Buckshaw v. Oliver

197 A.D.3d 691

150 N.Y.S.3d 576 (Mem)

Ricky Alan BUCKSHAW, respondent,

v.Tammy OLIVER, appellant.

2019–11583

Index No. 607446/17

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—June 8, 2021

August 25, 2021

Karen L. Lawrence (Sweetbaum & Sweetbaum, Lake Success, N.Y. [Joel A. Sweetbaum and Michael Siris ], of counsel), for appellant.

Joann Peraino (Mary Ellen O'Brien, Garden City, NY, of counsel), for respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, BETSY BARROS, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Jack L. Libert, J.), entered September 23, 2019. The order denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In November 2014, the plaintiff, a Nassau County police officer, allegedly was injured while responding to a request for assistance at the defendant's home. According to the plaintiff, while trying to restrain the defendant's son, the wall-to-wall carpeting in the defendant's living room shifted underneath him, causing him to lose his footing and injure his left knee. In July 2017, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant alleging, inter alia, that the defendant failed to maintain the walking surfaces and flooring of her home in a safe condition. Following discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the defendant appeals.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (see Stukas v. Streiter, 83 A.D.3d 18, 22, 918 N.Y.S.2d 176 ), the defendant failed to establish her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The evidence submitted by the defendant in support of her motion, which included transcripts of the parties’ deposition testimony, failed to establish, prima facie, that the subject carpet was not in a hazardous condition at the time of the plaintiff's accident (see Rosales v. Five Star Carting, Inc., 185 A.D.3d 854, 855, 125 N.Y.S.3d 563 ; cf. Witkowski v. Island Trees Pub. Lib., 125 A.D.3d 768, 770, 4 N.Y.S.3d 65 ). Moreover, the defendant could not sustain this burden by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof (see Kempf v. Magida, 116 A.D.3d 736, 736, 982 N.Y.S.2d 916 ).

As to notice, while the evidence submitted in support of the defendant's motion may have demonstrated, prima facie, that she did not have actual notice of the alleged hazardous condition of the carpet (see Koziar v. Grand Palace Rest., 125 A.D.3d 607, 608, 3 N.Y.S.3d 96 ), the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that she lacked constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition. " ‘A defendant has constructive notice of a hazardous condition on property when the condition is visible and apparent, and has existed for a sufficient length of time to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to discover and remedy it’ " ( Griffin v. PMV Realty, LLC, 181 A.D.3d 912, 913, 119 N.Y.S.3d 876, quoting Falco–Averett v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 174 A.D.3d 506, 507, 101 N.Y.S.3d 642 ). As relevant here, the defendant, to meet her initial burden on the lack of constructive notice, had to present some evidence as to when the area in question was last inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell (see Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 194 A.D.3d 675, 148 N.Y.S.3d 230 ; Birnbaum v. New York Racing Assn., Inc., 57 A.D.3d...