Bryant v. Covina-Valley Unified Sch. Dist.

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Alisia Yvonne Bryant v. Covina-Valley Unified School District et al.

No. CV 17-1274 PSG (AJWx)

United States District Court, C.D. California

January 10, 2023

Present: The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez, United States District Judge

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Proceedings (In Chambers): Order GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN PART Defendant's motion to dismiss

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Covina-Valley Unified School District (“Defendant”). See Dkt. # 34 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff Alisia Yvonne Bryant (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion, see Dkt. # 35 (“Opp.”), and Defendant timely replied, see Dkt. # 36 (“Reply”). The Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); L.R. 7-15. Having considered the moving papers, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant's motion to dismiss.

I. Background

The factual background of this action-which stems from Defendant's alleged discrimination against Plaintiff during her employment-was fully described in the Court's previous order granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's original complaint. See Dkt. # 32 (“MTD Order”), at 1-4. Plaintiff alleges that, from September 2002 until October 28, 2015, she experienced “a long-running pattern and practice of continuous misconduct” perpetrated by Defendant and its employees. See First Amended Complaint, Dkt. # 33 (“FAC”), ¶ 13. This includes “discrimination based on her status as an African-American woman as well as due to her decision to exercise her rights regarding workplace injuries she sustained during the course of her employment.” Id. ¶ 15. She further claims that she “was subjected to a hostile work environment, denied equal employment benefits, reduced employment benefits, and unjustified disciplinary actions,” actions that were allegedly sanctioned by Defendant through various supervisors, administrators, and decision-makers. Id.

On or about July 26, 2016, Plaintiff claims that she submitted a request for a charge of discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which “specifically asserted that Plaintiff was the victim of discrimination based on race, disability, and retaliation and provided detailed examples of the same.” Id. ¶ 11. On or about November 22 2016, the EEOC issued a “Dismissal and Notice of Rights,” thus satisfying the administrative prerequisite for filing this suit. Id. ¶ 12.

On October 16, 2017, the Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's original complaint. See generally MTD Order. After noting that “Title VII claimants generally establish federal court jurisdiction by first exhausting their EEOC administrative remedies,” id. at 5 (quoting Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990)), and that Title VII requires that a plaintiff file a complaint with the EEOC within either 180 or 300 days after the alleged misconduct, see MTD Order at 6-7, the Court concluded that Plaintiff's action was barred because the only alleged misconduct that occurred even within 300 days of her EEOC filing was a negative performance review, which “alone does not constitute an adverse employment action.” Id. at 7. Because “the Court conclude[d] that Plaintiff ha[d] not alleged a cognizable claim within the statutory period,” all of her causes of actions were therefore barred. Id. at 7-8. The Court ultimately granted Plaintiff leave to amend because “the principal defect of Plaintiff's [] causes of action [was] that no allegedly adverse employment action occurred during the statutory period prior to her filing with the EEOC, which could be cured by amendment.” Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).

Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) on November 9, 2017, in which she repeats the factual narrative described in the Court's previous order and asserts the following causes of action: racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, FAC ¶¶ 100-03; retaliation for engaging in protected activities, id. ¶¶ 104-09; violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, id. ¶¶ 110-13; and hostile and abusive work environment, id. ¶¶ 114-20.

Defendant now moves to dismiss the FAC, arguing that it “fails to remedy the fatal flaws that existed in [Plaintiff's] original Complaint.” Mot. 1:7-8.

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In assessing the adequacy of the complaint, the court must accept all pleaded facts as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Turner v. City & Cty. of S.F., 788 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2015); Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). The court then determines whether the complaint “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Accordingly, “for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

“Title VII claimants generally establish federal court jurisdiction by first exhausting their EEOC administrative remedies. Therefore [i]ncidents of discrimination not included in an EEOC charge may not be considered by a federal court unless the new claims are like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge.” Sosa, 920 F.2d at 1456; see also EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994) (“To establish federal subject matter jurisdiction, [plaintiff] was required to exhaust her EEOC administrative remedies before seeking federal adjudication of her claims.”). This administrative requirement also attaches to claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act. See Vinieratos v. United States, 939 F.2d 762, 773 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] federal employee who alleges employment discrimination on the basis of a handicap [under the Rehabilitation Act] must exhaust the administrative remedies available under Title VII.”). Therefore, because each of Plaintiff's causes of actions is premised on some combination of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, this action requires that she had first exhausted her administrative remedies by timely filing with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002).

Title VII requires that a “charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (emphasis added). That timeframe is extended to 300 days “in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice.” Id.; see also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002). Here, Plaintiff has alleged that she “filed several EEOC complaints throughout her employment, including but not limited to filing in 2008, 2009, [and] 2015.” FAC ¶ 93. Accordingly, the Court will apply the 300-day window because Plaintiff previously instituted proceedings with the EEOC.

Because Plaintiff filed the EEOC claim that served as a prerequisite for this action on July 26, 2016, at least one act of discrimination or retaliation must have occurred within 300 days of that date; in other words, on or after September 30, 2015. Plaintiff's FAC contains a catalogue of alleged adverse actions undertaken by Defendant and its employees, spanning a period of more than a decade. However, only two of these alleged acts occurred within the 300-day window: a negative performance review and, after Plaintiff's employment with Defendant ended, a denial of unemployment benefits.^[1]

Plaintiff alleges that on or about September 30, 2015, she received a negative work performance review “without true justification,” which, she contends, “continue[d] the ongoing discriminatory and unfair treatment she [] continuously received from Defendant.” Id. ¶ 85. However, as the Court discussed in its previous order, various courts have recognized that a negative performance review, without more, does not constitute an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[F]ormal criticism or poor performance evaluations are [not] necessarily adverse actions and they should not be considered such if they did not affect[] the [employee's] grade or salary.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Kortan v. California, 5 F.Supp.2d 843, 853 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1996); Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 18 F.3d 890, 896 (10th Cir. 1994)) (“A negative evaluation alone, without any concomitant adverse impact, such as a demotion or a change of responsibilities, is not cognizable.”). The negative review cannot therefore serve as a sufficient event within the 300-day window.

Plaintiff's only other allegation that falls within the 300-day timeframe is that Defendant “wrongfully denied [her] unemployment benefits after she was terminated,” an issue that apparently continues to today. FAC ¶¶ 87, 90. Defendant asserts that “this post-employment event cannot be considered an adverse employment action, as by their...