Brown v. S. Nev. Adult Mental Health Servs.

JAMES FLAVY COY BROWN, Plaintiff(s), v. SOUTHERN NEVADA ADULT MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, Defendant(s).

2:13-CV-1039 JCM (PAL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

DATED February 12, 2014

ORDER

Presently before the court is defendants Southern Nevada Adult Mental Health Services, Chelsea Szklany, Mike Willden, Richard Whitley, Leon Ravin, Anurag Gupta, and Kyle Devine's ("state defendants") motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 47). Plaintiff James Flavy Coy Brown filed an opposition (doc. # 49), and state defendants filed a reply (doc. # 49).

Also before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Linda J. White. (Doc. # 51). Plaintiff filed an opposition to this motion. (Doc. # 53). Because this motion incorporates the arguments contained in state defendants' motion to dismiss, the court need not discuss it in the instant order and it will be denied as moot.

Also before the court is defendants' prior motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 10). After this motion was filed, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, (doc. # 44), and thus that motion will be denied as moot.

I. Background

This case revolves around allegations that plaintiff and other similarly situated former patients at Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hospital ("Rawson-Neal") were involuntarily discharged by defendants and instructed to travel out-of-state destinations where defendants allegedly knew they would be unable to obtain proper treatment, care, and housing. Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent were allegedly given anti-psychotic medication before they were discharged from the facility.

Allegedly Rawson-Neal staff physically escorted defendant and other patients from the facility to waiting taxis bound for the Greyhound Bus Station in Las Vegas, Nevada. They were directed to travel on pre-paid tickets which had been previously ordered and paid for by defendant Southern Nevada Adult Mental Health Services ("SNAMHS").

Specifically, plaintiff claims that he was admitted to Rawson-Neal on February 9, 2013, due to psychosis and suicidal thoughts. The staff at Rawson-Neal cared for plaintiff for approximately two days, during which they administered Thorazine, Cymbalta, and Klonopin. On February 11, 2013, the staff discharged plaintiff involuntarily, physically escorted him from the facility, and took him to a taxi which transported him to the Greyhound bus station.

Prior to his discharge, the staff allegedly gave plaintiff a pre-paid ticket to Sacramento, California, and instructed him to travel there but did not make arrangements for psychiatric care or secure assistance of any kind upon his arrival. The staff is also alleged to have given plaintiff enough medication to last for the approximately fifteen-hour bus ride.

After plaintiff arrived in Sacramento, he was taken by the police to a local homeless service center, which could provide no housing, medical treatment, or transportation. He was then directed to the University of California at Davis Medical Center's emergency department which, after three days, arranged for plaintiff to be treated at a local psychiatric facility. From there he was discharged to a group home in Sacramento.

Plaintiff now claims that defendants' conduct violated the Eighth, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff also argues that these actions by defendantsviolated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and constituted "patient dumping" under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. Plaintiff also asserts claims of negligence, professional negligence, malpractice, negligent hiring, and breach of fiduciary duty under Nevada state law.

In the instant motion, defendants request that the court dismiss all of plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

II. Legal standard

A court may dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide "[a] short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands "more than labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citation omitted).

"Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citation omitted).

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. at 1949.

Second, the court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 1949.

Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has "alleged-but not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id.(internal quotations omitted). When the allegations in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, plaintiff's claim must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

The Ninth Circuit addressed post-Iqbal pleading standards in Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The Starr court stated, "First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively. Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation." Id.

III. Discussion

a. Constitutional claims

"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citation omitted).

1. Cruel and unusual punishment

In his first claim, plaintiff alleges a violation of the Eight Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Eighth Amendment applies "only after the [s]tate has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions. . . . [T]he [s]tate does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-672, n. 40 (1977).

Plaintiff argues that the court should take an unprecedented view of the requirements of the Eighth Amendment, putting forward the perspective that the Rawson-Neal staff "banished" plaintiff by discharging him involuntarily. Indeed, this view stretches the Eighth Amendment beyond its previously recognized limits, and would effectively require hospitals to indefinitely provide free careto all patients to avoid "punishing" them by forcing them out into the harsh existence of the real world.

The court refuses to adopt such a view, and instead will adhere to clearly established precedent holding that the Eighth Amendment applies only to criminal punishments or directly analogous state conduct. See id. at 669. Therefore, the court will dismiss plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim without prejudice.

2. Unreasonable seizure

In the second claim, plaintiff alleges a violation of the Fourth Amendment's right against unreasonable "seizure" due to defendants' actions of discharging plaintiff, escorting him to a taxi, and arranging for him to travel to Sacramento. To establish a that a "seizure" has occurred pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that he was (1) subjected to a use of physical force or a demonstration of state authority and (2) that he reasonably believed he was not free to leave. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991).

In this case, plaintiff fails to show that defendants utilized physical force or a demonstration of authority by providing him with transportation to Sacramento. The cases cited by plaintiff address circumstances in which individuals were subjected to direct commands from individuals bearing the coercive power of the state, including police officers, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), teachers, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009), and social workers, Rogers v. County of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2007).

In the instant case, the coercive power of the state was not imposed upon plaintiff. There is no allegation that plaintiff was threatened with punishment if he did not travel to Sacramento. Indeed, the complaint does not even allege that anyone from Rawson-Neal accompanied plaintiff to the bus station.

Accordingly, because there was no direct command from an individual bearing state coercive authority, nor threat of punishment if plaintiff did not comply, the court finds that neither of the criteria for a seizure are met in this case. Accordingly, plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim will be dismissed without prejudice.

3. Equal protection

Plaintiff argues that state defendants violated the Equal Protection...