Bryant-Bruce v. State, No. M2002-03059-COA-R3-CV (TN 9/27/2005)

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Unpublished Opinion

GREGORY DAVID BRYANT-BRUCE, JR. ET AL. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE.

No. M2002-03059-COA-R3-CV.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville.

January 9, 2004 Session.

Filed September 27, 2005.

Appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission; No. 96000863; William Baker, Commissioner.

Judgment of the Claims Commission Affirmed.

Brian T. Dunn, Los Angeles, California, for the appellants, Gregory David Bryant-Bruce, Sr. and Cheryl Denise Bryant-Bruce.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and Martha A. Campbell, Senior Counsel, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

William C. Koch, Jr., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which William B. Cain and Frank G. Clement, Jr., JJ., joined.

OPINION

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., P.J., M.S.

This appeal involves a dispute between the State of Tennessee and the parents of a profoundly ill infant regarding the State's responsibility for the medical care the child received while in the State's custody. After regaining custody of their child, the parents filed a claim in the Tennessee Claims Commission against the Tennessee Department of Human Services and certain of its employees, alleging, among other things, that the Department and its employees had negligently failed to investigate the causes of the child's medical condition and had negligently failed to ensure that the child received proper medical care while he was in foster care. After the Commission dismissed the claim in its entirety, the child's mother perfected this appeal on behalf of her son. She raises only one issue — whether the Commission erred by holding that the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity barred her claim that the Department and its employees negligently failed to supervise the medical care her child received while he was in foster care. Even though we have determined that the Commission misapplied the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity in this case, we have concluded, based on the undisputed facts, that the Department was entitled to dismissal of the parents' claim as a matter of law.

I.

Gregory David Bryant-Bruce, Jr. was born prematurely on June 10, 1993 at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. Because of his low birth weight and other complications, the child remained in pediatric intensive care until he was transferred to Vanderbilt University Medical Center ("VUMC") to evaluate his liver function and to assess the need for a liver transplant. On August 4, 1993, Vanderbilt released the child to his parents, Cheryl Bryant-Bruce, an Army physician stationed at Ft. Campbell, and Gregory David Bryant-Bruce, Sr.

The infant was readmitted to VUMC on September 11, 1993, where he remained for nineteen days. In addition to administering antibiotics and transfusions to treat the child's sepsis, the medical staff diagnosed the child with a bleeding disorder known as Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation and also determined that he was suffering from medical neglect and failure to thrive. They reported their concerns to the Tennessee Department of Human Services as required by law. On September 30, 1993, in response to the Bryant-Bruces' requests, VUMC transferred the child to Blanchfield Army Community Hospital ("Blanchfield") in Ft. Campbell, Kentucky. Blanchfield discharged the child to his parent on October 4, 1993.

The child returned to VUMC on October 23, 1993 with a confirmed diagnosis of Respiratory Syncytial Virus. He was treated and released the following day but was readmitted on October 26, 1993 for several surgical procedures and a liver biopsy. He was later discharged in his parents' custody.

On December 7, 1993 physicians at Blanchfield determined that the child had an abnormally low hematocrit rate and immediately transferred him to VUMC where he was admitted with severe anemia. A physician representing the Vanderbilt Committee on Child Abuse examined the child. After observing intracranial and retinal hemorrhaging, the physician concluded that the child was a victim of Shaken Infant Syndrome. This diagnosis was provided to the Department of Human Services as required by law.

On December 11, 1993, during an interview in the Clarksville office of the Department of Human Services, the Bryant-Bruces denied that they had abused their child and requested the Department to arrange for a "differential diagnosis" of their child. Over the course of the next two days, the Bryant-Bruces provided the Department with literature and other information containing explanations other than child abuse for their son's condition. It was during this period of time that Dr. Bryant-Bruce requested an early discharge from the United States Army to better enable her to care for her child.

On December 23, 1993, while the child remained hospitalized at VUMC, the Department filed a petition in the Montgomery County Juvenile Court seeking temporary custody because of the Shaken Infant Syndrome diagnosis. During a hearing on December 28, 1993, the juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem for the child and immediately granted the petition. The child remained hospitalized until mid-January 1994. Upon his release, the Department arranged for him to be placed in a foster home in Nashville and permitted the Bryant-Bruces' to have limited visitation.

Following hearings in February and March 1994, the juvenile court entered an order concluding that the child had been subjected to severe child abuse while in the Bryant-Bruces' custody and, therefore, that the child was dependent and neglected. Accordingly, the juvenile court determined that the child should remain in the Department's custody. During subsequent meetings, the Department's employees told the Bryant-Bruces that they were convinced that the Bryant-Bruces had abused their son and that they had no intention of attempting to reunite the child with his parents.

The Bryant-Bruces appealed the juvenile court's dependent and neglect findings to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. In June 1994, they moved to Atlanta, Georgia. Following their move, the Bryant-Bruces requested that the legal proceedings be transferred to a Georgia court and that their son be examined at Emory University's Egleston Children's Hospital ("Egleston") in Atlanta. The Department denied both requests. Following hearings in July and August 1994, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County determined that the child was dependent and neglected because of severe child abuse while in the Bryant-Bruces' custody. The trial court also determined that the child should remain in the Department's custody.

The child's condition continued to deteriorate during the fall and early winter. Following a supervised visitation on February 9, 1995, the Bryant-Bruces took their child from his foster parents and brought him to Georgia. Their plan was to obtain a second opinion about the cause of their child's medical condition from the physicians at Egleston. An arrest warrant was immediately issued for Dr. Byrant-Bruce, and she was arrested at her child's bedside at Egleston later the same evening.¹

The Department instructed the staff at Egleston not to begin diagnostic testing of the Bryant-Bruces' son. However, following intervention by the Dekalb County Superior Court, the Egleston physicians examined the child and determined that he had Alagille's Syndrome, a genetic disease linked to intracranial and retinal hemorrhaging. The Egleston physicians informed VUMC of their diagnosis, and on March 3, 1995, the child was returned to foster care in Nashville.

Thereafter, on May 23, 1995, the Bryant-Bruces moved to modify the circuit court's earlier order granting the Department custody of their child. The circuit court granted the Bryant-Bruces' motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Following a hearing in June 1995 during which the Bryant-Bruces presented the opinions and conclusions of the Egleston physicians, the circuit court returned custody of the child to the Bryant-Bruces and terminated the Department's further involvement with the family. The Department did not appeal from the circuit court's order.

On May 16, 1996, the Bryant-Bruces filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking to recover $1,000,000 for their son and themselves. They asserted that the Department and its employees had negligently breached their duty (1) to investigate the causes of their son's physical condition, (2) to ensure that their son received adequate medical care while he was in foster care, and (3) to honor their visitation privileges. They also made claims based on malicious prosecution, abuse of legal process, false imprisonment, defamation of character, outrageous conduct, and loss of consortium.

The Bryant-Bruces also filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. They asserted essentially the same claims against the Department and its employees. They also asserted similar claims against the foster care organization and parent with whom their son had been placed and against VUMC and the members of its medical staff who had treated their son. In addition, the Bryant-Bruces asserted a medical negligence claim against VUMC and its staff members.

The Commission stayed consideration of the Bryant-Bruces' claim pending the resolution of the proceeding in the United States District Court. All the defendants in the federal proceeding eventually moved to dismiss the complaint, and VUMC and its staff also moved for a partial summary judgment based on their immunity under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-410(a) (2001).² On July 3, 1997, the District Court dismissed all the claims against the Department and its employees, as well as the foster care organization and the foster parent, because the Bryant-Bruces had waived their right to seek judicial relief against these parties by filing an essentially identical claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission. Bryant-Bruce v....