Buckner v. Roy

LAWRENCE EDWARD BUCKNER, Plaintiff, v. JAMES MICHAEL ROY, et al., Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:15-cv-10441

UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

August 18, 2015

HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 14.) Plaintiff Lawrence Buckner has asserted the following federal claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: violation of Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the individual officers (Count I), as well as supervisor/municipal liability against County of Washtenaw and Sheriff Jerry L. Clayton for failure to enforce or train in proper procedure (Count II). (Dkt. 6.) Plaintiff, however, has stipulated to dismiss his Eighth Amendment claims. (Doc. 16.) Additionally, the complaint asserts the following claims arising under state law: negligence on the parts of Deputy James Roy and the Charter Township of Ypsilanti (Count III); negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle on the part of the Charter Township of Ypsilanti (Count IV); statutory owner's liability against the Charter Township of Ypsilanti (Count V); gross negligence on the part of all Defendants (Count VI); assault and battery as to all Defendants (Count VII); and intentional infliction of emotional distress as to all Defendants (Count VIII). Defendants argue that theofficers acted reasonably and in good faith and are entitled to qualified and governmental immunity. (Dkt. 14.) For the reasons stated on the record at hearing, the individual officers, other than Deputy Roy, are hereby dismissed without prejudice. Further, based on the parties' briefs, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following facts are as alleged by Plaintiff, which the Court adopts for the purposes of the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. On or about April 4, 2013, Plaintiff was the subject of a sting operation in which an undercover officer sold Plaintiff a handgun which had been rendered inoperable. As Plaintiff left the motel after the transaction, he was confronted by the plain clothed officers with their guns drawn. Plaintiff did not know that these men were officers and began to run in fear for his life. The officers gave chase, with one officer a few steps behind him about to tackle him (this officer is unidentified). At this point, Defendant Deputy Roy drove his police vehicle, owned by Defendant Charter Township of Ypsilanti, at a high rate of speed and directly struck Plaintiff. Plaintiff suffered serious injuries that have left him in pain and unable to ambulate without the assistance of a wheelchair or walker. (Compl. ¶ 22A-H).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) will fail if the complaint survives the heightened pleading standards set forth by the Supreme Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." However, the complaint, when taken as true, must allege more than"labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . ." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Ashcroft v. Iqbal held that a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint must plead facts that allow a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6431

The Court must first address Defendants' preliminary argument, namely, that the claims asserted against Defendants County of Washtenaw and Charter Township of Ypsilanti are barred because of Plaintiff's noncompliance with the statutory notice requirement set forth by Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6431. (See Doc. 20.) This statutory provision states:

No claim may be maintained against the state unless the claimant, within 1 year after such claim has accrued, files in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against the state or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies . . . .

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6431. Plaintiff contends that the notice requirement applies only to suits brought against the state or its agencies and, consequently, not to the present claims because neither the County of Washtenaw nor the Charter Township of Ypsilanti are state actors.

Section 600.6431 does not provide a definition of "the state or any of its departments, commissions . . . ," nor does case law offer any clarification. However, a related statute conferring on the Michigan Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction overclaims brought against "the state or any of its departments or officers" provides a definition of that phrase. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6419. Specifically, the statute provides:

"[T]he state or any of its departments or officers" means this state or any state governing, legislative, or judicial body, department, commission, board, institution, arm, or agency of the state, or an officer, employee, or volunteer of this state or any governing, legislative, or judicial body, department, commission, board, institution, arm, or agency of this state, acting, or who reasonably believes that he or she is acting, within the scope of his or her authority while engaged in or discharging a government function in the course of his or her duties.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6419(7). The Michigan Supreme Court has developed the following guidance for determining whether an entity is a state agency under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6419: (1) whether the entity was created by the state constitution, a state statute, or state agency action; (2) whether and to what extent the state government funds the entity; (3) whether and to what extent a state agency or official controls the actions of the entity at issue; and (4) whether and to what extent the entity serves local purposes or state purposes. This inquiry emphasizes an examination of the "totality of the circumstances" to determine "the core nature of an entity." Manuel v. Gill, 481 Mich. 637, 653 (2008).

Applying this standard to the present case results in the common-sense conclusion that neither the County of Washtenaw nor the Charter Township of Ypsilanti are state actors. These local entities are not traditional state departments, agencies, or commissions such as the Department of Corrections, Department of State, or Attorney General; indeed, they were not created by state statute or constitution, are not subject to state control, and serve local purposes. Defendants' reliance on Fairley v. Dept. of Corrections, No. 149722, 2015 Mich. LEXIS 1395 (Mich. June 5, 2015) and Johnson v.Operation Get Down, Inc., No. 11-15487, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111533 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2013), is unavailing. Fairley clearly concerned a suit against a state actor, the Michigan Department of Corrections, while Johnson involved a suit against a state contractor operating a diversion program. See Johnson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104147 at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2014). Accordingly, Plaintiff was not obligated to file notice of his intent to file the present suit with the Court of Claims.

B. Section 1983 Deprivation (Count I)

Because the individual officers, other than Deputy Roy, have been dismissed, Count I now proceeds only against Roy. Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Roy violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .

Plaintiff's claim against Deputy Roy is based on an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. Plaintiff claims that Deputy Roy, acting under color of law, used excessive force when he hit Plaintiff with the police vehicle in order to apprehend him.

Regarding Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim, Count I is more appropriately analyzed under the Fourth Amendment because it deals explicitly with intrusive governmental conduct, rather than an analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-395 (1989). "Where . . . the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections ofthe Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right 'to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures' of the person." Id. at 394. Therefore, this Court hereby dismisses Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim.

A claim for deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution involves a two-part analysis looking first at whether there has been a violation of a constitutional right, and if so, whether the officer is personally liable for that violation. Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 647-50 (6th Cir. 2010). To show violation of a constitutional right, Plaintiff must first show that the use of a vehicle against him was excessive force. The Fourth Amendment standard for determining excessive force is one of objective reasonableness. Determining whether the force used was objectively reasonable requires a careful balancing of "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). Factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of the conduct include...