Buckley v. El Dorado Enters., Inc.

REBECCA M. BUCKLEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. EL DORADO ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

B282204

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE

May 16, 2018

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC535634)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mel Red Recana, Judge. Affirmed.

Letizia Law Firm and Clarice J. Letizia for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria, Jonathan W. Brown; Mark S. Hoffman, Mark S. Hoffman and Erika L. Mansky for Defendant and Respondent.

____________________ Rebecca M. Buckley¹ (Buckley) sued her former employer, El Dorado Enterprises, Inc. (El Dorado) for employment discrimination. Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the trial court ordered the case to binding arbitration. The arbitrator issued an award purportedly disposing of all issues submitted for arbitration. Although the arbitrator found that Buckley prevailed on two of her six claims, he did not award her any monetary damages, because she "suffered no actual out of pocket loss." In issuing his award, the arbitrator observed that Buckley had not sought to recover her attorney fees. Three months later, following a postaward motion by Buckley, the arbitrator issued a second award, granting Buckley, as the "prevailing party," her attorney fees and costs.

Buckley subsequently petitioned the trial court to confirm the two awards, while El Dorado moved to vacate the second award. The trial court confirmed the initial award but vacated the second award on the ground that it exceeded the arbitrator's powers.

On appeal, Buckley argues that the trial court erred because, under the rules governing the arbitration, the arbitrator had the authority to issue the second, supplemental fee award. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the trial court's order.

BACKGROUND

In May 2012, El Dorado hired Buckley as a snack bar attendant. At that time, Buckley signed a written agreement committing her to resolve any legal controversy that might arise between her and El Dorado through binding arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Any such arbitration would be conducted pursuant to the then-applicable Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedures of the AAA (the Rules).

Five months later, in October 2012, Buckley informed El Dorado that she was pregnant. In January 2013, six months into her pregnancy, Buckley advised El Dorado that based on her doctor's orders; she could not lift buckets full of ice due to their weight. El Dorado requested a written note from Buckley's doctor regarding any work restrictions arising from her pregnancy. After Buckley provided a written note from her doctor stating that she was not to lift more than 15 pounds, El Dorado advised her that it could not accommodate the work restriction. On January 17, 2013, El Dorado placed Buckley on a temporary pregnancy leave of absence without pay.

After being placed on leave, Buckley retained legal counsel. On February 12, 2013, Buckley filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing. A week later, on February 19, 2013, El Dorado allowed Buckley to return to work under her doctor's weight-lifting restriction. At that time, El Dorado compensated Buckley for all back pay that was owed to her while on unpaid pregnancy leave.

A year later, in February 2014, Buckley sued El Dorado in state court alleging six causes of action: pregnancy discrimination; failure to accommodate; failure to engage in the interactive process; retaliation; harassment; and failure to prevent harassment, retaliation, and discrimination. A number of her claims, including her pregnancy discrimination and failure to accommodate claims, were based expressly on purported violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) (FEHA). By her complaint, Buckley sought, among other things, compensatory damages, damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, and her "attorney[ ] fees as provided by statute."²

In April 2014, the parties stipulated to binding arbitration before the AAA and, in May 2014, the trial court ordered the parties to arbitration.

I. The July 2016 award

On July 11, 2016, the AAA sent a letter to the parties confirming that the arbitration hearing had been "completed on July 7, 2016, and declared closed by the arbitrator on that date." The letter further advised the parties that "the arbitrator shall have 30 days from that date, or until August 8, 2016 to render the Award."

On July 29, 2016, within the 30-day window to issue an award, the AAA transmitted to the parties the arbitrator's signed award (the July award). In transmitting the July award, the AAA advised the parties that it had verified that the arbitrator had "submitted all requests for compensation" and that the AAA had "conducted a final reconciliation of the finances."

The July award confirmed that the "matter was considered submitted to the Arbitrator after receipt of the parties' post hearing briefs on July 7, 2016." As to the merits of Buckley's claims, the arbitrator found in her favor on her pregnancy discrimination and failure to accommodate claims, but against her on all of her remaining claims.

Although Buckley had prevailed on two of her claims, the arbitrator did not award her any compensatory damages for the following reason: "[Buckley] was put on an unpaid leave of absence for one month. She was reinstated with full back pay and all benefits. [Buckley] has suffered no actual out of pocket loss." The arbitrator also denied Buckley any damages for emotional distress and rejected her claims for punitive damages.

The July award did not find that Buckley was the prevailing party and did not award her attorney fees. In fact, the arbitrator noted that in Buckley's closing arbitration brief "[t]here was no request/motion for attorney[ ] fees made."

The July award did not state that there were any outstanding issues that remained to be decided or that the arbitrator retained jurisdiction to consider any issues that might arise from the July award. Instead, the arbitrator concluded by stating, "This Award is in full settlement of all claims submitted in this arbitration. All claims not expressly granted are hereby denied."

II. The October 2016 award

On September 14, 2016, Buckley filed a motion with the AAA seeking her attorney fees ($96,750) and costs ($9,602.35). El Dorado opposed the motion, arguing, among other things, that the July award was a final settlement of all claims submitted to the arbitrator.

On October 28, 2016, the arbitrator issued a second award (the October award). In the October award, the arbitrator found that Buckley was the prevailing party because she "proved the essential elements for pregnancy discrimination and failure to accommodate." As a result, the arbitrator awarded Buckley all of her requested attorney fees and a portion ($4,539.19) of her requested costs. In addition, the arbitrator directed El Dorado to pay all of the AAA's administrative fees ($2,150) plus the arbitrator's compensation and expenses ($18,656.25).

In issuing the October award, the arbitrator noted that he had previously issued the July award, but he made no attempt to explain how or why he had been able to retain jurisdiction over the parties and their dispute in light of either the AAA's statement that arbitration was completed and declared closed or the language of the July award that it was made in full settlement of all claims submitted.

III. The trial court's decision

On December 5, 2016, Buckley petitioned the trial court to confirm both awards. On January 17, 2017, El Dorado moved to vacate the second award, arguing, among other things, that the October award was in excess of the arbitrator's powers.

On February 22, 2017, the trial court heard oral argument on the parties' opposing motions. Before the hearing, the trial court issued a tentative order confirming the July award and vacating the October award. The trial court based its tentative ruling on a finding that the arbitrator "was without authority" to issue the October award. After hearing oral argument and then taking the matter under submission, the trial court issued an order later that same day adopting its tentative ruling. Buckley timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

The California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.³) (CAA) sets forth "a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating private arbitration in this state." (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9.) Under the CAA, a trial court may vacate an arbitration award where an arbitrator exceeded his or her power. (See §§ 1285, 1286.2, subd. (a)(4), 1286.6, subd. (b);⁴ Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 366.) " ' "[A]n arbitrator exceeds his powers when he acts in a manner not authorized by the contract or by law." ' " (Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1437.)

We review a trial court's decision regarding a petition to vacate an arbitration award de novo. (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 376, fn. 9; Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. v. Liebhaber, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 1106.) Although we review the trial court's decision de novo, we normally "give substantial deference to the arbitrator's own assessment of his contractual authority." (Kelly Sutherlin McLeod Architecture, Inc. v. Schneickert (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 519, 528.) However, where, as here, the parties to the arbitration agreement have stipulated that the arbitrator lacked the power to commit errors of law or fact and permitted the trial court to...