ respective submissions on the Motion, the Court concludes that the Motion is due to be DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

From September 16, 2019 to July 13, 2020, Brown was employed as a certified nursing assistant for the Defendants. (Doc. 12 at 3.)

On June 29, 2020, Brown went to her physician to be tested for COVID-19 because she was suffering from "severe weakness, fatigue, brain fog, high blood pressure, cough, difficulty breathing, fever, and swollen eyes." (Id. at 3.) While she awaited her test results, her physician directed her to self-isolate. (Id. ) Two days later, on July 1, 2020, Brown's test results came back positive for COVID-19. (Id.) Brown provided the physician's instructions and her positive COVID-19 test result to the Defendants. (Id. at 3–4.)

At the time, the Defendants maintained a policy that required a 14-day isolation period for any employee who tested positive for COVID-19. (Id. at 4.) This policy was consistent with then-CDC guidelines which also suggested a 14-day isolation period. (Id. at 5.) With the July 1 positive test, in compliance with the Defendants’ policy and the CDC guidelines, Brown was to isolate until July 14, 2020.

Despite this, Brown's supervisor, Rebecca Farr, called Brown on July 7, 2020—seven days into Brown's 14-day isolation—and instructed her to report to work to be tested again for COVID-19. (Id. at 4.) Brown responded that she was still under isolation, per her physician's instructions, and that she continued to experience the same severe symptoms. (Id. ) Although not clear from the Amended Complaint, Brown apparently remained in isolation, refusing to report to work to take the COVID-19 test.

On July 10, 2020, Farr contacted Brown again and repeated the instruction that Brown was to report to work to take a COVID-19 test. (Id. ) Once again, Brown told Farr that she was still suffering from COVID-19 symptoms. (Id. at 5.) And again, Brown remained in isolation and did not report to work to take the COVID-19 test.

The following day, Farr contacted Brown for a third time. This time, Farr informed Brown that if she did not return to work on July 13, 2020, the Defendants would consider Brown "as having voluntarily quit." (Id. )

Despite Farr's third and final instruction to return to work, Brown did not return to work on July 13, 2020 because, as she alleges, she still suffered from "severe weakness, fatigue, brain fog, high blood pressure, cough, difficulty breathing, fever, and swollen eyes." (Id. ) Brown was terminated that day, the 13th day of her 14-day isolation period. (Id. )

The day after her termination, because she continued to suffer from the same symptoms, Brown's physician re-tested her for COVID-19. (Id. ) Brown once again tested positive. (Id. ) She then filed this suit on September 3, 2021.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Motion is filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court accepts Brown's factual allegations as true, Hishon v. King & Spalding , 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984), and construes the operative complaint in Brown's favor, Duke v. Cleland , 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993). In analyzing the sufficiency of the pleadings, the Court is guided by a two-prong approach: (1) the Court is not bound to accept conclusory statements of the elements of a cause of action and (2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to entitlement to relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

"[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," but instead the complaint must contain "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

IV. DISCUSSION

The Defendants’ Motion seeks dismissal of Brown's ADA claim. In this claim, Brown alleges that she suffered from a disability, or was regarded as disabled due to having a severe case of COVID-19; that she requested a reasonable accommodation in that she be granted temporary leave due to her positive COVID-19 test and associated symptoms; that her request for accommodation was denied; and that she was terminated following her third refusal to return to work despite still experiencing symptoms and following an isolation protocol. (Doc. 12 at 6–9.)

To sufficiently plead a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Brown must allege (1) that she has a disability, (2) that she was qualified for the job, and (3) that her employer is a covered entity and discriminated against her because of the disability. See Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found. , 789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Reed v. Heil Co. , 206 F.3d 1055, 1061 (11th Cir. 2000).

Only the first element of Brown's prima facie case, whether she was disabled or regarded as disabled within the meaning of the ADA, is contested here. As the Defendants couch it, "a positive Covid-19 test and the symptoms Brown alleges are not sufficient to show that she was disabled under the meaning of the ADA, or that she was regarded as disabled." (Doc. 16 at 3.)

The ADA defines "disability" as either (1) "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;" (2) "a record of such an impairment;" or (3) "being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).

The ADA directs courts to construe "disability" in "favor of broad coverage of individuals" to the "maximum extent permitted by the terms" of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). Accordingly, courts have noted that the bar to be considered "disabled" under the ADA is not a high one. See, e.g., Mazzeo v. Color Resols. Int'l, LLC , 746 F.3d 1264, 1268 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that Congress instructed that "the establishment of coverage under the ADA should not be overly complex nor difficult").

Here, Brown argues that she has sufficiently pled the first and third definitions of "disability;" that she had an actual disability and that her employer regarded her as having a disability. On both accounts, Brown's pleadings sufficiently allege a claim that plausibly entitles her to relief.

1. Actual Disability

Brown first alleges that she had an actual disability under the ADA. Brown alleges that she told the Defendants that she was COVID-19 positive, that she suffered from severe weakness, fatigue, brain fog, high blood pressure, cough, difficulty breathing, fever, and swollen eyes, and that CDC-guidance and company policy required that she isolate for 14 days.

To have an actual disability under the ADA, an individual must have "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). "[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing , learning, reading, concentrating, thinking , communicating, and working. " 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (emphasis added).

While the Defendants argue that Brown failed to allege how her COVID-19 symptoms "affected a ‘major life activity," and therefore has not sufficiently plead an actual disability, (Doc. 16 at 5), the Court concludes that Brown has presented sufficient facts to allege that she had physical or mental impairments from COVID-19 and that those impairments substantially limited recognized major life activities.

To begin, recent guidance by the Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Justice indicates that certain forms of COVID-19 may be considered a disability under the ADA....