Brown v. Schnurr

1

CHRISTOPHER DAVID BROWN, Plaintiff, v. DANIEL SCHNURR, et al., Defendants.

No. 21-3105-JAR-GEB

United States District Court, D. Kansas

August 24, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JULIE A. ROBINSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Christopher David Brown, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil rights action against Kansas Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) officials related to a September 13, 2018 incident at the Hutchinson Correctional Facility (“HCF”). Highly summarized, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Todd Swenson, an HCF officer, intentionally closed a food pass door on Plaintiff's hand and arm, causing him injuries, and denied him his food. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jeffrey Pettijohn, also an HCF Officer, witnessed the incident but refused to help. He further alleges that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by interfering in the grievance process. The Honorable Sam A. Crow screened the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and allowed Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint or show cause why the case should not be dismissed based on several deficiencies.^[1] On January 3, 2022, after considering several motions and notices filed by Plaintiff, Judge Crow dismissed Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Daniel Schnurr, the Warden at HCF, and Carman Baynham, a nurse who treated him at HCF.^[2] Judge Crow permitted Plaintiff to move forward with his federal and state law claims against Swenson and Pettijohn.

Now before the Court is Swenson and Pettijohn's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Doc 25). The Court also considers two motions filed by Plaintiff Motion Requesting the Court Issue an Order to Show Cause why KDOC Officials/Employee's [sic] Continue to Subject to Numerous Forms of Retaliation for Plaintiff Exercising his First Amendment Rights and to Explain Why the Court Shouldn't Issue a Temporary Preliminary Injunction and/or Protective Order (Doc. 42); and Motion to Correct the Record (Doc. 46). The motions are fully briefed and the Court is prepared to rule. As described more fully below Plaintiff's motion seeking an order to show cause regarding injunctive relief is denied, Defendant's motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment is granted, and Plaintiff's motion to correct the record is moot.

I. Motion Seeking Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff has repeatedly filed documents in this case claiming that the named Defendants and unnamed KDOC officials engaged in and continue to engage in First Amendment retaliation against him.^[3] In his motion seeking a “protective order” or an order to show cause why injunctive relief should not be granted, he claims that KDOC officials regularly retaliate against him for exercising his First Amendment rights to file legal claims and complain about his prison conditions by destroying or losing his grievance forms, denying him medication, placing him with cellmates who KDOC officials know to be dangerous to Plaintiff, lodging false disciplinary actions against him, disconnecting his phone lines during personal calls, and physically harming him. He fears that KDOC officials plan to transfer him to a different facility that will be “worse off than Plaintiff is currently.”^[4] And his motion discusses grievance forms he filed on May 17, 2022, for which he was retaliated against by being placed in a cell by himself. Plaintiff asks the Court to require “KDOC officials” to show cause why the Court should not issue a “Temporary Preliminary Injunction and/or Protective Order” due to First Amendment retaliation.^[5]

“The limited purpose of a preliminary injunction ‘is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.'”^[6] “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”^[7] This standard “requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.”^[8]

The Court denies Plaintiff's request for an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction, or order of protection, should not be issued to prevent ongoing First Amendment retaliation. Injunctive relief is a “drastic and extraordinary remedy.”^[9] Accordingly, the movant must demonstrate the request is related to the conduct that gives rise to the underlying claims in the Complaint.^[10] Plaintiff's underlying claims arise out of an incident that occurred at HCF on September 13, 2018, when Swenson allegedly intentionally closed a food pass door on Plaintiff's hand and arm, causing him injuries, and denied him his meal. Although Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Defendants “continue destroying Plf's Form-9's/official/legal papers regarding this incident as a retaliatory act,”^[11] his motion seeking injunctive relief discusses conduct by officials other than Swenson and Pettijohn and relates to incidents that occurred after this Complaint was filed. Because the motion seeks relief that is unrelated to the underlying claims in this case, the Court cannot grant the injunctive relief Plaintiff requests or issue an order to show cause why such injunctive relief should not be granted.

II. Federal Claims

Swenson and Pettijohn, the remaining Defendants in this case, move to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment on Plaintiff's federal claims under § 1983 based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants move to dismiss under the Eleventh Amendment to the extent Plaintiff alleges official-capacity claims against Swenson and Pettijohn. A suit for damages against a state official in his official capacity is the treated as a suit against the state and therefore subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity.^[12]When sovereign immunity applies, it deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby shielding states from suit.^[13] The Court finds that Defendants' motion to dismiss the officialcapacity claims against Swenson and Pettijohn is moot. The Complaint alleges federal claims against these Defendants in their individual capacities only, and Plaintiff confirms in his response that he intended to sue them in their individual capacities only. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply.

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Defendants rely on matters outside the pleadings to support their exhaustion of administrative remedies affirmative defense, so the Court applies the summary judgment standard in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).^[14] Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.^[15] In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.^[16] “There is no genuine issue of material fact unless the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”^[17] A fact is “material” if, under the applicable substantive law, “it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim.”^[18] “An issue of fact is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party' on the issue.”^[19]

Finally, summary judgment is not a “disfavored procedural shortcut”; on the contrary, it is an important procedure “designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”^[20] In responding to a motion for summary judgment, “a party cannot rest on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial.”^[21]

B. Uncontroverted Facts

The following facts are either uncontroverted or viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the nonmoving party. Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he was the victim of excessive force on September 13, 2018, when Swenson purposefully closed a food pass door on Plaintiff's hand and arm causing injury, pain, and suffering. Plaintiff alleges that Pettijohn witnessed what happened and, despite Plaintiff asking for his help, did not intervene to help him.

On September 21, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a Personal Injury Claim Form pursuant to IMPP 01-118D, requesting $500 for his injuries. He recited the events of September 13, 2018, and named Swenson and Pettijohn. Pettijohn signed this form on September 24, 2018, and the warden received it on October 1, 2018. Pettijohn sent a memo to the warden on November 26, 2018, explaining that there was an investigation into the incident and it was determined that “Swenson did in fact use excessive force in this situation,” but “the situation was handled at a supervisory level.”^[22] The warden disapproved the personal injury claim on March 14, 2019, and the Secretary of Corrections disapproved the claim on March 25, 2019.

Plaintiff submitted several request forms in late 2018 and early 2019 asking for the status of his Personal Injury Claim Form. The form that included the denials of his injury payment request, was returned to him on April 17, 2019.

On April 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Inmate Grievance Form complaining that his personal injury claim was denied and asking for a review of security footage from September 13, 2018. At the top of the form, Plaintiff wrote “Special Kinds of Problems.”^[23] He argued in the grievance that even if Swenson's use of excessive force was handled at the supervisory level, he has...