Bryan v. Erie Cnty. Office of Children & Youth

861 F.Supp.2d 553

Paul BRYAN and Bonnie Bryan, husband and wife, individually and as parents and natural guardians on behalf of their minor child, K.B., and K.B., Plaintiffs,

v.ERIE COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILDREN & YOUTH, et al., Defendants.

C.A. No. 03–259.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

March 22, 2012.

Jay P. Deratany, Jay Paul Deratany & Associates, Jeffrey G. Mashni, Jeffrey G. Mashni Attorney at Law, Chicago, IL, Timothy D. McNair, Law Office of Timothy D. McNair, Erie, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Pamela V. Collis, Paul J. Walsh, III, John M. Polena, Litchfield Cavo, LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SEAN J. McLAUGHLIN, District Judge.

Plaintiffs' original complaint was filed on August 12, 2003 and was dismissed by the Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) by Opinion and Order dated September 28, 2006.¹ In that Order the Court dismissed the Erie County Office of Children & Youth (“OCY”) defendants (and other defendants, unnamed herein in the First Amended Complaint) from all eight counts set forth in the Plaintiffs' original Complaint. On August 18, 2008, 293 Fed.Appx. 143 (3d Cir.2008), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated that order with the directive that the Plaintiffs be permitted to amend their original Complaint.

On remand the Plaintiffs did so. The cause of action arises out of sexual assaults by J.O., a minor foster child placed in the home of Plaintiffs Paul and Bonnie Bryan. The Bryans have brought this lawsuit individually and as parents and natural guardians of their son, K.B., the victim of the assaults, against the OCY and several of its present or former employees.² At Count I, Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants violated K.B.'s federal substantive due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by virtue of their involvement in placing J.O. in the Bryan home. Count II alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. A motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint was denied on May 13, 2009.

Presently pending before the Court is a motion by the Defendants for summary judgment. The issues have been briefed and argued and the Court has reviewed the rather extensive record. Oral argument was held before the undersigned on July 21, 2011. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a) and 1367(a).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In adjudicating a motion for summary judgment, we apply the well-established legal standard presently set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), pursuant to which summary judgment shall be granted when no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “A disputed fact is ‘material’ if it would affect the outcome of the suit as determined by the substantive law,” Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 771 (3d Cir.2009) (citation omitted), and a factual dispute is “genuine,” and thus warrants trial, “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248–49, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Accordingly, in order for a claim to survive summary judgment, “there must be [significantly probative] evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. For purposes of Rule 56, we assume that the non-moving party's allegations are true and give the non-moving party the benefit of the doubt when those allegations conflict with the moving party's claims. Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assocs., 44 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir.1995). However, summary judgment must be entered against any party unable to present sufficient evidence in support of an essential element of a claim because “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

With this standard in mind, we review the evidence of record. Except as otherwise indicated, the following facts are undisputed.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

A. Events Leading to J.O.'s Placement

On January 12, 1998, OCY caseworker Cyndi Steves (hereinafter, “Steves”) petitioned the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, and the court entered an order that J.O. be detained in an emergency shelter within seventy two hours. (Defs.' Exs. A, B). On January 16, 1998, Steves prepared an intake opening document which amassed detailed background information, and included a subsection known as a “risk assessment summary.” ³ (Defs.' Ex. C.) In her intake opening document, Steves stated:

Both parents, along with their spouse or significant other, contacted this Agency and requested [J.O.]'s placement as none of the adults felt they could deal with his special emotional issues. [J.O.] has been diagnosed attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder along with conduct disorder. [J.O.] takes three different medications in an attempt to assist him in controlling his behavior.... He is physically violent, according to his parents, hitting, kicking and biting.

* * *

It was reported that the boy was fascinated with fire in the past and has been found playing with matches. It was also reported that [J.O.] was acting out sexually with a half-sister and a niece in North Carolina. Both parents also report the child is verbally threatening to blow things up, shoot people and stab people. He is reported to suffer from both enuresis and encopresis.

The child resided in the home with his mother from birth to 7 years old. [His mother] states that at age 3 she was having behavior problems with the child and did seek out services ... Since none of this was effective, she made arrangements for the child to stay with his father. [J.O.] resided with his biological father for approximately one year during which time family tension increased and they felt they could no longer keep the child. Arrangements were made for [J.O.] to go stay in North Carolina with an extended family member. Supposedly, when [J.O.] was in North Carolina he acted out sexually with a younger child in that residence, and also was a behavior problem. After approximately one year, the relatives in North Carolina could no longer keep the child. They made arrangements for [J.O.] to come back to Pennsylvania and stay with his father again.

( Id.) (emphasis added). As to the incident in North Carolina, Steves had not yet had the opportunity to speak with the “extended family member” in North Carolina who had custody of J.O. for approximately one year, and she suggested “it would be informative for someone to contact this person to obtain additional, firsthand information.” ( Id.)

When J.O. returned to the Erie area, his father and stepmother again suffered additional challenges, and ultimately took him to Clarion Psychiatric Hospital where he was admitted for approximately two weeks. ( Id.) Upon his discharge, the father and stepmother did not want to continue to provide for J.O. and sent him back to his mother. ( Id.)

Steves interviewed each family member. J.O. told her that he did not get along with his half-siblings, who continually lied about him. ( Id.) He denied any wrongdoing, and also denied that he had been physically or sexually abused. ( Id.) J.O.'s mother told Steves that his behavior was so extreme that the stress from living with him exacerbated her poor physical health and debilitating asthma. ( Id.) J.O.'s mother's live-in boyfriend had issued an ultimatum that if J.O. were to return to his mother's care, he and his daughter would move out. ( Id.) J.O.'s father and stepmother described J.O. as not having “any remorse or any conscience” and did not want to leave him alone, given his behaviors. ( Id.) They likewise were not willing to have him return to their residence as they felt he needed more help than they were capable of giving. ( Id.)

Steves also interviewed J.O.'s half-sister. She stated that there were two occasions when J.O. “had gotten on top of her in her bed” when she was fully clothed. ( Id.) Steves summarized the information obtained from J.O.'s half-sister as follows:

On the first occasion three years ago, both [the half-sister] and [J.O.] were fully clothed and [J.O.] was just laying on top of her. When [she] came upon this sight she told [J.O.] to get off [the girl's] bed and to leave her alone. On the second occasion a month later, [J.O.] was found with his pants off laying on top of [her], who was again clothed. [She] stated that she was attempting to push [J.O.] off of her and that she told him to go put his pants on. [The half-sister] stated that [J.O.] never tried to touch her or have her touch him.

( Id.)

On January 26, 1998, Jeff Rose (hereinafter, “Rose”), a caseworker in the sexual abuse unit at OCY assigned to J.O. after the intake procedure, completed a Protocol for Placement Review by Resource Management Team Document. (Defs.' Ex D at EC 1019–1020.) Rose testified that he had ruled out any foster home placement for J.O. because “[t]he behaviors cited by both parents would indicate this child would be a danger to himself, other foster kids and the foster home.” (Pls.' Ex. P at 99.) Rose requested residential or group home placement (as opposed to foster home) because “J.O. was diagnosed w/ADHD, conduct disorder, he supposedly sexually acted out, started fires, self-abusive, bangs his head eneuretic, encopretic, plays w/knives & numerous other acting out behaviors.” (Defs.' Ex. D at EC 1019.)

Despite J.O.'s denial that he had been sexually abused, given his behaviors, child welfare authorities continued to explore that possibility. (Pls.' Ex. B at p. 35.) While J.O. was at the Edmund L. Thomas Shelter, on February 23, 1998, after holding a dispositional and placement review...