Brown v. United States

1

RAMAINE BROWN, Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

No. 1:22-cv-00404

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

March 24, 2023

MEMORANDUM

Kane Judge

Pending before the Court is Defendant the United States of America (“United States”)'s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and/or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted filed pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc No. 21.) Also pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Tramaine Brown (“Plaintiff')'s motion to strike the United States' notice of substitution for Defendant Ryan Miller (“Miller”). (Doc. No. 26.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the parties' motions.

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Tramaine Brown (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), is currently incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution Schuylkill in Minersville, Pennsylvania (“FCI Schuylkill”). On March 17, 2022, he commenced the above-captioned action by filing a complaint against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, et seq. (Doc. No. 1.) Approximately one month later, on April 15, 2022, he filed an amended complaint, adding Miller, the “Executive Assistant/Camp Administrator/Public Information Officer” at FCI Schuylkill, as a defendant in this action. (Doc. No. 6 at 2, ¶ 5.) On that same date, Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 7), as well as his prisoner trust fund account statement (Doc. No. 8).

On April 21, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, deemed his amended complaint filed, and directed the Clerk of Court to issue a summons with a copy of Plaintiff's amended complaint to the United States Marshal for service upon the United States pursuant to Rule 4(i)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 10.) In addition, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of the amended complaint on Miller. (Id.) On May 16, 2022, the United States was served, and the summons was returned executed. (Doc. No. 13; Doc. No. 14 (indicating that, on May 18, 2022, a copy of the summons and complaint was mailed to the United States Attorney General in Washington, D.C.).)

Following two (2) requests for an extension of time to respond to Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. Nos. 15, 17), which were granted by the Court (Doc. Nos. 16, 23), the United States filed a notice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1679, stating that it was substituting itself as the proper defendant for Miller. (Doc. No. 18.) In its notice, the United States cites 28 U.S.C. § 2679. (Doc. No. 18 at 1.) This Section of Title 28 permits the Attorney General of the United States, or his or her designee, to certify that a federal employee-whose alleged negligent or wrongful act or omission gives rise to a plaintiff's claim-was acting within the scope of his or her employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d); 28 C.F.R. § 15.3(a). Upon this certification, the employee is dismissed from the action, the United States is substituted as the defendant in place of the employee, and the action is thereafter governed by the FTCA. See id.; Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229-30 (2007).

Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to strike the United States' notice of substitution for Miller, as well as a supporting brief. (Doc. Nos. 26, 27.) Thereafter, the United States filed a brief in opposition (Doc. No. 30), to which Plaintiff filed a reply brief (Doc. No. 31). Additionally, after the United States filed its notice of substitution, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. (Doc. No. 20.) Plaintiff's second amended complaint once again names the United States and Miller as defendants and reasserts claims pursuant to the FTCA. (Id.) Plaintiff's second amended complaint also asserts for the first time, however, an Eighth Amendment claim against Miller pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (“Bivens”).^[1](Id.)

In response to the second amended complaint, the United States filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and/or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as well as a supporting brief. (Doc. Nos. 21, 22.) On September 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the United States' motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 28.) The United States has not filed a reply brief, and the time period for doing so has passed. Thus, the parties' pending motions (Doc. Nos. 21, 26) are ripe for the Court's resolution. The Court will now turn to the allegations set forth in Plaintiff's second amended complaint.^[2] (Doc. No. 20.)

Plaintiff alleges that, on October 15, 2020, he was placed in BOP custody and housed at FCI Schuylkill to begin serving a federal sentence. (Id. at 6.) At that time, he “was 5 feet 8, weighed 185 pounds with a BMI of 30, and [had] a history of being a smoker.” (Id. (alleging that a BMI of 30 put him in the “obese category” per the Center for Disease Control (internal quotation marks omitted).) Plaintiff alleges that the “[e]mployees” at FCI Schuylkill knew of this and that it put him “at a high risk of severe illness or death if he were to be exposed to COIVD-19” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that, in late December of 2020, there was “a massive COVID-19 outbreak” at FCI Schuylkill, which “result[ed] in at least 160 inmates testing positive for COVID-19.” (Id. (explaining that this outbreak originally started at the main camp at FCI Schuylkill and eventually made its way to the satellite camp, where Plaintiff was housed)). Plaintiff appears to claim that, during this time, he was “forced into quarantine or transferred” into housing at the main camp, which had “a much higher security level than he should have been exposed to.” (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that the “[e]mployees” at FCI Schuylkill “failed to take any precautionary measures to prevent or stop the spread of the virus and continued working after being exposed to the virus[.]” (Id.) “[A]s a result of this persistent course of action,” Plaintiff asserts that he was exposed to the virus on March 2, 2021, and again on September 1, 2021. (Id.) Notably, however, Plaintiff does not appear to claim that he ever contracted the virus during this period of time. See (id. at 6-7).

Plaintiff alleges that he subsequently submitted an administrative claim to the BOP pursuant to the FTCA for the injuries he sustained based upon the failure of FCI Schuylkill “employees” to follow health and safety protocols that were designed to prevent the spread of COVID-19. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff asserts that his administrative claim was denied and that, as a result, he brought this action against the United States seeking compensatory damages for the injuries he sustained due to the allegedly negligent acts and omissions of BOP. (Id.; id. at 11 (alleging that he “suffered loss of sleep, headaches, severe mental pain, depression and will continue to suffer severe and extreme emotional distress, including loss of sleep, headaches, severe mental pain, and depression . . . ”)). Plaintiff claims that he has also brought this action against Miller for intentionally subjecting him to dangerous prison conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. at 7.)

In connection with all of these allegations, Plaintiff sets forth five (5) counts in his second amended complaint. (Id. at 7-14.) The first two counts are asserted against the United States for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 7-8.) The final three counts are asserted against Miller for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 9-14.) As for relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages against the United States, and compensatory, general and special damages, and punitive damages against Miller. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff also makes a demand for a jury trial. (Id. at 15.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be either a facial or a factual attack.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). “A court ruling on a facial attack considers only the complaint, viewing it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Long v. SEPTA, 903 F.3d 312, 320 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). However, a court ruling on a factual attack, wherein the defendant contests the truth of the jurisdictional allegations, “is a different matter: the court need not treat the allegations as true[.]” See id. (citations omitted).

“In reviewing a factual attack, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings.” Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Indeed, “[b]ecause at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's . . . very power to hear the case[,] there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). In other words, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” See id.

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide the defendant notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must present...