Browning v. Seifert

JASON BROWNING, Plaintiff, v. NICKI SEIFERT, BRANDI MILLER,GREG YAHNKE, EVELYN SEIFERT,MICHAEL TAYLOR, C.J. RYDER,and JAMES RUBENSTEIN Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

March 20, 2015

(Judge Keeley)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 121], GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 103], AND DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUBPOENAS [DKT. NO. 111]

Pending before the Court is the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") (Dkt. No. 121) of Magistrate Judge Robert Trumble regarding the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants (Dkt. No. 103), and the motion for subpoenas filed by the plaintiff, Jason Browning ("Browning")(Dkt. No. 111). For the reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Browning's motion for subpoenas.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 11, 2013, Browning filed a complaint in this Court seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. No. 1). His complaint alleged that the defendants, Nikki Seifert ("N. Seifert"), Brandi Miller ("Miller"), Greg Yahnke ("Yahnke"), Evelyn Seifert ("E. Seifert"), Michael Taylor ("Taylor"), C.J. Ryder("Ryder"), and James Rubenstein ("Rubenstein"), have violated his right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") by 1) denying him a kosher diet, 2) denying him the ability to wear religious apparel, and 3) denying him the right to worship weekly and on special holidays.¹ Id.

At the outset of the case, the defendants filed three (3) separate motions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) seeking dismissal of Browning's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Yokum filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 2, 2013; N. Seifert, Miller, Yahnke, E. Seifert, Taylor, Ryder, and Rubenstein filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 2, 2013; and Workman filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 2, 2013.

On January 28, 2014, Magistrate Judge James E. Seibert filed an R&R recommending that Yokum and Workman's motions to dismiss be granted based on Browning's failure to establish that either defendant had violated his civil rights. Magistrate Judge Seibert further recommended that the motion to dismiss of N. Seifert, Taylor, Miller, E. Seifert, Rubenstein, Ryder, and Yahnke be deniedbecause those defendants had failed to establish that they were entitled to immunity from this action. Finally, Magistrate Judge Seibert recommended that Browning's motion for preliminary injunction be denied because he had failed to make a clear showing that he would be irreparably harmed absent receiving preliminary relief (Dkt. No. 66). The Court adopted Magistrate Judge Seibert's R&R on March 18, 2014, and 1) granted Yokum and Workman's motions to dismiss, 2) denied the remaining defendants' motion to dismiss, and 3) denied Browning's motion for preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 71).

On March 28, 2014, the remaining defendants answered Browning's complaint (Dkt. No. 74). After discovery concluded, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on August 22, 2014, arguing that Browning's RLUIPA claims are moot, and that any burdens imposed upon him were the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest (Dkt. No. 103). On September 5, 2014, Browning filed four separate responses to the defendants' motion (Dkt. Nos. 105-108), and on September 16, 2014, the defendants filed their reply (Dkt. No. 118). On September 5, 2014, Browning also filed a motion for subpoenas (Dkt. No. 111).

On February 12, 2015, Magistrate Judge Robert W. Trumble issued an R&R in which he recommended that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part, and that Browning's motion for subpoenas be dismissed without prejudice (Dkt. No. 121 at 41).² On February 24, 2015, the defendants objected to portions of the R&R (Dkt. No. 123). Browning has not filed any objections, despite having been warned that his failure to do so would result in waiver of his appellate rights as to any issues not decided in his favor.

Following de novo review of the portions of the R&R to which the defendants have objected, the Court finds that the defendants' objections are without merit.³

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Browning currently is an inmate at the Huttonsville Correctional Center ("HCC"). Previously, he had been incarceratedat the Northern Correctional Center ("NCC") from October 2008 until July 2014, following which he was transferred to Mount Olive Correctional Complex ("MOCC"), from where eventually he was designated to HCC. He is a practicing Orthodox Jew who alleges that the defendants have violated his right to freely exercise his religion in various ways.

Specifically, Browning alleges that he has been denied a kosher diet, and that the prison kitchen refuses to serve him a kosher meal, instead requiring him to eat a vegetarian or non-pork alternative, neither of which is kosher. He further asserts that the prison commissary does not offer an adequate selection of kosher foods, nor does it label which foods are kosher. Prison officials also allegedly denied Browning's request to receive a shipment of kosher foods from the Aleph Institute (Dkt. No. 1).

Browning further claims that he has been denied the ability to properly worship in prison. He argues that the prison only offers weekly religious services for Messianic, and not Orthodox, Jews. He further alleges that he is not allowed to wear his yarmulke, a traditional Jewish head gear, at all times. Finally, he claims that he is denied the ability to participate in special holidays, including Rosh Hashanah, Hanukkah, Yom Kippur, and Passover. Id.

As to the specific defendants, Browning alleges that N. Seifert, his former unit manager, received his food-related grievances but did nothing to correct the problem. Similarly, he alleges that Miller, his current unit manager, has received several of his grievances but continues to do nothing to address his issues. Browning contends that Yahnke, the Associate Warden of Programs at NCC, and Taylor, the Chaplain at NCC, also denied him the items and relief he seeks, including kosher meals, wearing a yarmulke, the ability to worship at a weekly service, the opportunity to celebrate Jewish holy days, and the ability to both feast and fast. Additionally, Browning states that Taylor is the official with whom he has had the most interaction regarding his complaints.

Browning alleges that E. Seifert, who is the Warden at NCC, is aware of all the grievances he has filed, but nevertheless has "willfully, deliberately, and methodically" denied his requests. He further contends that E. Seifert has engaged in targeted efforts to hinder his ability to worship in prison.

Browning contends that Rubenstein, who is the Commissioner of the West Virginia Department of Corrections ("WV DOC"), has been responsible for reviewing the denial of his grievances and merely"rubber stamped" the Warden's denials without giving them proper consideration. He further contends that Ryder, the religious coordinator for the WV DOC, has also failed to properly review the denial of his religious-related grievances.

In sum, Browning alleges that the defendants have wrongfully and deliberately denied his multiple requests and grievances regarding his religious needs, for which he seeks injunctive and monetary relief. The matter is fully briefed and ripe for review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Pro Se Pleadings

Because Browning is acting pro se, the Court must liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978). Even a pro se complaint is subject to dismissal, however, if the Court cannot reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, nor should it "conjure up questions neversquarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274 (4th Cir. 1985).

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where the "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . ., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" establish that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (a). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews all the evidence "in the light most favorable" to the nonmoving party. Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir. 2000). The Court must avoid weighing the evidence or determining the truth and limit its inquiry solely to a determination of whether genuine issues of triable fact exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing the nonexistence of genuine issues of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has made the necessary showing, the nonmoving party "must set forth specificfacts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" favoring the nonmoving party will not prevent the entry of summary judgment; the evidence must be such that a rational trier of fact could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248-52.

APPLICABLE LAW

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Pursuant to 42...