Bullock v. City of Phila.

ALICIA BULLOCK v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-1183

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JULY 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM

SURRICK, J.

Presently before the Court in this employment discrimination matter is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 10.) For the following reasons, Defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On March 20, 2019, Plaintiff Alicia Bullock filed a Complaint against the Defendant, City of Philadelphia. (ECF No. 1.) On July 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 8.) On July 22, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on August 5, 2019. (ECF No. 12.)

B. Plaintiff's Allegations

The Amended Complaint consists of seven counts against Defendant: (Count I) race discrimination, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.; (Count II) hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII; (Count III) retaliation, in violation of Title VII; (Count IV) discrimination by a municipal entity, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983; (Count V) wrongful termination, in violation of public policy; (Count VI) violation of the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act (PHRA), 43 P.S. § 951 et seq.; and (Count VII) violation of the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (PFPO), Philadelphia Code § 9-1101. In support of these claims, Plaintiff alleges the following:

Plaintiff is an African American woman. In April 2016, Defendant hired Plaintiff as a wireless communications analyst to work in its Office of Innovation and Technology ("OIT"). Plaintiff was assigned to the Philadelphia International Airport. As a wireless communications analyst, Plaintiff was responsible for issuing, managing, and troubleshooting wireless phones and other wireless communications devices at the airport. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-11, ECF No. 8.)

During her employment with OIT, Plaintiff witnessed discrimination against African Americans and was herself often the subject of racial slurs. One male coworker in particular had a reputation for making racist comments and harassing female employees. OIT knew about this individual's mistreatment of African Americans and women and transferred him to a different department on one occasion because of his actions towards female employees. (Id. ¶¶ 13-17.) On multiple occasions, the male coworker made disparaging remarks to Plaintiff. On one such occasion, he asked her where her "master" was. Plaintiff told him that she was offended and reported the issue to her supervisor. The supervisor sent an email to the OIT staff addressing the inappropriate use of stereotypes, but neither the supervisor nor anyone else at OIT penalized the male coworker for his comment. On a second occasion, the male coworker made a similar "master" remark to Plaintiff. OIT sent another general email to the staff about stereotypes, but it did not otherwise hold the male coworker accountable for his remark. The coworker continued making racial slurs to Plaintiff, including asking Plaintiff if she ate her fried chicken with honey. (Id. ¶¶ 18-24.)

OIT also ignored other racist activities in the workplace. For example, Plaintiff's supervisor referred to African Americans as "those people." (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) On anotheroccasion, Plaintiff notified her supervisor that certain custodial employees needed work phones. The supervisor promptly provided non-minority employees with phones, but the supervisor refused to provide minority employees with phones. The custodial department consisted largely of African Americans and other minorities. (Id. ¶¶ 28-30.)

During her employment with OIT, Plaintiff found several instances of wasteful spending, including Defendant's payment for phone lines assigned to retired or deceased workers and payments on maintenance plans for wireless devices that were missing. In 2017, Plaintiff advised Defendant's human resources department, OIT's human resources department, and Defendant's chief information officer about the wasted funds. In February 2018, she also reported the waste to Defendant's Office of Inspector General. In March 2018, Plaintiff emailed the chief information officer to make additional complaints about certain inefficiencies regarding management of wireless devices. (Id. ¶¶ 31-39.)

On April 4, 2018, Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC. Shortly thereafter, she told her supervisor and a human resources staff member that she had filed the complaint. On April 27, 2018, a Friday, Plaintiff called out sick and timely notified her supervisor. When she returned to work on the following Monday, her office door was locked and she could not enter the office. Plaintiff waited three hours for her supervisor to arrive, and when he did, he told Plaintiff that she was fired as of April 27, 2018. Defendant subsequently issued a termination letter dated April 27, 2018. The letter stated that Plaintiff had been terminated because she "failed to perform tasks, properly use leave, and work collaboratively with the Airport team." (Id. ¶¶ 40-46.)

II. DISCUSSION

In its Motion, Defendant asserts that: (1) Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts giving rise to an inference of discrimination; (2) the facts alleged do not establish a hostile work environment; and (3) Plaintiff has failed to allege a causal relationship between reporting her concerns about racism and her termination. We agree that the Amended Complaint fails to allege a hostile work environment. However, we are satisfied that the allegations are sufficient to support a finding of causation, as well as claims for discrimination and retaliation.

A. Standard of Review

Defendant moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "courts 'accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.'" Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. Of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 223, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). Courts are "not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations." Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). "In order to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, plaintiffs' '[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level....'" Eid, 740 F.3d at 122 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "Thus, 'only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss'" under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).

"[A] complaint need not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss." Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 2016). "A prima facie case is 'an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.'" Id. at 789 (quoting Swierkiewicz v.Sorema, NA., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002)). "Instead of requiring a prima facie case, the post-Twombly pleading standard 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].'" Id. (quoting Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234).

B. Plaintiff States a Claim for Race Discrimination under Title VII

"In order to state a viable Title VII claim, a plaintiff must show that she (1) belongs to a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Twillie v. Erie Sch. Dist., No. 11-165, 2013 WL 4666072, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2013) (citing Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008)), aff'd, 575 F. App'x 28 (3d Cir. 2014).

Defendant's only argument on this claim is that Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the fourth element. In support of its argument, Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to offer "comparators or other evidence that she was treated differently from employees of a different race." (Def. Br. 6, ECF No. 10.) However, on a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff is "not required to plead comparator evidence to support an inference of discrimination. Such an inference could be supported in a number of ways, including, but not limited to, comparator evidence, evidence of similar racial discrimination of other employees, or direct evidence of discrimination from statements or actions by her supervisors suggesting racial animus." Golod v. Bank of Am. Corp., 403 F. App'x 699, 702 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510).

Here, Plaintiff offers several specific examples of discriminatory statements or actions by her supervisor and OIT as a whole. These include her supervisor and OIT's failure to holdPlaintiff's male coworker accountable for racially charged statements, even after that coworker made those statements—and Plaintiff reported them—more than once. Plaintiff's supervisor also allegedly referred to African Americans as "those people." In addition, the supervisor allegedly refused to provide minority custodial staff, including African Americans, with work phones, but immediately provided non-minorities in the same department with work phones. "'While any one of these allegations, taken alone, may not be sufficient to support an inference of discrimination, when taken together, and viewed in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], they are sufficient to support such an inference at this motion-to-dismiss stage.'" Bellamy v. Waterfront Square Condos., No. 12-6618, 2013 WL 607848, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2013) (quoting Dantzler-Hoggard v. Graystone Academy Charter Sch., No. 12-0536, 2012 WL 2054779, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2012)). Accordingly, Defendant's motion with...