Bucklew v. Charter Commc'ns

GARY BUCKLEW, Plaintiff, v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Defendant.

Case No: 8:19-cv-2029-TPB-AAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

April 5, 2021

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on "Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law," filed on December 9, 2020. (Doc. 36). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion on January 19, 2020. (Doc. 44). Defendant filed a reply on February 16, 2021. (Doc. 50). Based on the motion, response, reply, court file, and record, the Court finds as follows:

Background

Plaintiff Gary Bucklew worked for Bright House Networks from 2006 to 2016, when Defendant Charter Communications took over operations from Bright House and became Plaintiff's employer. As a Business Solutions Field Supervisor, Plaintiff supervised a team of about 20 agents. The agents accepted calls from approximately 100 field technicians who provided services to Charter customers. Plaintiff's desk was in a raised cubicle on the dispatch center floor where his team worked and adjacent to the work areas for other teams.

Plaintiff testified he was prescribed opioids to treat pain resulting from a neck injury, arthritis and/or anxiety, but Plaintiff's taking these medications did not impact his work directly. In 2016, he asked for and received FMLA leave to participate in a detoxification program to reduce the dosage of his medications. He returned to work and continued in his same position without issue.

On April 7, 2017, however, Plaintiff's supervisor, Manager Roger Worden, observed that Plaintiff was unresponsive to messages and sounded groggy. He later observed Plaintiff sleeping at his desk.¹ Worden woke Plaintiff and told him that if Worden returned and found Plaintiff asleep again, he would be sent home. On April 18, 2017, Worden received complaints that Plaintiff was disturbing others with personal calls while at his desk. Worden counseled Plaintiff to keep personal calls to a minimum and avoid disturbing others. Plaintiff responded that it would not happen again. On April 27, 2017, Plaintiff attended a company barbecue where hewas given tasks to perform. Both Worden and Saldarriaga observed that Plaintiff appeared disoriented and lethargic and was slurring his words.

On May 3, 2017, Worden received another complaint from Plainitff's co-workers about Plaintiff making personal calls. Worden again counseled Plaintiff on the issue and the next day communicated with Defendant's human resources department about possible corrective action for ongoing problems with Plaintiff. However, no formal action was taken at that point.

On August 3, 2017, Worden sent an instant message to Plaintiff stating that he noticed Plaintiff falling asleep at his desk again. Plaintiff responded that he would be "extra careful about appearing drowsy" and that it was "not a repeat performance, promise." (Doc. 36-3 at 137-38). On August 9, 2017, Plaintiff failed to complete a document and failed to schedule interviews with job applicants, requiring Worden to contact the human resources department to schedule the interviews. On August 10, 2017, Worden observed Plaintiff again making a personal call from his desk, loudly disputing an insurance bill.

On August 11, 2017, Worden received complaints that Plaintiff had been observed exhibiting strange behavior and conversation and was asleep at his desk. Worden himself observed this conduct and he called over Director David Saldarriaga, Worden's supervisor, who also observed it. Saldarriaga awakened Plaintiff and warned him that this conduct was unacceptable. Worden and Saldarriaga thereupon recommended to the human resources department thatPlaintiff be formally disciplined. The human resources department agreed that disciplinary action should be taken.

On August 16, 2018, however, before any further action by Defendant, Plaintiff went on FMLA leave to enter a detoxification program to withdraw completely from the use of opioids. On August 17, 2017, while on leave, Plaintiff e-mailed co-employees stating that his doctors expected him to be fully recovered by August 25, 2017 and to be able to return to work "100%" by August 28, 2020. (Doc. 36-3 at 201). Plaintiff stated that he was "working with doctors to find the right combination of medications that will put an end to a combination of the narcolepsy (uncontrollable daytime sleeping), and hopefully I can become a valuable member of the team again, and for some time to come." (Id.)

Plaintiff returned from his FMLA leave on August 28, 2017. On September 5, 2017, Plaintiff failed to ensure coverage for routing of field technicians in Tampa, resulting in a two-hour gap in coverage. The same day, Worden and Saldarriaga, along with Anna Ciserano from Defendant's human resources department, met with Plaintiff and counseled him regarding sleeping on the job and other performance issues. They specifically warned Plaintiff that further problems could result in termination. On September 13, 2017, Plaintiff was again observed asleep at his desk, and at that point Worden and Saldarriaga recommended that Plaintiff be terminated. Worden, Saldarriaga, Vice President John Doctor, and Regional Vice President Mike Robertson participated in the decision to terminate Plaintiff.Saldarriaga, Worden, and Ciserano met with Plaintiff on September 18, 2017 and informed him of the decision.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging claims for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate a disability under the Florida Civil Rights Act ("FCRA"), interference with benefits under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA), and retaliation under the FMLA. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on these claims.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A properly supported motion for summary judgment is not defeated by the existence of a factual dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Only the existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude summary judgment. Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). When the moving party has discharged its burden, the nonmoving party must then designate specific facts showing the existence of genuine issues of material fact. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995). If there is a conflict between the parties' allegations or evidence, the nonmoving party's evidence is presumed to be true and all reasonableinferences must be drawn in the nonmoving party's favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003).

Analysis

FCRA Discrimination

Disability discrimination claims under FCRA are governed by the same principles as claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiff must show: (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he is a "qualified individual" such that he could perform the essential functions of his position with or without accommodation; and (3) that he was discriminated against because of his disability. See, e.g., Berard v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 8:10-cv-2221-T-26MAP, 2011 WL 4632062, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2011).

Disability discrimination includes both failing to provide the employee with a reasonable accommodation for the disability and subjecting the employee to disparate treatment because of the disability. See Holly, 492 F.3d at 1261-62; Toliver v. City of Jacksonville, 3:15-cv-1010-J-34JRK, 2017 WL 1196637, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2017). Plaintiff alleges both types of discrimination.

Defendant raises multiple arguments in support of summary judgment on Plaintiff's discrimination claims. Because the Court finds the arguments discussed below dispositive, the Court will not address the other points Defendant has raised. The discussion below therefore assumes, without deciding, that Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies, that he properly pled the claims hecurrently asserts, that he had a disability (specifically, the symptoms resulting from opioid withdrawal), and that the claimed disability is entitled to protection under FCRA.

Failure to Accommodate

Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not a "qualified" person entitled to relief under FCRA, a requirement for both failure to accommodate and disparate treatment claims. To be "qualified," the employee must be able to perform the essential functions of the job, even if reasonable accommodation is needed to allow him to do so. See, e.g., Cremeens v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 427 F. App'x 855, 857 (11th Cir. 2011) ("If the particular function is essential, an ADA plaintiff must show that he can perform it either without accommodation or with a reasonable accommodation) (internal quotation omitted); Morris-Huse v. GEICO, 748 F. App'x 264, 267 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Holly, 492 F.3d at 1256). An accommodation is reasonable "only if it enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job." Holly, 492 F.3d at 1256. (emphasis added).

Plaintiff supervised 20 agents who took calls from 100 field technicians. His duties were "fast paced and fluid" and included dealing with service outages and other emergencies. (Doc. 36-3 at 62). There is no doubt that remaining awake and alert throughout the day was essential to Plaintiff's job as a supervisor, and Plaintiff does not contend otherwise. See, e.g., Smith v. Sturgill, 516 F. App'x 775, 776-77 (11th Cir. 2013) (security officer who could not remain awake due to sleep apnea was "unable to fulfill the essential functions of a Security Officer asestablished by...