Buonocore v. Yale University

Karen BUONOCORE v. YALE UNIVERSITY

No. CV186077098S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, New Haven

October 15, 2019

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Wilson, J.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Karen Buonocore, commenced this action against the defendant, Yale University, on January 8, 2018, by service of summons and a two-count complaint sounding in "harassment"^[1] and hostile work environment respectively.^[2] The complaint alleges the following facts. The plaintiff, a woman of Native American descent, has been employed by the defendant at its School of Medicine since 1997, and is currently employed there as a billing and coding analyst. On or about May 2014, during a survey regarding the diversity in its departments, the defendant became aware of the plaintiff’s Native American ancestry, a fact which has been publicly known within the School of Medicine since that time. On or about May 24-25, 2016, the plaintiff’s manager, Jennifer Luther, sent a meeting notice to all staff, wherein the meeting was characterized as a "pow wow." Compl., Count 1, ¶7. The plaintiff complained to Jennifer Luther about the use of the term. At some point during the plaintiff’s employment, the defendant had provided the plaintiff with a flex hours work schedule of 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., due to the plaintiff’s obligations after work. In November 2016, the plaintiff’s supervisor, Ms Dupee, took away the plaintiff’s flex hours for the stated reason that she "might want to have a meeting in the afternoon," however, no such afternoon meeting has taken place. Compl., Count 1, ¶8. On or about February 8, 2017, the plaintiff reported that her sister had passed away, and in response the plaintiff’s supervisor, Johanna Hartigan, asked whether she was a "tribal sister." Compl., Count 1 ¶9. Moreover, although Ms. Dupee typically informed staff when a relative of a staff member had died, and permitted the taking of a collection, she did not afford such treatment to the plaintiff when the plaintiff’s sister died. On March 3 2017, the plaintiff complained to Ms. Dupee about comments being made in the workplace concerning Native Americans, to which, Ms. Dupee responded: "that was the way they talked and if the plaintiff did not like it she could quit." Compl., Count 1, ¶11.

The plaintiff further alleges the following in support of her claims. On or about March 9, 2017, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint of discrimination with the defendant’s equal opportunity program representative, but did not receive a response. On or about April 6, 2017, the plaintiff was removed from her office and into the basement of the building, where she was told she could have her desk either in an office with another analyst, or in the hall. The plaintiff asked to share the space with the other analyst, however, she was denied that space and placed into the hall. A different employee was moved into the office instead. For approximately two months after being moved into the hall, the plaintiff was not provided with a telephone. Although other employees had chairs next to their desks, Ms. Dupee removed the chair that was next to the plaintiff’s desk and placed it in a conference room.

The plaintiff further alleges in count one of the complaint that, in the manner described above, the defendant has retaliated against the plaintiff for opposing and complaining about its discriminatory practices. Moreover, in count two, the plaintiff alleges that, in the manner described above, the defendant has caused or permitted the plaintiff’s workplace to be permeated with discriminatory intimidation sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s work environment. On March 7, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum of law in support thereof, on the following grounds: (1) the plaintiff’s claims based on alleged conduct that occurred more than 180 days prior to the filing of the plaintiff’s complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities are time barred; (2) the plaintiff’s race discrimination claim fails because she cannot demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action or that any alleged adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of race discrimination; (3) the plaintiff cannot prevail on her retaliation claim because she did not suffer an adverse employment action and there is no causal connection for conduct that occurred prior to her complaints of discrimination; and (4) the plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim fails because the plaintiff cannot establish that her workplace is permeated with discrimination. On April 22, 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, which only addresses the defendant’s arguments on the retaliation claim. On May 23, 2019, the defendant filed a reply memorandum in response to the plaintiff’s objection. Oral argument was held on June 17, 2019.

DISCUSSION

"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried ... However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury ... the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard ... of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534-35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). "To satisfy his [or her] burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ... Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ... It is not enough ... for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact ... are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 317 Conn. 223, 228, 116 A.3d 297 (2015).

Moreover, "[s]ummary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations Summary judgment is appropriate on statute of limitations grounds when the material facts concerning the statute of limitations [are] not in dispute ..." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 313, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). The burden remains "on the moving party to establish that a party did not act in a timely manner when the statute they are relying on specifically provides for tolling as an alternative method of timeliness." Id., 322. In such circumstances, "the party moving for summary judgment should not be able to prevail by showing the absence of a genuine issue of fact solely with respect to one part of the statute upon which it relies, while ignoring the statutory tolling provisions which provide an alternative means of commencing a timely action. Accordingly, defendants moving for summary judgment pursuant to [such a statute] should have the initial burden of demonstrating the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to both the [statutory] limitation period and the statute’s compulsory tolling provision." (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 323.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS WITHIN A SINGLE COUNT

Before addressing the parties’ arguments, the court notes that count one of the plaintiff’s complaint is entitled "Harassment," and alleges a race discrimination claim in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(b)(1) as well as a retaliation claim in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(b)(4).^[3] Because both of the plaintiff’s claims are contained in a single count, the court must first address the propriety of rendering summary judgment on individual claims within the same count.

"In Connecticut, [t]here is no appellate authority as to whether a court can permit summary judgment against a party relative to individual allegations within a single count of a complaint. At the trial court level there is a split of authority on the issue. A review of the decisions finds that the majority of cases do not allow a party to eliminate some, but not all, of the allegations of a single count through a motion for summary judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Glidepath, LLC v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-10-6014624-S (December 21, 2012, Peck, J.). Despite the majority view on the issue, Practice Book § 17-51 provides, in the context of summary judgment, that "[i]f it appears that the defense applies to only part of the claim, or that any part is admitted, the moving party may have final judgment forthwith for so much of the claim as the defense does not apply to, or as is admitted, on such terms as may be just; and the action may be severed and proceeded with as respects the remainder of the claim." "[S]ome courts have found that the language of Practice Book § 17-51 authorizes the entry of summary judgment on part of a claim within a single count provided final judgment can be entered with respect to that part of the claim and it can be severed from the remainder of the claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Glidepath, LLC v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., sup...