Buettner-Hartsoe v. Balt. Lutheran High Sch. Ass'n

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DONNA BUETTNER-HARTSOE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BALTIMORE LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION, d/b/a/ CONCORDIA PREPARATORY SCHOOL, Defendant.

JENNIFER PULLEN, Plaintiff, v. BALTIMORE LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION, d/b/a/ CONCORDIA PREPARATORY SCHOOL, Defendant.

ANDREA CONRAD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BALTIMORE LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION, d/b/a/ CONCORDIA PREPARATORY SCHOOL, and LUTHERAN CHURCH-MISSOURI SYNOD, SOUTHEASTERN DISTRICT, Defendants.

ARIANA GOMEZ, Plaintiff, BALTIMORE LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION, d/b/a/ CONCORDIA PREPARATORY SCHOOL, and LUTHERAN CHURCH MISSOURI SYNOD, SOUTHEASTERN DISTRICT, Defendant. SELENA BARBER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BALTIMORE LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION, d/b/a/ CONCORDIA PREPARATORY SCHOOL, Defendants.

Civil Action Nos. RDB-20-3132, RDB-20-3214, RDB-20-3229, RDB-20-3267, RDB-21-0691

United States District Court, D. Maryland

September 6, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Richard D. Bennett United States District Judge.

These five cases are brought by five different women, all former students of Concordia Preparatory School (“CPS”) previously known as Baltimore Lutheran High School. The women make similar allegations of sexual assault and verbal sexual harassment by male students at the school dating back to 2016. They allege that school officials failed to adequately address their numerous complaints or take any meaningful action in response, thereby cultivating a hyper-sexualized culture at the school. In this series of cases, three minors N.H., H.C., and A.G.-through their respective mothers, Donna Buettner-Hartsoe, Andrea Conrad, and Selena Barber-and two adults, Jennifer Pullen and Ariana Gomez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), bring federal and state claims against Defendant Baltimore Lutheran High School Association, now doing business as Concordia Preparatory School, and Defendant Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, Southeastern District (“LCMS”).^[1]

Presently pending before this Court is Defendant CPS's Motion for Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal. (ECF No. 132.)^[2]Additionally before this Court are Motions for Leave to File Amicus Brief by several interested parties. (ECF Nos. 134, 136.) The Court has reviewed the parties' submissions and held a hearing on September 1, 2022. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons set forth on the record at the hearing and for the reasons that follow, Defendant CPS's Motion is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. Specifically, CPS's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, but the Alternative Motion to Certify the Order for Interlocutory Appeal is GRANTED. This case shall be STAYED pending a ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Motions for Leave to File Amicus Brief ARE GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

In a Memorandum Opinion dated June 23, 2021, this Court detailed Plaintiffs' factual allegations. (E.g., RDB-20-3132, ECF No. 63 at 5-20.)^[3] On July 21, 2022, this Court denied Defendant CPS's Motion for Summary Judgment.^[4] (ECF Nos. 130, 131.) In response, Defendant CPS filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal (ECF No. 132). Defendant's Motion largely reiterates arguments previously addressed by this Court. In short, Defendant requests reconsideration on the basis of clear error and takes the position that the Court erred in holding that federal tax exemption under 501(c)(3) constitutes federal financial assistance for the purposes of Title IX. (ECF No. 132-1 at 2-3.) Plaintiffs astutely note that disagreement with the Court's Order is not a sufficient basis for reconsideration. (ECF No. 140 at 26.) As explained below, the Court DENIES the part of Defendant's Motion that seeks reconsideration.

Defendant's Motion alternatively seeks certification for an interlocutory appeal. (ECF No. 132-1 at 18.) Defendant argues that the requirements for interlocutory appeal have been met, namely that the issue of whether 501(c)(3) tax exemptions constitute federal financial assistance is a controlling question of law, and its immediate resolution would materially advance the outcome of litigation. Id. Plaintiffs oppose interlocutory appeal and characterize the issue as a mere disagreement that can be narrowed to the financial facts pertaining to CPS.

(ECF No. 140 at 32-40.) As stated on the record, the Court is mindful of the split in authority on this question and the implications of its analysis. Accordingly, this issue shall be certified for interlocutory appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Motion for Reconsideration

Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “any order or other decision . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of [final judgment].” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). “Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders are not subject to the strict standards applicable to motions for reconsideration of a final judgment.” Am. Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2003). However, the Fourth Circuit has suggested that the Rule 60(b) standard guides the district court's analysis. Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.3d 1462, 1472 (4th Cir. 1991). As this Court has previously noted, “the court's analysis is guided by Rule 60(b) but is not bound by its strictures.” Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Fish, No. RDB-19-3355, 2022 WL 1225419, *1 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2021).

“Rule 60(b) provides extraordinary relief and may only be invoked under ‘exceptional circumstances.'” Mines v. United States, No. WMN-10-520, 2010 WL 1741375, at *2 (D. Md. April 28, 2010) (quoting Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1982)). To support a motion under Rule 60(b), the moving party must demonstrate “timeliness, a meritorious defense, a lack of unfair prejudice to the opposing party, and exceptional circumstances.” Hale v. Belton Assoc., Inc., 305 Fed.Appx. 987, 988 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1993)). If these threshold requirements are met, the moving party must then establish one of six predicates:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; or

(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The moving party “must clearly establish the grounds therefore to the satisfaction of the district court,” and those grounds “must be clearly substantiated by adequate proof.” In re Burnley, 988 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

II. Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal

“A district court's order denying a motion for summary judgment or denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and may be appealed only (a) if the district court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) that the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation; and (b) the Court of Appeals permits such appeal.” Georgetown Coll. v. Madden, 660 F.2d 91, 96-97 (4th Cir. 1981).

The district court has broad discretion to determine whether an interlocutory appeal is appropriate. Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995). As § 1292(b) provides that a district court “shall” certify an appeal when its requirements are met, “[w]hen a district court determines that the statutory criteria are present, . . . it has a “duty . . . to allow an immediate appeal to be taken.” In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 369 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 219 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2000)). However, the Fourth Circuit has made clear that Section 1292(b) “should be used sparingly and . . . its requirements must be strictly construed.” Myles v. Laffitte, 881 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1989).

ANALYSIS

I. Motion for Reconsideration

Defendant faces a “high bar . . . to succeed on a Motion for Reconsideration.” Worsham v. Discount Power, No. RDB-20-0008, 2021 WL 5742382, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2021) (citation omitted). A litigant's “mere disagreement” with a court's ruling is not enough to justify a motion for reconsideration. Lynn v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., 953 F.Supp.2d 612, 620 (D. Md. 2013) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “the prior judgment cannot be ‘just maybe or probably wrong; it must . . . strike the court as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.'” Fontell v. Hassett, 891 F.Supp.2d 739, 741 (D. Md. 2012) (citation omitted). In other words, the Court's previous judgment must be “dead wrong.” TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2009).

Defendant CPS's motion for reconsideration largely reiterates arguments previously addressed by the Court, such as its reliance on Johnny's Icehouse Inc. v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n, 134 F.Supp.2d 965 (N.D. Ill. 2001), and its challenge to the scope of Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). (ECF No. 132-1.) These arguments have already been decided, and are not a valid predicate for reconsideration under Rule 60(b), even under the more permissive construction afforded by Rule 54(b). However, Defendant does raise, for the first time, the impact of the DOJ regulations implementing Title IX, 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g). (ECF No. 132-1 at 5-6.)...