Brunswick Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Gill Montague Reg'l Sch. Dist.

BRUNSWICK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff, v. GILL MONTAGUE REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

1:13-CV-0445 (LEK/RFT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

August 12, 2014

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Brunswick Central School District ("Plaintiff," or "BCSD") brings this action seeking tuition reimbursement from Defendant Gill Montague Regional School District ("Defendant," or "GMRSD") under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq. ("IDEA"). Dkt. No. 1 ("Complaint"). Both parties have filed Motions for summary judgment and oppositions. Dkt. Nos. 11 ("Defendant Motion"); 13 ("Plaintiff Response"); 15 ("Plaintiff Motion"); 16 ("Defendant Response"). Because the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, this case is dismissed.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The IDEA

Congress enacted the IDEA "to promote the education of handicapped children." Walczak v. Florida Union Free School Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982)). "Toward that end, Congress provides federal funds to those states that develop plans to assure 'all children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate publiceducation ["FAPE"].'" Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)); see also A.M. ex rel. Y.N. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 964 F. Supp. 2d 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("The [IDEA] requires any state receiving federal funds to provide disabled children with a FAPE."). The IDEA does not dictate how each state administers its education to disabled students, but merely provides that "[e]ach State that receives funds under this chapter shall . . . ensure that any State rules, regulations and policies relating to this chapter conform to the purposes of this chapter." 20 U.S.C. § 1407.

The IDEA also "ensure[s] that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a [FAPE]." 20 U.S.C. § 1415. The IDEA's procedural safeguards serve two primary functions. First, "[i]f a parent believes that the [school district] has breached its obligations under the IDEA 'by failing to provide their disabled child a FAPE, the parent may unilaterally place their child in a private school at their own financial risk and seek tuition reimbursement.'" Scott ex rel. C.S. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 12 CIV 3558, 2014 WL 1225529, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2014) (quoting Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 9-10, 16 (1993)). Second, a parent may also challenge the adequacy of their child's Individualized Education Plan ("IEP"). See Antonaccio v. Bd. of Educ. of Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 281 F. Supp. 2d 710, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

The IDEA requires parents or disabled children seeking tuition reimbursement or challenging an IEP to bring their claims through a state administrative process. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415. Only after the administrative process has been fully exhausted may they appeal an unfavorable, administrative decision in state or federal district court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404(3); see also Antonaccio, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 713.

B. Factual History¹

Plaintiff is a New York state school district located in Rensselaer County. Dkt. No. 11-2 ("Def. Statement of Material Facts") ¶ 1. Defendant is a Massachusetts school district located in Franklin County, which includes the Village of Turner Falls ("Turner Falls"). Id. ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 15-5 ("Pl. Statement of Material Facts") ¶ 2. In May 2010, a child in Turner Falls was taken into foster care by the Massachusetts Department of Children & Families ("DCF") and placed in a foster home in Rensselaer County. Def. SMF ¶¶ 3-4. From May 2010 through June 2012, the child was enrolled in a special education program in Plaintiff's school district, which caused Plaintiff to incur tuition expenses in the amount of $67,719.76. Pl. SMF ¶¶ 3, 8.

On June 26, 2012, the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education ("DOE") issued a letter to Defendant concerning the tuition expenses incurred by Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 14 ("Pl. Response to Def. SMF") at 3. DOE's letter indicated that, pursuant to Massachusetts regulation 603 C.M.R. 28.10(4),² Defendant was fiscally responsible for the child's tuition expenses because the child's sole surviving parent resided in Turner Falls at the time the child was enrolled inPlaintiff's school. Id. Additionally, on July 10, 2012, Walter Solzak ("Solzak"), Director of Special Education and Student Services for Defendant, sent a letter to the child's mother indicating "[w]e have been assigned responsibility for your son." Id. at 4.

After Plaintiff's repeated, unsuccessful attempts to obtain reimbursement from Defendant, see e.g., Dkt. No. 13-2 at 50, 52-53, 78, 86, Plaintiff commenced this action. See Compl. at 1. Plaintiff asserts that the Court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over this case because it "arises under" under the IDEA and "its regulations thereunder." Id. at 1-2.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal district courts are "courts of limited jurisdiction," Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005), and have subject matter jurisdiction only over cases in which there is a federal question, or in which there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. "Determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry and a claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . when the district court lacks statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 168 (2d Cir. 2008). Even in the absence of a challenge from any party, the Court is still obligated to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. See Da Silva v. Kinsho Int'l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000); see also U.S. v Robinson, 357 F. Supp. 2d. 523 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (Kahn, J.) ("A court may sua sponte inquire into the subject matter jurisdiction and satisfy itself that such jurisdiction exists."). Finally, "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).

IV. DISCUSSION

Federal-question jurisdiction is properly invoked when there is "a colorable claim 'arising under' the Constitution or laws of the United States." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331). "A case arises under federal law within the meaning of § 1331 . . . if a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Empire Healthchoice Assur. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006); see also Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).

A. Private Right of Action

1. Express Private Right of Action

As described supra, the IDEA explicitly provides for an administrative process through which disabled children and their parents may file grievances concerning the child's education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b). In addition, the IDEA permits children or their parents to appeal an unfavorable administrative decision in state or federal court. See id. at § 1415(i)(2). Thus, it is well established that the IDEA affords disabled children and their parents an express private right of action to bring suit in federal court after exhausting the administrative process. See Beth V. by Yvonne V. v. Carroll, 87 F.3d 80, 88 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing district court's finding that disabled children and their parents did not have a private right of action under the IDEA); John T. v. Iowa Dep't of Educ., 258 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing appeal of an administrative law judge's decision in a claim brought by parents challenging their child's IEP); Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 948 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting parent's right to seek tuition reimbursement following an unfavorable administrative decision); Todd D. v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576, 1579 (11th Cir. 1991)(recognizing parent's right to challenge administrative decision on child's IEP in district court); David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 418-20 (1st Cir. 1985) (same).

Furthermore, school districts have also been permitted to appeal an unfavorable, administrative decision in federal court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) ("[A]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under this subsection . . . shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint . . . in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States. . . ."). However, in all such cases the dispute was initiated by parents at the administrative level. See, e.g., St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd. v. State of La.,142 F.3d 776, 785 (5th Cir. 1998) (permitting a local school board to bring an action in federal court seeking reimbursement from the state DOE following an administrative determination of the school's liability in an action commenced by the student's parents); S.C. ex rel. C.C. v. Deptford Tp. Bd. of Educ., 213 F. Supp. 2d 452, 456-59 (D. N.J. 2002) (addressing school district's third-party complaint against NJ DOE in action initiated by parents); Todd D., 933 F.2d at 1582-83 (allowing cross claim by local educational authority against education department following administrative claim by parents); Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park & River Forest High Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. IL State Bd. of Educ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 971, 979-81 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (same).

The question presented in this case, however, is whether a school district, in the absence of an administrative grievance filed by a parent or disabled child, may nonetheless bring a tuition-related claim in federal court. This precise issue appears to be of first impression, but courts who have addressed similar issues...