Brown v. State

895 N.W.2d 612

Jerrell Michael BROWN, Appellant,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

A15-1402

A16-0648

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: May 24, 2017

Jerrell Michael Brown, Stillwater, Minnesota, pro se.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

OPINION

LILLEHAUG, Justice.

On March 8, 2010, a jury found appellant Jerrell Michael Brown guilty of first-degree murder committed for the benefit of a gang. We affirmed Brown's conviction on direct appeal, as well as the postconviction court's denial of his first petition for postconviction relief. State v. Brown , 815 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2012). The day before the postconviction statute of limitations expired (December 9, 2014), he filed his second petition. Over the next six months, he filed various addenda and attachments to his second petition. Brown also filed a third petition on October 23, 2015, wherein he raised additional claims and moved for discovery. By motion filed November 25, 2015, Brown also requested re-testing of certain trial evidence. The postconviction court denied both petitions and Brown's other requests without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that his claims were each untimely filed or procedurally barred, or failed on the merits. We affirm.

FACTS

On August 29, 2008, Darius Miller was fatally shot outside a nightclub in downtown Minneapolis. After a police investigation, the State presented evidence against Brown to a grand jury, which indicted Brown on four counts of murder, all on an accomplice-liability theory: (1) first-degree murder, Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1 (2016), 609.185(a)(1) (2016) ; (2) first-degree murder committed for the benefit of a gang, Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.185(a)(1), 609.229, subd. 2 (2016) ; (3) second-degree intentional murder, Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2016) ; and (4) second-degree intentional murder committed for the benefit of a gang, Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, 609.19, subd. 1(1), 609.229, subd. 2.

The case went to trial. The State presented evidence that a bullet casing found next to Miller was fired from the same firearm that Brown admitted to firing in connection with a June 2008 reckless-discharge conviction. The State also presented surveillance video from the nightclubs surrounding the murder scene, eyewitness testimony describing the shooter (matching Brown), testimony from two of Brown's fellow inmates at Hennepin County Jail that Brown had confessed to the murder, and more. In total, the State presented testimony from twenty-five witnesses: six Minneapolis Police Department officers, eight civilian eyewitnesses, four witnesses related to the 2008 reckless-discharge conviction, two inmates, two forensic experts, a medical examiner, a jail records custodian, and Miller's mother.

A jury found Brown guilty of all four counts of murder. The trial court convicted Brown of first-degree murder committed for the benefit of a gang.

Brown filed a direct appeal. He also filed his first petition for postconviction relief, which was denied, appealed, and consolidated by this court with his direct appeal. We affirmed Brown's conviction on direct appeal, as well as the postconviction court's denial of his first petition for postconviction relief. Brown , 815 N.W.2d at 622. Brown then filed a petition with the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was denied on December 10, 2012.

On December 9, 2014, Brown filed his second petition for postconviction relief. In that petition, Brown alleged that D.M.—a State witness who testified at trial that Brown confessed to the crime while the two were in Hennepin County Jail—had recanted.

On December 26, 2014, a Minneapolis Police Sergeant visited D.M. at the Faribault Correctional Facility to discuss the alleged recantation. D.M. explained to the sergeant that Brown had written multiple letters threatening D.M. if he did not recant. D.M. also said that Brown's postconviction attorney had contacted D.M. and visited him in prison three times, and had coerced D.M. to provide written answers to a questionnaire that would help exonerate Brown. D.M. told the sergeant that he answered all of the questions as Brown's attorney instructed because D.M. was told that his answers were not legally binding. D.M. then told the sergeant that his trial testimony was the truth and signed a notarized affidavit to that effect.

The sergeant informed D.M. that the State had moved to vacate several plea agreements between D.M. and the State—in cases unrelated to the events surrounding Brown's case—wherein D.M. had promised to provide truthful testimony at Brown's trial. The sergeant told D.M. that the whole incident would hopefully be moot because D.M. was signing the notarized affidavit stating that D.M.'s trial testimony was the truth.

Over the next several months, Brown filed several documents raising claims that were not raised in his second petition for postconviction relief. On March 6, 2015, Brown filed an "Addendum to Petition for Postconviction Relief," dated February 12, 2015. In that addendum, Brown raised a new allegation that another State witness, A.A., provided false eyewitness testimony. On April 10, 2015, Brown filed a second addendum, this time raising new claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and requesting discovery of surveillance video evidence from the trial. On April 15, 2015, Brown filed an affidavit from D.S. allegedly supporting Brown's claim regarding A.A. On June 5, 2015, Brown filed another affidavit, this one from L.J., allegedly supporting Brown's claim regarding A.A.

On July 23, 2015, the postconviction court denied all relief, including Brown's request for an evidentiary hearing. Brown appealed to this court, but the appeal was stayed on Brown's motion because he planned to file a third petition for postconviction relief.

On October 23, 2015, Brown filed his third petition for postconviction relief, raising new claims and expanding on other claims previously raised in the second petition and its addenda. Specifically, Brown alleged prosecutorial misconduct regarding the State's dealings with D.M., false testimony by the State's firearms expert at trial, and additional grounds for his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. On November 25, 2015, he requested re-testing of bullets that had been found at the crime scene. The postconviction court again denied all relief, including his request for an evidentiary hearing.

Brown appealed to our court. We consolidated his appeals from the postconviction proceedings on his second and third petitions. We affirm.

ANALYSIS

We review a district court's denial of a petition for postconviction relief and an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State , 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). "A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "We review a postconviction court's legal determinations de novo, and its factual findings for clear error." Martin v. State , 865 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. 2015) (citing Riley , 819 N.W.2d at 167 ).

In determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required, a postconviction court considers the facts alleged in the petition as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the petitioner. Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 2012). The petition must allege "more than argumentative assertions without factual support." Lynch v. State , 749 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Minn. 2008) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "An ‘evidentiary hearing is not required unless the petitioner alleges such facts which, if proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would entitle him or her to the requested relief.’ " Sutherlin v. State , 574 N.W.2d 428, 436 (Minn. 1998) (quoting Rainer v. State , 566 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. 1997) ); Roby v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Minn. 1996). When the facts alleged in the petition conclusively establish that the petition is untimely filed under the postconviction statute of limitations, Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)-(c) (2016), there is no need to hold an evidentiary hearing. Taylor v. State , 874 N.W.2d 429, 431 (Minn. 2016).

I.

Brown argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his second petition for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. According to Brown, he is entitled to postconviction relief because D.M. allegedly recanted his trial testimony. D.M. testified at trial that Brown confessed to the murder while in Hennepin County Jail awaiting trial. The State argues that, even if the facts alleged in the second petition were proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence at an evidentiary hearing, they fail to satisfy the second requirement of the Larrison standard.

A petitioner is entitled to a new trial due to witness recantation of trial testimony if:

(1) the court is reasonably well-satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness was false; (2) ... without the testimony, the jury might have reached a different conclusion; and (3) ... the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial.

Williams v. State , 692 N.W.2d 893, 896 (Minn. 2005) (citing Opsahl v. State , 677 N.W.2d 414, 422-23 (Minn. 2004) ); see also Larrison v. United States , 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928), overruled by United States v. Mitrione , 357 F.3d 712, 717-18 (7th Cir. 2004) (modifying the Larrison standard). "The first two prongs of the Larrison standard are compulsory." Caldwell v. State , 853 N.W.2d 766, 772 (Minn. 2014).

Brown's...