Bruton v. City of Grand Forks

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Ray Bruton, Plaintiff, v. City of Grand Forks, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-135

United States District Court, D. North Dakota, Eastern Division

May 5, 2023

ORDER

Peter D. Welte, Chief Judge

Defendants City of Grand Forks (the “City”), Luke Wentz (“Officer Wentz”), Caleb Nelson (“Officer Nelson”), Michael Ruit (“Officer Ruit”) and Andrew Ebertowski (“Officer Ebertowski”) move for partial dismissal of Plaintiff Ray Bruton's complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. No. 25. Bruton opposes the motion. Doc. No. 29. For the reasons below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts are taken from the complaint and are accepted as true for the purposes of deciding this motion. Doc. No. 1. Bruton is a resident of Grand Forks, North Dakota. Id. Officers Wentz, Nelson, Ruit, and Ebertowski are police officers for the City. Id. As alleged, on April 15 2021, Bruton was driving to his home in Grand Forks. Id. Bruton was pulled over by Officers Nelson and Wentz, and they asked Bruton to step out of his vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 12-21. Officers Ruit and Ebertowski then pulled up behind Bruton's vehicle. Id. Shortly after Bruton was pulled over, two more Grand Forks Police Department (“GFPD”) cruisers also arrived on the scene. Id.

Officers Wentz and Nelson approached Bruton's vehicle first. Id. ¶ 23. Officer Wentz allegedly told Bruton that he had been pulled over for an improper turn. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. Bruton was then asked to exit the vehicle, and he complied. Id. ¶ 27. After getting out of his vehicle, Bruton gave Officer Wentz his cell phone, which displayed his insurance card. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. Officers Wentz and Ebertowski then told Bruton to walk back to the police vehicle and get in the back seat. Id. ¶ 34.

Bruton alleges Officers Wentz and Ebertowski intentionally ushered him to the police cruiser quickly, and he did not have time to close the driver's side door of his vehicle. Id. ¶ 40. And as soon as Bruton reached the police cruiser, Officer Ruit looked inside the vehicle through that open door. Id. ¶ 42. Officer Ruit then walked a drug-sniffing dog around Bruton's vehicle. When he reached the open driver's side door, Bruton alleges Officer Ruit encouraged the dog to jump into his vehicle, which it did. Id. ¶¶ 43-44. As alleged, the dog stayed inside the vehicle for several seconds, then exited the vehicle, and Officer Ruit went on to guide the dog around the car for several more minutes. Id. ¶¶ 45-47.

When Bruton got to the police cruiser, he alleges he asked Officer Ebertowski why the officers were reacting so forcefully to an alleged improper turn. Id. ¶ 50. In response, Officer Ebertowski supposedly discussed the GFPD's policies and procedures concerning the use of drugsniffing dogs at routine traffic stops. Id. ¶ 51. Bruton alleges that Officer Ebertowski said they removed Bruton from the vehicle for the express purpose of deploying the drug sniffing dog. Id. ¶ 52. He is then alleged to have said that deploying the dog was “not a search, it's just a sniff.” Id. ¶ 53. Bruton alleges that Officer Ebertowski stated:

1. We're allowed to sniff any vehicle.

2. We have that right. That's what the U.S. Supreme Court has said.

3. I don't need probable cause . . . We don't even need reasonable suspicion in the State of North Dakota. We don't need anything.

4. We don't need a reason to deploy the dogs. In North Dakota you don't need any reason to deploy the dogs.

Id. ¶ 54. He also alleges that Officer Ebertowski told him that he was right behind Bruton at the time Bruton allegedly made the improper turn and that there was no improper turn. Id. ¶ 56.

Bruton was then put in the backseat of the police cruiser. Id. ¶ 57. The door was locked from the outside. Id. ¶ 58. Bruton was in the backseat for several minutes before Officer Ebertowski opened the door to let him go. Id. ¶ 65. Officer Wentz then issued Bruton a citation for making an improper turn under Grand Forks Code of Ordinances § 8-0503. Id. ¶ 66. Bruton challenged the citation, but the civil violation for an improper turn was upheld in municipal court. See City of Grand Forks v. Ray Bruton, Grand Forks Municipal Case GF-2021-TR-00879.

Bruton's complaint alleges three 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the individual Officers- (1) unlawful seizure, (2) unlawful search, and (3) unlawful arrest, all in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Doc. No. 1. The complaint also alleges an unconstitutional custom, pattern, policy, practice, and/or procedures claim against the City. Id.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

This is a partial motion to dismiss.^[1] The Defendants seek dismissal of the unlawful seizure claim in its entirety, to the extent it claims the Officers were not justified in initiating the traffic stop. They also move for dismissal as to Officers Nelson and Ruit to the extent the claim alleges the traffic stop was unconstitutionally prolonged. As to the unlawful search claim, the Defendants move for dismissal as to Officers Wentz, Nelson, and Ebertowski. And as to the unlawful arrest, the Defendants argue the claim should be dismissed as to all Officers, or alternatively, dismissal of this claim against Officers Nelson and Ruit.

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a pleading only to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” But a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” and a party may raise that defense by motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Gorog v. Best Buy Co., 760 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). The complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” shall be held liable for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [.]” To bring a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) that the defendant's alleged conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected federal right. See Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 571 (8th Cir. 2009). Here there is no dispute that the Officers acted under color of state law. But there is a dispute as to whether Bruton plausibly alleged that the individual Officers violated his constitutional rights. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (stating the threshold question of any § 1983 claim is whether a deprivation of a constitutional right has been established.).

With individual capacity claims, “[t]o prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show each individual defendant's personal involvement in the alleged violation.” White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1081 (8th Cir. 2017). By extension then, “[a]n officer may be held liable only for his or her own [actions].” Torres v. City of St. Louis, 39 F.4th 494, 504 (8th Cir. 2022). But participation in an unconstitutional activity with other officers is generally sufficient to implicate individual liability. See Clinton v. Garrett, 551 F.Supp.3d 929, 950 (S.D. Iowa 2021).

1. Unlawful Seizure

Turning to his first claim, Bruton's alleges he was unlawfully seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights in two ways-first, when the Officers initially stopped his vehicle without reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he had committed any crime, and second, when the Officers unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop. Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 74-75.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures (U.S. Const. amend. IV) and applies to state actors because it is incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). A person is seized under the Fourth Amendment when an officer, “by means of physical force or show of authority,” terminates or restrains the person's freedom of movement. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007). A traffic stop is a seizure of the driver even though the stop is limited, and the detention of the driver is brief. Id. at 255. Because it is subject to Fourth Amendment protections, a traffic stop must be supported by either reasonable suspicion or probable cause. United States v. Chartier, 772 F.3d 539, 543 (8th Cir. 2014). Fourth Amendment protections do not end there though-a constitutionally permissible traffic stop can become unlawful if its length exceeds the time needed to attend to the stop's “mission” and “related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (internal citations omitted). Without reasonable suspicion, an officer may not conduct unrelated checks that extend the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete its original purpose of the stop. Id. at 355.

a. Initial Traffic Stop

Starting with the initial traffic stop, recall that Bruton was initially stopped for an improper turn. He alleges the Officers did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate that traffic stop. But, as the Defendants point out in their motion, Bruton's improper turn was upheld as a civil violation in municipal court. And because that...