Brown v. State

311 A.3d 424

261 Md.App. 83

Levar Montez BROWN

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 2103 Sept Term, 2022

Appellate Court of Maryland.

March 1, 2024

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Case No. C-02-CR-22-000861, Michael E. Malone, Judge

Argued by Thomas E. Robins, Asst. Public Defender (Natasha M. Dartigue, Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellant

Argued by Gary E. O’Connor, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Anthony G. Brown, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellee

Argued before: Graeff, Albright, Timothy E. Meredith (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Graeff, J.

Levar Brown, appellant, was charged in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County with possession with the intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, as well as handgun and driving offenses. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to suppress,, which the court denied. Appellant then entered a conditional plea of guilty on the charge of possession with the intent to distribute, and the State entered a nolle prosequi on each of the remaining counts.¹

On appeal, appellant presents one question for this Court’s review, which we have revised slightly, as follows:

Did the court err in denying the motion to suppress the crack cocaine and handgun found in appellant’s vehicle?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 19, 2023, the court held a suppression hearing. Officer Wesley Harris, a member of the Anne Arundel County Police Department, testified that, on June 11, 2021, at approximately 3:00 a.m., he was on patrol in Severn, Maryland, and he saw a silver Infiniti sedan that did not have its registration light illuminated. He activated his emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. He did not observe the vehicle commit any other traffic-related infractions; his sole purpose for initiating the traffic stop was because the vehicle’s registration plate was not illuminated.²

The vehicle pulled into a residential area and backed into a parking space. Officer Harris observed the occupant, whom he identified as appellant, exit the vehicle. The recording from Officer Harris’s body-worn camera was played, and it showed that Officer Harris instructed appellant to remain in the vehicle. Appellant kept walking toward Officer Harris and stated: "I don’t have my license." When Officer Harris reiterated that appellant should remain in the vehicle, appellant "took off" on foot. Officer Harris ran after appellant. Appellant then stumbled and fell, and, with some difficulty, Officer Harris placed appellant in handcuffs. Officer Harris questioned appellant’s actions, stating: "All this for a fucking license? Are you stupid?" Appellant responded: "Because I don’t want to go to jail, man."

Officer Harris escorted appellant back to his patrol vehicle. The body-worn camera recording reflects that the following colloquy then occurred:

OFFICER HARRIS: You ran from me because you was [sic] drinking. I can smell it on your breath. How much have you had to drink tonight?

APPELLANT: A lot, man.

OFFICER HARRIS: What is "a lot"?

APPELLANT: Like, a half (indiscernible.)

***

OFFICER HARRIS: Half a pint of what?

APPELLANT: D’usse.

Officer Harris testified that, based on his "training, knowledge, and experience as a police officer," he knew that D’ussé is a cognac, an alcoholic beverage. At that point, appellant was placed under arrest for driving under the influence.

On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony that Officer Harris did not conduct any field sobriety tests. Appellant did not have bloodshot eyes or slurred speech, and he was coherent and alert during their interaction.

Officer Harris returned to appellant’s vehicle to conduct a search "for subsequent evidence of the driving under the influence." Prior to conducting the search, officers looked through the windows using their flashlights. Officer Harris did not observe any open containers, cups, or liquids inside the vehicle at that time, and when he opened the vehicle’s door, he did not detect "a smell of alcohol emanating from the car."

Officer Harris then searched appellant’s vehicle. He found a plastic bag containing 71 smaller plastic baggies, which contained an "off-white rocky substance" that he knew, based on his "training, knowledge, and experience," to be crack cocaine. Another officer found a handgun inside the glove compartment.

On January 3, 2023, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging that Officer Harris’s search of the vehicle was unconstitutional and did not fall within the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant doctrine. Relying principally on Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), appellant argued that, because he was "handcuffed and secured well before the search" and "was approximately 7–10 feet away" from the vehicle, Officer Harris could not have reasonably believed that evidence of driving under the influence might be found in the vehicle. Appellant also argued at the hearing that the arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol was not lawful. Appellant sought to suppress all. evidence found during the search.

The State argued that Officer Harris had probable cause to arrest appellant for driving under the influence of alcohol, and the subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle, incident to that arrest, was lawful. Citing Taylor v. State, 224 Md. App. 476, 121 A.3d 167 (2015), aff'd, 448 Md. 242, 137 A.3d 1029 (2016), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 1216, 137 S.Ct. 1373, 197 L.Ed.2d 553 (2017), the State argued that, "when someone is arrested under the suspicion that they’re driving while impaired or driving under the influence of alcohol, there is pretty much always going to be reason to believe that evidence of the crime would be found in the vehicle; namely, alcoholic beverages."

The court denied appellant’s motion to suppress. After finding that there was a permissible stop based on a violation of the transportation code, the court discussed the validity of the arrest. It found probable cause for the arrest based on the facts that Officer Harris smelled alcohol, that appellant told him he had been drinking, and that appellant fled from the vehicle. The court then addressed whether "the vehicle contain[ed] evidence of the offense of the arrest." It found that it was "reasonable for the search to occur" based on "the smell of alcohol, the statement that – what had been consumed." Accordingly, it denied the motion to suppress.

This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1–4] This Court has described the applicable standard of review for a motion to suppress as follows:

When reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we are "limited to the record developed at the suppression hearing." Moats v. State, 455 Md. 682, 694, 168 A.3d 952 (2017). "We review the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party" Thornton v. State, 465 Md. 122, 139, 214 A.3d 34 (2019). As a "mixed question of law and fact[,]" we accept "the hearing court’s finding of fact unless they are clearly erroneous" but "review the hearing judge’s legal conclusions de novo[.]" Id. (citations omitted). Thus, we independently evaluate without deference to the circuit court whether a police officer’s conduct violated the constitutional rights of the defendant. Sizer v. State, 456 Md. 350, 362, 174 A.3d 326 (2017).

Rodriguez v. State, 258 Md. App. 104, 114–15, 295 A.3d 658 (2023) (alteration in original).

DISCUSSION

[5, 6] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment, however, does not prohibit all searches; it proscribes only those that are unreasonable. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). Thus, in determining whether a search is constitutional, a court must determine if it is reasonable. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) (" ‘[T]he ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness.’ ") (quoting Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995)).

[7] The general rule is that " ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ " Gant, 556 U.S. at 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). Accord Rodriguez, 258 Md. App. at 115, 295 A.3d 658. Appellant contends that the warrantless search of his vehicle was unconstitutional, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

[8, 9] As the State notes, however, one exception to the warrant requirement "is a search incident to a valid arrest." Taylor, 448 Md. at 246, 137 A.3d 1029. There are two steps involved in determining the reasonableness of a search incident to a warrantless arrest. First, we must determine whether there was a valid arrest, i.e., did the police have probable cause to support the arrest. See Lewis v. State, 470 Md. 1, 20, 233 A.3d 86 (2020); Donaldson v. State, 416 Md. 467, 481, 7 A.3d 84 (2010); Rodriguez, 258 Md. App. at 120–21, 295 A.3d 658. Second, if the first step is satisfied, we determine whether the subsequent search was a proper search incident to arrest.

Appellant contends that the State failed in its proof for each of these steps. As explained below, we disagree.

I. Probable Cause for Appellant’s Arrest

[10] Appellant contends that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress the items seized from the vehicle because Officer Harris did not have probable cause to support his arrest. He asserts that the only two...