Bryant v. Norfolk S. R.R.

BOBBY W. BRYANT, JR., Plaintiff, v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILROAD andJASON McWILLIAMS, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:20-cv-00225-TES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

December 22, 2020

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Bobby Bryant, Jr., ("Bryant") sued Jason McWilliams ("McWilliams") and Norfolk Southern Railroad ("Norfolk Southern") under Title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964 and various state law causes of action. Before the Court are McWilliams's and Norfolk Southern's Motions to Dismiss [Doc. 26] [Doc. 29] Bryant's Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 24].

BACKGROUND

Bryant filed his original Complaint on June 10, 2020. [Doc. 1]. McWilliams moved to dismiss Bryant's original Complaint for three main reasons: (1) Plaintiff may not assert a claim for sexual harassment against McWilliams under federal law and "[t]o the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief against McWilliams in his individual capacity for allegedly violating Title VII, his claims must be dismissed"; (2) Plaintiff could not allege a claim for sexual harassment against Defendant McWilliams under Georgia law because no such claim exists; and (3) Plaintiff's "[d]ubious" state-law claim against McWilliams fails under Iqbal/Twombly. [Doc. 7, pp. 3-4]. Bryant then filed an amended Complaint on July 22, 2020. [Doc. 12]. In his amended Complaint, Bryant merely incorporated his entire original Complaint by reference and then sought to add new facts and claims against McWilliams. [Id.]. Upon review of the Plaintiff's amended Complaint, the Court found it to be a prohibited shotgun pleading and sua sponte struck it. [Doc. 23]. In the Court's order, the Court allowed Bryant to file a Second Amended Complaint and gave Bryant specific instructions to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 10(b) and state each claim against each defendant in a separate count. [Id. at p. 15].

Bryant then filed his Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 24]. In it, Bryant again complains that McWilliams, his fellow Norfolk Southern employee, sexually harassed him over the course of four days in August 2019. [Id. at ¶ 20]. Specifically, Bryant claims that McWilliams made overt sexual remarks to him, touched and rubbed against him, rubbed his penis against him, threatened to rape and sodomize him, tried to kiss him, and generally acted in a hostile and aggressive manner towards him. [Id. at ¶¶ 20, 55]. Bryant sued McWilliams for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence per se under Georgia law. [Id. at ¶¶ 69-88].

Bryant claims that Norfolk Southern, as McWilliams's employer, is responsible for failing to intervene and prevent McWilliams from harassing Bryant as well as the resulting hostile work environment to which McWilliams subjected him. [Id. at ¶¶ 39, 41]. Bryant also seems to allege that Norfolk Southern improperly fired him. [Id. at ¶ 51].

Bryant invokes the Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by way of Bryant's Title VII claims (federal question jurisdiction). [Id. at ¶12]. Bryant invokes the Court's supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for his state law claims since they arise from the same case or controversy as the Title VII claims. [Id.].

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, district courts must accept the facts set forth in the complaint as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007). A complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it alleges sufficient factual matter (accepted as true) that states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009)). In fact, a well-pled complaint "may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citations omitted).

Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does require "more than [ ] unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]." McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (citation omitted). To decide whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, district courts use a two-step framework. Id. The first step is to identify the allegations that are "no more than mere conclusions." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). "Conclusory allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. (citation omitted). After disregarding the conclusory allegations, the second step is to "assume any remaining factual allegations are true and determine whether those factual allegations 'plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.''' Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

Furthermore, a complaint attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion must be dismissed if it fails to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "A plaintiff must plead more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "To be sure, a plaintiff may use legal conclusions to structure his complaint, but legal conclusions 'must be supported by factual allegations.'" McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). While courts, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true; they are not bound to accept a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts must "identify conclusory allegations and thendiscard them—not 'on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical' but because their conclusory nature 'disentitles them to the presumption of truth.'" McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681).

The issue to be decided when considering a motion to dismiss is not whether the claimant will ultimately prevail, but "whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scheuer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). The factual allegations in a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and cannot "merely create[] a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545, 555. Finally, complaints that tender "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement'" will not survive against a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Stated differently, the complaint must allege enough facts "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" supporting a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

B. Claims Against Norfolk Southern

Bryant sues Norfolk Southern for gender discrimination under Title VII [Doc. 24, ¶¶ 34-44] ("Count One"), wrongful termination [id. at ¶¶ 45-53] ("Count Two"), and vicarious liability [id. at ¶¶ 89-93] ("Count Eight"). Bryant also sues Norfolk Southern for a generic claim [Doc. 24, ¶¶ 54-68] ("Count Three") titled "Defendant Norfolk Southern Railroad unlawfully subjected Plaintiff to a hostile work environment."

1. Count Three Violates Rule 8(a) and 10(b)

Norfolk Southern argues that Bryant's Second Amended Complaint suffers from the same "shotgun pleading" deficiencies as his original and amended complaints. Norfolk Southern wants the Court to dismiss Bryant's entire Second Amended Complaint on this basis. The Court described Bryant's original Complaint as follows:

Plaintiff's first and second claims are titled as follows: (1) "Race/Gender Based Discrimination in Violation of Title VII"; and (2) "Wrongful Termination in Violation of Title VII." Plaintiff does not title his third claim, but generally alleges that Defendant McWilliams is liable to him "in tort."

[Doc. 23, p. 3 (citations omitted)]. Overall, the Court finds that Bryant's Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 24] no longer suffers from all of the pleading shortfalls that doomed his original Complaint. In other words, Bryant's Second Amended Complaint is not a "shotgun pleading." Each count, for the most part, contains the facts Bryant seeks to use to support that count. Regarding McWilliams, Bryant specifies which state law claims he brings and alleges them discretely. Because Bryant's Second Amended Complaint, as a whole, is not a shotgun pleading, the Court DENIES Norfolk Southern's motion to dismiss the entire Second Amended Complaint.

Count Three, however, in the diplomatic words of Norfolk Southern, "continue[s] to confuse." [Doc. 29, p. 2]. In this somewhat rambling count, Bryant makes mention of potential claims for negligence, negligent hiring, negligent retention, Title VII hostile work environment, or for other torts committed by McWilliams by way of the respondeat superior doctrine. See [Doc. 24, ¶¶ 54-68]. What is clear, however, is thatBryant failed to follow the instructions the Court gave to him in its earlier Order [Doc. 23]. Bryant never clearly identifies his specific cause of action against Norfolk Southern in Count Three. For example, while Bryant names Count Three as one for hostile work environment, the Court cannot easily decipher whether Bryant seeks to state several claims in this one count, or if he is incorporating negligence and vicarious liability principles into a hostile work environment claim. Bryant only compounds the confusion as to Count Three because Count Eight also focuses on Norfolk Southern's alleged vicarious liability for McWilliams's actions. See [Doc. 24, ¶¶ 89-93]. Further, Bryant also claims hostile work environment in Count One [Doc. 24, ¶ 39] and Count Three.

Count Three suffers from the same pitfalls as Bryant's Original and Amended Complaints that the Court struck down as a shotgun pleading. See [Doc. 23]. The Court gave Bryant...