Bryant v. Mayor of Balt.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge

Plaintiff La'Tonya Bryant (“Bryant” or “Plaintiff”), a former Baltimore City employee, brought suit against Defendants Mayor and City Council of Baltimore; Quinton M. Herbert, individually and in his official capacity; and City of Baltimore, Department of Human Resources (“the City” or “Defendants”) alleging thirteen counts of employment discrimination under both Maryland and Federal law. (See Compl., ECF No. 2.) Specifically, Bryant raises claims under the Maryland Fair Employment Practice Act (“MFEPA”), Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 20-602 et seq; the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C § 2601 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Bryant originally filed her case in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland. (See Case No. 24-C-20-004750.) On March 3, 2021, Defendants sought removal of the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), invoking federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

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1331 and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.) Presently pending before this Court are Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (“Partial Motion to Dismiss”) (ECF No. 9) and Bryant's Motion to Remand to State Court (ECF No. 14). The parties' submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons that follow, the Bryant's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 14) is DENIED and Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART.

BACKGROUND

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts in a complaint and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015)). Plaintiff La'Tonya Bryant is a resident of Ellicott City, Maryland. (ECF No. 2 ¶ 1.) Defendant Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, a municipal corporation, operates a municipality and local government in Maryland. (Id. ¶ 2.) Defendant City of Baltimore, Department of Human Resources is an agency governed, administered, and funded by Defendant Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. (Id. ¶ 3.) Defendant Quinton M. Herbert was at all times relevant and remains the Interim Director and Chief Human Capital Officer for the City of Baltimore, Department of Human Resources. (Id. ¶ 4.)

From August 2012 until November 9, 2018, Bryant worked for the City of Baltimore, Department of Human Resources (“the Department”). (Id. ¶ 10.) Her title at the conclusion of her employment was Deputy Director of Human Resources Administration. (Id.) In or

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about late September 2018, Bryant communicated with Defendant Quinton Herbert, and indicated that she would soon require medical leave to have surgery on her Achilles tendon to repair a tear. (Id. ¶ 13.) The injury to her Achilles tendon caused Bryant difficulty performing daily functions like walking, lifting, bending, and sitting. (Id. ¶ 14.) Prior to her surgery, Bryant walked with a limp, wore an orthopedic boot cast, and participated in physical therapy for the better part of a year. (Id.)

When Bryant explained her need to take medical leave, Herbert expressed frustration and displeasure. (Id. ¶ 15.) On prior occasions, the Department had discouraged Bryant from taking leave. (Id. ¶ 16.) Nevertheless, Bryant decided to take medical leave and submitted Family and Medical Leave Act paperwork to the Department in advance of her surgery. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Bryant underwent surgery on November 6, 2018. (Id. ¶ 18.) Just three days later, on November 9, 2018, Bryant's employment was terminated. (Id. ¶ 19.)

While Bryant had accrued sufficient paid leave to cover most of her period of medical leave, the majority of this leave was not paid out in her final paycheck. (Id. ¶ 20.) At the time of her termination, Bryant was 51 years old. She was replaced by an employee who had been transferred from another department. That employee was in her 30s. (Id. ¶ 21.) Despite considerable efforts, Bryant was unable to find new employment for over a year after her termination. Her final salary before her termination was approximately $133, 000.00. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) Due to the loss of income, Bryant moved out of her home and into an apartment. She struggled to provide for her family and sought mental health counseling for the first time in her life. (Id. ¶ 26.)

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On September 4, 2019, Bryant filed a Charge of Discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which was cross-filed with the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights. (Id. ¶ 27.) In her Charge, Bryant alleged discrimination on the basis of disability and age as well as retaliation. (Id.) On October 27, 2020, Bryant received notification from the EEOC of her right of file suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. On October 29, 2020, Bryant received a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC authorizing her to file suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. (Id. ¶ 29.)

On November 9, 2020, Bryant filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. (ECF No. 14-2.) Defendant Quinton Herbert was served with Bryant's complaint on February 3, 2021. (Id.) Defendants Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and City of Baltimore, Department of Human Resources were served on February 5, 2021. (Id.) On March 3, 2021, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal with this Court. (ECF No.1.) On March 8, 2021, Defendants filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss Bryant's complaint. (ECF No. 9.) On April 2, 2021, Bryant filed a Motion to Remand to State Court. (ECF No. 14.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Remand Standard

A defendant in a state civil action may remove the case to federal court only if the federal court can exercise original jurisdiction over at least one of the asserted claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(c). Once an action is removed to federal court, the plaintiff may file a motion to remand the case to state court if there is a contention that jurisdiction is defective. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction in the federal court. Johnson v. Advance America, 549 F.3d 932, 935 (4th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff

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may also seek to remand a case to state court where a defendant does not comply with the procedural requirements of the removal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). A plaintiff must make such a motion within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal. Id.; see also Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 2008). On a motion to remand, this Court must “strictly construe the removal statute and resolve all doubts in favor of remanding the case to state court.” Richardson v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 950 F.Supp. 700, 701-02 (D. Md. 1997) (citation omitted); see also Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 815-16 (4th Cir. 2004).

II. 12(b)(6) Standard

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is “to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).

To survive a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl., Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Under the plausibility standard, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). A complaint need not

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include “detailed factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint must, however, set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to plead a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see A Soc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011).

ANALYSIS

I. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand

Plaintiff argues that this case should be remanded back to state court because Defendants allegedly did not comply with the procedural requirements of the removal statute. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the City did not “promptly” file a copy of its notice of removal with the Circuit Court for Baltimore City after filing the notice with this Court as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). The City argues that it did comply with the requirements of § 1446(d) because it filed a notice of removal with the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, albeit under an erroneous case number.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) requires a defendant seeking to remove a civil action from state...