Bryant v. Carpenter

322 So.3d 1052

Frankie BRYANT, administrator of the Estate of Deitrick Bryant, deceased

v.Elston CARPENTER and Athelyn Jordan, individually and in their official capacities as officers of the Greene County Sheriff's Office

1180843

Supreme Court of Alabama.

September 18, 2020

Gene T. Moore, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.

J. Randall McNeill and Jamie H. Kidd of Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, for appellees.

MITCHELL, Justice.

Deitrick Bryant ("Deitrick") committed suicide in his cell while he was an inmate at the Greene County jail. Deitrick's mother, as the administrator of his estate, sued two jail employees, alleging that their negligence allowed Deitrick's suicide to happen. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the jail employees, and Deitrick's mother appeals. We affirm the judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

On April 3, 2012, an investigator from the Greene County Sheriff's Office attempted to arrest Deitrick on an outstanding warrant. While he was being handcuffed, Deitrick knocked the investigator down and fled the premises. Later that evening, Greene County Sheriff Joe Benison and several deputies went to Deitrick's last known address and found him hiding in a freezer. After he was handcuffed, Deitrick knocked down a deputy, again broke away, and began to run. Deputy Jeremy Rancher pursued him and ultimately used a stun gun to subdue him and take him into custody. Deitrick was then transported to the Greene County jail.

It is undisputed that Deitrick was compliant while being booked into the jail. As part of the intake process, Deitrick was asked about his health and medical history and he gave no indication that he was in pain or had any injuries, nor did he express any suicidal ideations. Jail employee Elston Carpenter assisted in the intake process by searching Deitrick and supervising him while he changed into jail clothes. According to Carpenter, Deitrick never complained that he was in pain, expressed suicidal ideations, or indicated that "he was even depressed."

Based on the aggressive behavior Deitrick exhibited both times the sheriff's office attempted to take him into custody, he was placed in an isolation cell in the booking area. That cell was visible to staff in the booking area and monitored remotely by staff in the security-control room, where 36 monitors showed live feeds of various areas throughout the jail. No camera was dedicated exclusively to Deitrick's cell, but his cell door and window were within the area monitored by a camera located in the booking area.

The next day, April 4, Deitrick's mother, Frankie Bryant, visited the Greene County courthouse to inquire about having Deitrick released on bond. She states that she spoke with a district court judge and Sheriff Benison and that she told Sheriff Benison that Deitrick did not need to be in jail because "he [was] not well." Nevertheless, Deitrick was not released on bond, and he remained in jail. Carpenter states that his interactions with Deitrick in jail that day were normal, that they talked while Deitrick was eating his food, and that Deitrick said he wanted to talk to his grandmother.

On April 5, at 4:00 P.M., Carpenter reported to work. He states that, as he came in, he asked Deitrick how he was doing and that Deitrick replied that he was fine.

About an hour later, jail employee Athelyn Jordan, who also began her shift at 4:00 P.M., had her first and only interaction with Deitrick when they spoke while she was passing through the booking area.¹ Jordan states that Deitrick told her that he had been sexually assaulted sometime before he was jailed and that he needed to see a doctor. Jordan testified that Deitrick "did not seem alarmed, distressed, or emotional" when he told her about the sexual assault and that she told him she would pass that information along.

A video recorded by the camera in the booking area shows that approximately an hour later, at 6:11 P.M., Deitrick committed suicide by hanging himself with his bed sheet. At 6:39 P.M., another inmate who was passing through the booking area saw Deitrick's body and used a call box to contact Carpenter in the security-control room. Carpenter and the inmate got Deitrick down and telephoned emergency medical personnel, but Deitrick was pronounced dead on the scene.

Bryant sued various entities and individuals associated with Greene County and the Greene County Sheriff's Office, including Carpenter and Jordan, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, alleging that excessive force had been used during Deitrick's arrest, that he had not been provided with proper medical care, and that the defendants' negligence had proximately caused Deitrick's death. The federal district court dismissed Bryant's lawsuit after concluding that none of her federal claims were viable. But the court noted in its order of dismissal that Bryant could refile some of her claims in state court if she concluded that those claims were "appropriate and supported by law." Bryant v. Greene Cnty., No. 7:14-CV-519-LSC, July 23, 2014 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (not reported in F.Supp.).

One week later, Bryant did precisely that, filing a wrongful-death action against Greene County; the Greene County commissioners, in their official capacities; and Carpenter, Jordan, and Barbara Collins, the administrator of the Greene County jail, in their individual and official capacities, in the Greene Circuit Court. Bryant eventually withdrew her claims against all defendants except Carpenter and Jordan.

Bryant's complaint alleged that Carpenter and Jordan failed to follow proper procedures for monitoring Deitrick and that they failed to provide him with necessary medical care. Carpenter and Jordan denied Bryant's allegations and moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) that Bryant's claims against them were barred by § 14-6-1, Ala. Code 1975, which extends the State immunity held by sheriffs to individuals employed by a sheriff "to carry out [the sheriff's] duty to operate the jail and supervise the inmates housed therein" provided that those employees "are acting within the line and scope of their duties and are acting in compliance with the law," and (2) that Deitrick's death was unforeseeable. The trial court granted Carpenter and Jordan's motion and entered a summary judgment in their favor. Bryant appealed.

Standard of Review

When a party "appeals from a summary judgment, our review is de novo." Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C., 792 So. 2d 369, 372 (Ala. 2000). We therefore apply the same standard of review the trial court used to determine whether the trial court had before it substantial evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that must be resolved by the factfinder. Id. "Substantial evidence" is "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved."

West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). We further note that, in reviewing a summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and entertain such reasonable inferences as the jury would have been free to draw. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n v. ECO Pres. Servs., L.L.C., 788 So. 2d 121, 127 (Ala. 2000).

Analysis

Bryant's brief is largely devoted to arguing that Carpenter and Jordan are not entitled to immunity. Bryant references § 14-6-1 –– the statute that is the basis of Carpenter and Jordan's claim of immunity –– but the vast majority of her argument focuses on the doctrine of State-agent immunity. This Court has yet to definitively articulate how § 14-6-1 should be interpreted. And while we might interpret § 14-6-1 in a manner that would dispose of this case, it would not be prudent for us to make an interpretation of that statute here, when one party's arguments are largely directed to other issues, unless the posture of the case requires us to do so.² See Cook Transps., Inc. v. Beavers, 528 So. 2d 875, 878 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (explaining that an issue of first impression regarding the proper application of a statute "must await a better vehicle for interpretation"). Ultimately, however, we do not have to interpret § 14-6-1 or decide whether it applies because the trial court's judgment is due to be affirmed on the other basis of Carpenter and Jordan's summary-judgment motion –– that Deitrick's suicide was not foreseeable.

This Court has previously decided appeals involving wrongful-death claims stemming from the suicides of individuals being kept in law-enforcement or mental-health facilities. In Popham v. City of Talladega, 582 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 1991), the Court explained the circumstances under which a party might bear liability for such a suicide:

"The controlling factor in determining whether there may be a recovery for a failure to prevent a suicide is whether the defendants reasonably should have anticipated that the deceased would attempt to harm himself. Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 751, 782–92 (1950). In Keebler v. Winfield Carraway Hospital, 531 So. 2d 841 (Ala. 1988), this Court held ‘that foreseeability of a decedent's suicide is legally sufficient only if the deceased had a history of suicidal proclivities, or manifested suicidal proclivities in the presence of the defendant, or was admitted to the facility of the defendant because of a suicide attempt.' Keeton v. Fayette County, 558 So. 2d 884, 887 (Ala. 1989)."

See also City of Crossville v. Haynes, 925 So. 2d 944, 951 (Ala. 2005) ("Th[e] test of foreseeability [set forth in Popham ] remains the law applicable today in determining whether a duty to prevent a suicide exists."). Applying this test to the facts of Bryant's case, a factfinder could not conclude that Carpenter and Jordan reasonably should have anticipated that Deitrick would attempt to harm himself while he was incarcerated in the Greene County jail.

A. Deitrick had no history of...