Brumfield v. State

641 S.W.3d 568

Demetra BRUMFIELD, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee

NO. 12-21-00031-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Tyler.

Opinion delivered February 16, 2022

Sarah Bales Mikkelsen, for Appellee.

Amy R. Blalock, Tyler, for Appellant.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

OPINION

James T. Worthen, Chief Justice

Demetra Brumfield appeals his conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Appellant raises five issues on appeal. We modify and affirm as modified.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged by indictment with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and pleaded "not guilty." The matter proceeded to a jury trial. Following the presentation of evidence, the jury found Appellant "guilty" as charged and assessed his punishment at imprisonment for twenty years and a ten thousand dollar fine. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly, and this appeal followed.

EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's judgment. Specifically, he argues that there is no evidence to support that he engaged in the prohibited conduct either intentionally or knowingly.

Standard of Review and Governing Law

The Jackson v. Virginia¹ legal sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 315–16, 99 S. Ct. at 2786–87 ; see also Escobedo v. State , 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd). The standard for reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789 ; see also Johnson v. State , 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789 ; Johnson , 871 S.W.2d at 186. A jury is free to believe all or any part of a witness's testimony or disbelieve all or any part of that testimony. See Lee v. State , 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff'd , 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A successful legal sufficiency challenge will result in rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing court. See Tibbs v. Florida , 457 U.S. 31, 41–42, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2217–18, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982).

Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Rodriguez v. State , 521 S.W.3d 822, 827 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Sorrells v. State , 343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. See Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Juries are permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 15. Juries are not permitted to come to conclusions based on mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions. Id. An inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them, while speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence presented. Id. at 16.

The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State , 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge would include one that "accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant is tried." Id.

To satisfy its burden of proof that Appellant committed the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as charged in the indictment, the State was required to prove that Appellant intentionally or knowingly operated another's motor vehicle without the effective consent of the owner. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07(a) (West 2016). Effective consent includes "consent by a person legally authorized to act for the owner." Id. § 31.01(3) (West 2019). Thus, operating a vehicle is unlawful only if the accused is aware that the operation of the vehicle is without the owner's consent. McQueen v. State , 781 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ; Battise v. State , 264 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd). Testimony that the car owner did not give consent to operate his vehicle can be sufficient to support a finding that an appellant knew he did not have consent to operate the vehicle. McQueen , 781 S.W.2d at 604–05 ; Battise , 264 S.W.3d at 227 ; see also Williams v. State , No. 01-13-00439-CR, 2014 WL 3697790, at *3 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] July 24, 2014, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ; Edwards v. State , 178 S.W.3d 139, 145 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (concluding evidence sufficient to show defendant knowingly operated vehicle without effective consent when vehicle was loaned to him by someone who defendant knew was not owner); In the Matter of A.P. , No. 03-97-00731-CV, 1998 WL 694913, at *2 (Tex. App.–Austin Oct. 8, 1998, no pet.) (op., not designated for publication) ("[appellant's] initial admission that he did not know who owned the van, provides further evidence that appellant knew he lacked effective consent to drive the van").

Discussion

In the instant case, the record reflects that Appellant drove a U-Haul box truck from Dallas, Texas to Tyler, Texas at the request of a third party, who offered to pay Appellant to purchase a recreational vehicle at Broadway Power Sports in Tyler. When Appellant and two other individuals arrived at the dealership on January 19, 2019, they attempted to purchase a four-wheeler using a check. Wesley Ward, the general manager at the dealership, became suspicious based on rumors communicated to him from Dallas dealerships involving customers’ arriving at dealerships in U-haul trucks and attempting to pay for recreational vehicles with checks without there being sufficient funds to cover the purchase. As a result, Ward contacted the police. Ward testified that while they waited for the police to arrive, they proceeded with the ordinary procedures of a transaction and that one of the men had begun filling out a check for the purchase. Upon arrival at the scene, police determined that the U-Haul truck was stolen.

Rabiel Smith, who operates a U-Haul dealership in Dallas, Texas, testified that a U-Haul truck went missing from his dealership's lot January 7, 2019, but the only key for the truck still was in his office. He further testified that if someone had permission to have that U-Haul truck, they would have the key that went with it. Smith stated that he called law enforcement and gave them the vehicle identification number for the missing truck, which he identified as "U-Haul truck EL3461M." Smith further stated that no one with Appellant's name ever had consent from him, as a representative for U-Haul, to use that truck. He elaborated, stating that if a person does not have a contract while in possession of a U-Haul truck, then U-Haul considers that truck stolen. Smith testified that he later received a call from a police officer in Tyler, Texas, who told him the truck missing from his lot was stolen. He further testified that the truck later was transported to the nearest U-Haul corporate store before it was put back into rental service.

Tyler Police Department Officer Andrew Mackey testified he responded to the scene on the day in question and determined, based on the license plate and the vehicle identification number of the U-Haul truck, that the vehicle had been reported stolen by the Dallas Police Department. Mackey further testified that he made contact with Appellant, who was inside the dealership sitting at the sales desk. According to Mackey, after he detained Appellant, Appellant told him that he was driving the U-Haul and did not know it was stolen. Mackey stated that Appellant initially claimed not to know the name of the person who provided the U-Haul to him but later informed Mackey that someone named "Keith," a friend-of-a-friend, whose last name he did not know, gave him the truck to use. Mackey further stated that Appellant said that Keith offered to give him one hundred fifty dollars to drive the U-Haul to Tyler to pick up a four-wheeler. Appellant also told Mackey that a wrecker service had to be called to unlock the U-Haul before he drove it to Tyler.

In sum, the evidence reflects that the U-Haul truck Appellant drove from Dallas to Tyler was stolen. Smith testified that no one with Appellant's name ever had his consent to use that truck. See McQueen , 781 S.W.2d at 604–05 ; Battise , 264 S.W.3d at 227. The jury also was able to consider Smith's testimony that there only was one key to the U-Haul, which still was in his office after the truck went missing. The jury further could consider Appellant's initial statement to Mackey that he did not know the name of the person who provided the U-Haul to him along with Appellant's explanation that that person, who he later identified as "Keith," was not someone Appellant knew well. Lastly, the jury was entitled to consider the veracity of Appellant's explanation of his acquisition of the truck, which Mackey testified did...