Bryan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

205 Md.App. 587

45 A.3d 936

Denise BRYAN et al.

v.STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 0353, Sept. Term, 2011.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 7, 2012.

Robert E. Wilson (Wilson & Parlett, on the brief) Upper Marlboro, MD, for appellant.

Michael J. Budow (Howard R. Meinster, Budow & Noble, PC, on the brief) Bethesda, MD, for appellee.

Panel: ^*EYLER, JAMES R., WRIGHT, LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY (Retired, Specially Assigned), J.

In this motor tort case, the defense is nonmutual issue preclusion. The issue on this appeal centers on the finality of the termination of a prior judicial proceeding.

The plaintiffs-appellants are one of the drivers, Brenton Bryan (Brenton), and his three passengers, his wife, Denise Bryan (Denise), and his two children, Taeysha Bryan (Taeysha) and Tashera Davis (Tashera), collectively, the Plaintiffs. They allege that the accident was caused by a phantom driver. The defendant-appellee is State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), the uninsured motorists coverage carrier of the vehicle operated by Brenton.

The Circuit Court for Montgomery County entered summary judgment in favor of State Farm by applying nonmutual preclusion on the issue of liability. For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm in part and reverse in part.

Facts and Procedural History

The motor vehicle accident took place in Freeport, New York on May 29, 2006. In the case before us, the Plaintiffs allege that a phantom vehicle changed lanes and cut off the Plaintiffs' vehicle. This maneuver, Plaintiffs assert, caused their vehicle to collide with two other vehicles. One of these vehicles was being driven by Juan Chevez, whose wife, Ines Chevez, was a passenger in the car. Juan and Ines Chevez (the Chevezes) filed suit against Brenton in the Civil Court of the City of New York, County of Queens, alleging that Brenton's negligence caused the accident.

The Chevezes' suit was tried to a jury, commencing on December 13, 2010. The Chevezes and Brenton were respectively represented by counsel. The issue of damages was bifurcated from liability. Juan Chevez described the happening of the accident, and Brenton and Denise testified in the defense case. Following the arguments of counsel, only liability was submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict on two special interrogatories. To the first, “[W]as the defendant,Brenton Bryan, negligent in the operation of his motor vehicle on May 29, 2006?”, the jury unanimously responded, “Yes.” To the second question, “[W]as the negligence of the defendant, Brenton Bryan, a substantial factor in bringing about the accident on May 29, 2006?”, the jury unanimously replied, “Yes.”

The parties returned to court the next day and advised, on the record, that the case was settled for the payment of $15,000 to each of the Chevezes, who would provide a general release and a “Stipulation of Discontinuance.” The trial judge questioned each of the Chevezes to assure that they understood the terms of the settlement. Whereupon, the court had the jurors return to the courtroom and thanked them for their service.

The record before us also contains an “Extract of Minutes,” certified by the New York court's clerk which reads:

“On Dec. 13, 2010 this case was tried with a Jury in Part 101 ... and a Verdict was rendered therein in favor of the Plaintiff[s, i.e., the Chevezes] on liability. After this verdict, the parties settled the matter in the amount of $30,000.00.”

On February 5, 2009, the Plaintiffs had filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County against State Farm for uninsured motorist benefits arising out of the May 2006 accident. The case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on January 28, 2010. State Farm moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 2010 jury verdict in New York on the issue of liability collaterally estopped the Plaintiffs from pursuing their suit against State Farm. Following a hearing on April 21, 2011, the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of State Farm. The circuit court reasoned:

“The principal behind the defense [of issue preclusion] has been satisfied in this case and that the New York jury determined adversely to this Plaintiff the exact same issue that's in question in this case, and accordingly, I grant the defendant's motion.”

State Farm's motion sought summary judgment against all of the Plaintiffs, and the docket entry of judgment records that that motion was granted.

The Plaintiffs timely appealed to this Court.

Standard of Review

The standard by which we review a trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment is one of legal correctness. See, e.g., Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591, 578 A.2d 1202, 1206 (1990). “If no material facts are placed in genuine dispute, this Court must determine whether the Circuit Court correctly entered summary judgmentas a matter of law.” Anderson v. Council of Gables, 404 Md. 560, 571, 948 A.2d 11, 18 (2008).

Our review is further limited to the basis relied upon by the trial court. See, e.g., Warner v. German, 100 Md.App. 512, 517, 642 A.2d 239, 242 (1994) (“when analyzing the lower court's decision, we ordinarily are confined to the basis relied on by that court and may not otherwise explain its conclusion by introducing new legal theories”); Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. 509, 536, 836 A.2d 655, 671 (2003).

Choice of Law

State Farm's argument rests on the jury verdict at a bifurcated trial in a New York court and on the minute, or docket entry, describing the ultimate resolution of the proceeding. No party to the instant matter has raised an issue of choice of law, much less asked this Court to take judicial notice of New York law. Under these circumstances, we shall decide the issue as if the special verdict, finding Brenton liable for the May 29, 2006 accident, were rendered in a Maryland circuit court at a trial in which the issue of liability had been bifurcated, followed by a settlement resulting in a docket entry of voluntary dismissal with prejudice. See Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 10–504 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article; Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex, Inc., 174 Md.App. 681, 758, 923 A.2d 971, 1014–15 (2007).

Elements of Issue Preclusion

The purpose of collateral estoppel is to “ ‘avoid the expense and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and foster reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibilities of inconsistent decisions.’ ” Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass'n, 361 Md. 371, 387, 761 A.2d 899, 907 (2000) (quoting Murray Int'l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547, 555 A.2d 502, 503–04 (1989)). Maryland courts follow a four-part test to determine if a party is collaterally estopped from bringing a claim:

“ ‘1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question?

“ ‘2. Was there a final judgment on the merits?

“ ‘3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?

“ ‘4. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted given a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue?’ ”

Id. at 391, 761 A.2d at 909 (quoting Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. TKU Assocs., 281 Md. 1, 18–19, 376 A.2d 505, 514 (1977)). There is no contention here that elements 1, 3 and 4 have not been met as to Brenton. We are concerned in this case only with the requirement for a final judgment on the merits.

The Court of Appeals has frequently referred to the second element as a “valid and final” judgment. See, e.g., Colandrea, 361 Md. at 387, 761 A.2d at 907 (“ ‘A common and well-established articulation of the doctrine is that “when an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” ’ ”) (quoting Janes v. State, 350 Md. 284, 295, 711 A.2d 1319, 1324 (1998)); Gibson v. State, 328 Md. 687, 693, 616 A.2d 877, 880 (1992) (“The collateral estoppel doctrines operates to a preclusive end, so that when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined once by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot be litigated again between the same parties in a future action.”); Welsh v. Gerber Products, Inc., 315 Md. 510, 516, 555 A.2d 486, 489 (1989) (same); Cousins v. State, 277 Md. 383, 398, 354 A.2d 825, 834 (1976) (same).

Two Rules

The positions of the parties may be stated quite simply. Plaintiffs contend that issue preclusion requires a final judgment and that a jury verdict is not a final judgment. State Farm contends that there has been a trial and a determination within a judicial system of the issue of liability and that, by virtue of the settlement and termination of the proceeding, that factual determination is beyond modification by a court.

The Plaintiffs' position is supported by the traditional statement of the requirements for res judicata. The older authorities equate finality for purposes of appealability with finality for the purpose of res judicata, including claim preclusion, and thus do not give res judicata effect to a jury verdict. 2 Freeman on Judgments § 251 (3d ed. 1881), states:

“No question becomes Res Judicata until it is settled by a final judgment. For this reason, the verdict of a jury is not admissible as evidence to create an estoppel, before it has received the sanction of the court, by passing into a judgment. Until then, it is liable to be made nugatory by an order arresting judgment or granting a new trial.”

(Emphasis in original).

In Oklahoma City v. McMaster, 196 U.S. 529, 533, 25 S.Ct. 324, 325, 49 L.Ed. 587 (1905), the Supreme Court said:

“Without a judgment the plea of res judicata has no foundation; and neither the verdict...