Brown v. Wayne Cnty. Sheriff's Office

GEORGE BROWN, Plaintiff, v. WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants.

18-CV-06573 CJS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FILED: December 13, 2018

December 14, 2018

ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff George Brown ("Plaintiff"), an inmate currently confined in the Attica Correctional Facility ("Attica"), has filed this action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"), Docket Item 1, alleging Defendants' deliberate indifference to his medical needs and the excessive use of force when he was a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Wayne County Sheriff. Plaintiff has also submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis with a signed authorization, Docket Item 2, and Motion to appoint counsel, Docket Item 3.

Because the Plaintiff has met the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and filed the required authorization, he is granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. Therefore, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a), this Court is required to conduct an initial screening of the Complaint. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that some of Plaintiff's claims are sufficient to proceed to service.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Section 1915 "provide[s] an efficient means by which a court can screen for and dismiss legally insufficient claims." Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004)). The court shall dismiss a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity, or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, if the court determines that the action (1) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). Generally, the court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend or to be heard prior to dismissal "unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim." Abbas, 480 F.3d at 639 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, leave to amend pleadings may be denied when any amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).

In evaluating the Complaint, the Court must accept all factual allegations as true and must draw all inferences in Plaintiff's favor. See Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam); King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1999). "Specific facts are not necessary," and a plaintiff "need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' " Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Boykin v. Keycorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213(2d Cir. 2008) (discussing pleading standard in pro se cases after Twombly. "even after Twombly, dismissal of a pro se claim as insufficiently pleaded is appropriate only in the most unsustainable of cases."). Although "a court is obliged to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations," McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), even pleadings submitted pro se must meet the notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2004).

"To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1994)). "Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985)).

To establish liability against an official under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that individual's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; it is not enough to assert that the defendant is a link in the chain of command. See McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 2004); Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). Moreover, the theory of respondeat superior is not available in a § 1983 action. See Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2003). But a supervisory official can be found to be personally involved in an alleged constitutional violation in one of several ways:

(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.

Colon, 58 F.3d at 873 (citing Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)).

II. Plaintiff's Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by Investigator Roger LeClair and "five or six other Wayne County Sheriff's Office employees" on October 6, 2016. Docket Item 1 at 3. The assault, which lasted for about one minute, occurred in an interrogation room at the Wayne County Sheriff's Office at the end of an interview conducted by Defendant LeClair. Id. at 2-3. "During the assault, LeClair struck the plaintiff, took the plaintiff to the floor and stood on [Plaintiff's] neck while the other Wayne County Sheriffs employees assaulted" him. Id. at 3. Plaintiff was then held in custody on burglary charges for two weeks and denied medical care for the injuries that he suffered during the assault. Id. at 3-4. Upon being released on bail, Plaintiff was treated at an urgent care facility and diagnosed with a torn rotator cuff in his right shoulder. Id. at 4. He also suffered a split lip, black eye, and various bruises. Id.

III. Analysis

A. Due Process Claims

In light of Plaintiff's status as a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged incident, the Court reviews his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment due process standardrather than under the Eighth Amendment standard applicable to a sentenced prisoner. See Darnell v Pineiro, 849 F3d 17, 33 (2d Cir. 2017) (discussing the impact of Kingsley v. Hendrickson, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (2015) on Eighth Amendment claims). "[A] pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable." Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473 (2015). Factors bearing on the "on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used" include the following:

the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.

Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (a court must consider the "facts and circumstances of each particular case.")); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (finding that the absence of serious injury may be relevant but does not alone defeat an excessive force claim).

The allegations here, considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, sufficiently state a due process violation against the named Defendants for their use of force. Plaintiff's claims for inadequate medical care, however, are dismissed with leave to amend.

"[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees from inadequate medical care by the state." Moran v. Livingston, 155 F. Supp. 3d 278, 287 (W.D.N.Y. 2016). Such a claim requires a plaintiff to allege facts to show that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his or her serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); Ross v. Kelly, 784 F. Supp. 35, 43-44 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 970 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1040 (1992). The Courtmust first consider whether the pleadings establish that Plaintiff's medical needs are objectively serious. "A serious medical condition exists where 'the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.' " Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136-137 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Lawrence v. Evans, 136 F. Supp. 3d 486, 489 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) ("An objectively 'serious medical need' is one which presents "a condition of urgency" that may result in "death, degeneration, or extreme pain.") (quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1154 (1995)), aff'd, 669 F. App'x 27 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order).

Second, the Court must consider whether the pleadings allege the deliberate indifference of the Defendants named in the Complaint. To sustain such a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee must allege that "the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety." Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35.

Here, Plaintiff alleges the complete denial of treatment for his shoulder injury...