Brown v. Rotenberg

268 F.Supp.3d 445

Abdullah-rafa BROWN, Plaintiff,

v.William ROTENBERG, Advanced Manufacturing Career Navigator, Finger Lakes WIC Board, Lee Koslow, Technical Assistance and Training Manager, and Bradley Stalker, Educational Recruiter, in their personal and professional capacity duty equally and independently as agents of Rochester Works, Rochester, New York, County of Monroe, Defendants.

6:15–CV–6678 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed August 3, 2017

Abdullah-rafa Brown, Rochester, NY, pro se.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Abdullah-rafa Brown ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting constitutional violations arising out of the Defendants' purported failure to pay all of his tuition for classes at Monroe Community College, which caused the transcript of his grades to be withheld. (Dkt. 10).

This Court previously directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, (Dkt. 7), and Plaintiff has done so. (Dkt. 10). Plaintiff's amended complaint must be screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Also before the Court are Plaintiff's motions to amend his complaint to: increase the amount of damages claimed (Dkt. 11); add factual allegations (Dkt. 12); add a punitive damages claim (Dkt. 13); and file an exhibit (Dkt. 15).

For the reasons stated below, the amended complaint is dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(b), and the motions to amend are denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND ¹

On July 12, 2012, Plaintiff attended a seminar during which he learned about the opportunity to enroll at Monroe Community College ("MCC"), with financial support in the form of a grant. (Dkt. 10 at 3). Plaintiff began to discuss the opportunity with Defendant William Rotenberg ("Rotenberg"), a Career Navigator with Rochester Works. (Id. ). Rotenberg told Plaintiff he had to only follow Defendant Bradley Stalker's ("Stalker") instructions to enroll. (Id. ).

On August 17, 2012, Plaintiff enrolled at MCC "in the presence of... Stalker." (Id. ). Stalker instructed Plaintiff to apply for financial aid. (Id. at 4). Stalker also informed Plaintiff that he "was entitled to a grant of $2,100.00 to cover [P]laintiff's college expenses." (Id. ). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants received money to pay Plaintiff's grant on November 10, 2012, and made a partial payment to MCC of $333.33. (Id. ). This left Plaintiff with a deficiency in the tuition owed to MCC of approximately $1,722.00. (Id. ). Plaintiff asked Stalker on December 12, 2012, to pay the balance of the tuition owed, but his request was refused. (Id. ). The tuition balance was never paid, and MCC froze Plaintiff's grades for the Fall 2012 semester due to the tuition deficiency. (Id. ).

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, 29 U.S.C. § 2801 (since repealed and replaced, see 29 U.S.C. § 3343 ) (hereinafter "WIA"). (Id. at 4, 5 (referencing WIA)). Plaintiff further claims violations of his constitutional due process rights. (Id. at 2).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint Must Be Dismissed

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court must dismiss an action if it determines that it "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In evaluating the complaint, the Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations and must draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Larkin v. Savage , 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003). Moreover, "a court is obliged to construe [pro se ] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations." McEachin v. McGuinnis , 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004).

Nevertheless, even pleadings submitted pro se must meet the notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wynder v. McMahon , 360 F.3d 73, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2004). "Specific facts are not necessary," and the plaintiff "need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ " Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Boykin v. KeyCorp , 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that, "even after Twombly , dismissal of a pro se claim as insufficiently pleaded is appropriate only in the most unsustainable of cases").

A. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. " Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who deprives an individual of federally guaranteed rights ‘under color’ of state law."

Filarsky v. Delia , 566 U.S. 377, 132 S.Ct. 1657, 1661, 182 L.Ed.2d 662 (2012) (quoting § 1983 ). To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the challenged conduct was "committed by a person acting under color of state law," and (2) that the conduct "deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). " Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999).

In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983 against an individual defendant, a plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of the defendant in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Farid v. Ellen , 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010). A claim which fails to demonstrate a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation is subject to sua sponte dismissal. Sealey v. Giltner , 116 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1997).

1. Claims against Defendant Koslow Must Be Dismissed

Plaintiff's complaint does not include any factual allegations to demonstrate personal involvement of Defendant Lee Koslow ("Koslow") in the alleged constitutional violations. (See Dkt. 10). Plaintiff has failed to allege how Koslow was personally involved in the denial of an additional payment to MCC. Plaintiff's original complaint also failed to include any specific factual allegations against Koslow, which led to this Court previously dismissing claims against Koslow. (Dkt. 7 at 7). Plaintiff has not remedied this deficiency in his amended complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Koslow are dismissed for lack of personal involvement. See Farid, 593 F.3d at 249.

2. Plaintiff's Due Process Claims

Even assuming that Rotenberg and Stalker were acting under color of law, Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim. To do so, a plaintiff must allege that he possessed a protected liberty or property interest, and that he was deprived of that interest without due process. Bedoya v. Coughlin, 91 F.3d 349, 351–52 (2d Cir. 1996) ; Frazier v. Coughlin , 81 F.3d 313, 316 (2d Cir. 1996). "The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and ‘those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.’ " Victory v. Pataki, 814 F.3d 47, 59 (2d Cir. 2016), as amended (Feb. 24, 2016) (citation omitted).

In general, to have a property interest in a government benefit, "a person clearly must have more than an abstract need for it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Such an entitlement is not created by the Constitution itself but rather " ‘by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source...’ " In considering [an independent source], we focus initially on the relevant statute, regulation, or contract establishing eligibility for the government benefit at issue.

Plaza Health Labs., Inc. v. Perales , 878 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff makes no allegation as to what protected liberty or property interest of which he was deprived. (See Dkt. 10). Plaintiff only claims that Defendants failed to pay his MCC tuition. Reading Plaintiff's allegations liberally, he links the failure to pay with an alleged requirement under the WIA that his tuition be paid. This is not sufficient to show a property interest. The WIA provided that "nothing in [the WIA] shall be construed to provide an individual with an entitlement to a service...." 29 U.S.C. § 2945(12). As Plaintiff has no entitlement to payment under the WIA, he has no legitimate claim of a protected property interest. Thus, he fails to state a due process claim.

B. Plaintiff's Claim under the WIA

Plaintiff also claims that Defendants violated the WIA by failing to pay for Plaintiff's tuition with grant money allegedly earmarked for Plaintiff. (Dkt. 10 at 3). Plaintiff points to no particular section of the WIA that was violated, nor the basis for a private right of action under the WIA. (See id. ). Plaintiff notes that his grant was offered due to his status as a veteran. The WIA provided for the administration of grants specifically for veterans. See 29 U.S.C. § 2913. Nothing in this provision suggests a private right of action to enforce the payment of a grant. See id. The WIA provides a right of judicial review for any decision by the Secretary of Labor which declines or only conditionally approves an award of financial assistance under the WIA, 29 U.S.C. § 2937, but Plaintiff does not challenge a decision of the Secretary. He merely challenges a decision by Rochester Works, a purported...