Brutus 630, LLC v. Harford Cnty.

BRUTUS 630, LLC, v. HARFORD COUNTY, ET. AL.

No. 283

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2019

August 12, 2020

Circuit Court for Harford County

Case No. C-12-CV-18-000480

UNREPORTED

Meredith, Leahy, Shaw Geter, JJ.

Opinion by Shaw Geter, J.

* This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

This is an appeal from an affirmance by the Circuit Court for Harford County of the Maryland Tax Court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, the Town of Bel Air (the "Town") and Harford County (the "County"). Brutus 630, LLC ("Brutus"), appellant, initially sought a refund of sewer connection charges paid to the Town between 2004 and 2011. The Town denied the claim and Brutus filed an appeal to the Tax Court. The appeal was dismissed by that Court for lack of jurisdiction because it sought a refund of charges or fees, not taxes. Following another judicial review and appeal, the Court of Appeals, ultimately, remanded the case to the Tax Court, holding the Tax Court had jurisdiction over the refund claim. Brutus 630, LLC v. Town of Bel Air, 448 Md. 355, 383 (2016).

Upon remand to the Tax Court, Harford County was joined as a party. The Town and County then moved to dismiss certain claims as barred by the statute of limitations and all parties filed motions for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the Tax Court granted appellees' motions and upon review, the circuit court affirmed the Tax Court's decision. This timely appeal followed. Appellant presents the following questions for our review, which we have rephrased and consolidated

1. Did the Tax Court err in determining certain claims were barred by the statute of limitations set forth in § 20-115 of the Local Government Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland?

2. Did the Tax Court err in granting summary judgment?

3. Was the Tax Court's decision in conformity with the law and supported by substantial evidence in the record?

For reasons to follow, we affirm the Tax Court.¹

BACKGROUND

In 1965, before Harford County became a Charter County, Sod Run Waste Water Plant was the sewage treatment facility that serviced most of the county. The facility was built by the Harford County Metropolitan Commission (the "HCMC"). The Town of Bel Air, however, disposed of its sewage in its own wastewater treatment plant. To secure federal grants to upgrade Sod Run, the HCMC sought out the Town as a customer and persuaded the Town to give up its sewage treatment facility. In 1969, the Town signed its first Sewer Service Agreement with the HCMC for the use of Sod Run. Harford County became a Charter County in 1971, and HCMC was abolished and replaced by Harford County in 1973. On August 8, I977 and May 29, 1979, the Town of Bel Air entered intoSewer Service Agreements with the County. These agreements were superseded by a 1988 Agreement entered into by the Town and County (the "1988 Agreement").

Pursuant to the 1988 Agreement, the County would provide "transmission and treatment of the sewage generated within the corporate limits of the Town," and in return, the Town would remit payment of certain charges to the County. Such charges included a "Sewer Connection Charge," which is a charge made for each new connection to the Town's sewer system "made after the date of [the] Agreement which shall be allocated by the County to defray the cost of future replacement and expansion of basic main and other sewage treatment facilities used to treat sewage generated within the corporate limits of the Town." Section 3 of the 1988 Agreement provides for a base sewer connection charge of $650 and that the charge "shall be graduated" using a scale based on peak demand, number of fixtures, and meter size. Under Section 5 ". . . the Town may authorize new sewer connections and hook up each such new sewer connection made after the date of this Agreement within the corporate limits of the Town . . . upon payment to the County of appropriate sewer connection charges as required under this Agreement."

On September 17, 1990, the Town approved an amendment to the 1988 Agreement that established the "Plumtree surcharge," an $800 surcharge for each connection within the Town contributing sewage which runs through the Plumtree Run Pumping Station. On July 19, 1991, County Bill No. 91-36 was enacted, which provided for a System Development Fee. There was an initial System Development Fee of $1,696, which was subject to annual increases of 6%. At an April 19, I993 meeting, the Bel Air Board ofTown Commissioners adopted the System Development Fee at the rate of $1,798 and a subsequent addendum to the 1988 Agreement was signed on April 29, 1993.

Brutus 630 is an assignee of the entity, NVR, Inc. Between February 17, 2004 and February 2012, NVR, Inc. built 274 residential units and paid the Town $1,186,627 in sewer connection fees pursuant to the 1988 Agreement. On February 2, 2012, NVR assigned its interest in any potential refunds of the connection fees to Brutus 630. On February 12, 2012, the co-manager of Brutus 630, Mike Jones, contacted Lisa Moody, the Town's Finance Director, to request a refund of the sewer connection fees originally paid to the Town by NVR Inc. A hearing was held on April 18, 2012, and on May 11, 2012. Moody, in a written decision, denied appellant's application for a refund.

On June 7, 2012, appellant filed an appeal to the Maryland Tax Court. Appellant and the Town filed several motions, including the Town's Motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Tax Court granted the Town's motion and dismissed the appeal. Appellant then filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Harford County and the Circuit Court affirmed the Tax Court's decision. On appeal to this Court, we also affirmed. The Court of Appeals subsequently granted appellant's writ of certiorari. Noting, "the sewer connection fee at issue in this case would qualify as a 'charge' or a 'fee,'" the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the Tax Court, holding "the refund statute does not limit its scope to taxes," and thus, the Tax Court had jurisdiction over the refund claim. Brutus 630, 448 Md. at 368.

On remand to the Tax Court, over appellant's objection, the Town joined Harford County as a respondent because the Town remitted the connection fees directly to theCounty in accordance with the 1988 agreement. The Town and County moved to dismiss certain claims as barred by the statute of limitations and all parties filed motions for summary judgment. The Tax Court granted the motions as to the Town and County. Appellant, again, petitioned for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Harford County. The circuit court affirmed the Tax Court's decision. Appellant timely appealed to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Since the Tax Court is "an adjudicative administrative body of the executive branch, its decisions are subject to the same standards of judicial review as adjudicatory decisions of other administrative agencies." NIHC, Inc. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 439 Md. 668, 682 (2014). Thus, on appeal "[w]e review the decision of the Tax Court, not the ruling of the circuit court . . . ." Comptroller of Treasury v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 186 Md. App. 169, 181 (2009). Our review is "narrow" and "limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the [Tax Court's] findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law." Comptroller of Treasury v. Taylor, 465 Md. 76, 86 (2019) (citation omitted). Further, "we cannot uphold the Tax Court's decision on grounds other than the findings and reasons set forth by the Tax Court." Id.

"We must respect the expertise of the agency and accord deference to its interpretation of a statute that it administers." McLaughlin v. Gill Simpson Elec., 206 Md. App. 242, 251(2012). "Despite [this] deference, it is always within our prerogative to determine whether an agency's conclusions of law are correct." Employees' Ret. Sys. ofBaltimore County v. Bradford, 227 Md. App. 75, 89 (2016). "An agency decision based on . . . statutory interpretation is a conclusion of law," and thus subject to de novo review. Kor-Ko Ltd. v. Md. Dep't of the Env't, 451 Md. 401, 412 (2017); see Hayden v. Md. Dep't of Nat. Res., 242 Md. App. 505, 521 (2019). ("We review de novo an agency's conclusions of law . . . . This includes questions of statutory interpretation.")

With respect to statutory interpretation, "we look first at the plain language of the statute, with a goal to implement the legislative intent." Charles Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 300 (2004). "Therefore, where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, according to its ordinary and commonly understood meaning, a court must so construe the statute, rather than resort to legislative history or other extraneous considerations to arrive at a contrary construction." Total Audio-Visual Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 360 Md. 387, 395 (2000) (internal citations omitted).

I. The Tax Court did not err in determining certain claims were barred by the statute of limitations set forth in § 20-115.

Appellant argues the Tax Court erred when it held the statute of limitations applied. Specifically, appellant claims "because the statute's text does not mention either 'charges' or 'fees' [the statute of] limitations applies only to taxes," and thus, "[a]ppellant's claims are not barred." Conversely, appellees argue the Tax Court correctly barred appellant's claims.

Section 20-115 of the Local Government Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland provides that "A claim for refund shall be filed within 3 years of the date that the tax, interest, or penalty was paid." § 20-115 Md. Local Gov't. In ...