Burch v. 1412 Lansdowne Operating, LLC

1

SHIRLEY BURCH, administratrix for the estate of Lois Coleman, deceased, and in her own right, Plaintiff, v. 1412 LANSDOWNE OPERATING, LLC, d/b/a St. Francis Center for Rehabilitation & Healthcare, and CENTER MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC, Defendants.

No. 18-CV-3000 (RPK) (ST)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

September 29, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RACHEL P. KOVNER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Shirley Burch is the representative for the estate of Lois Coleman, her mother, who died in 2017 from injuries she allegedly sustained at a nursing home in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff filed this action against the owners and operators of the nursing home, 1412 Lansdowne Operating, LLC, and Center Management Group, LLC, raising negligence, wrongful death, and survival claims under Pennsylvania state law and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants have moved to dismiss the action and compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims. For the reasons below defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. Defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted in part and denied in part, and the action is stayed pending arbitration.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the complaint and documents that were submitted by both parties in connection with defendants' motion to compel arbitration. In November 2014, plaintiff's mother, Lois Coleman, was admitted to St. Francis Center for Rehabilitation & Healthcare (“St. Francis Center”), a nursing home in Pennsylvania. Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 2-3 (Dkt. #41). At all relevant times, St Francis Center was owned, operated, controlled directed, and managed by defendants 1412 Lansdowne Operating LLC, and Center Management Group, LLC. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7. According to the complaint, the purpose of Ms. Coleman's stay at St. Francis Center “was for short term rehabilitation to increase her leg strength and ambulatory skills” after hip replacement surgery. Id. ¶¶ 11-12.

At the time she was admitted, Ms. Coleman signed a “Short-Term Admission Agreement.” Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Ex. D at 12 (“the Agreement”) (Dkt. #42-7). The Agreement states that both the resident and the facility agree to the agreement's terms “in consideration of Resident's admission to the Facility for a Short-term Rehabilitation Stay.” Id. at 1. The Agreement includes a section on the “Facility's Grievance Procedure”: unless the parties agree to resolve a given dispute through mediation, “the dispute may only be resolved by arbitration as provided in th[e] Agreement.” Id. at 6. Under a section in capital letters labeled “Mandatory, Binding Arbitration, ” the Agreement defines “arbitration” as “a specific process of dispute resolution utilized instead of the traditional state or federal court system.” Id. at 7. The Agreement states, “When arbitration is mandatory, it is the only legal process available to the parties. Mandatory arbitration has been selected with the goal of reducing the time, formalities and cost of utilizing the court system.” Ibid.

Under a subsection labeled “Personal Injury or Medical Malpractice, ” the Agreement provides, again in capital letters, “Unless resolved or settled by mediation, any claim that the resident may have against the facility for any personal injuries sustained by the resident arising from or relating to any alleged medical malpractice, inadequate care, or any other cause or reason while residing in the facility, shall be settled exclusively by arbitration.” Id. at 8.

The Agreement then states, in capital letters and bolded text:

This means that the resident will not be able to file a lawsuit in any court to bring any claims that the resident may have against the facility for personal injuries incurred while residing in the facility. It also means that the resident is relinquishing or giving up all rights that the resident may have to a jury trial to litigate any claims for damages or losses allegedly incurred as a result of personal injuries sustained while residing in the facility.

Ibid. The Agreement states, in capital letters, that “[t]he costs of the arbitration shall be borne equally by each party, and each party shall be responsible for their own legal fees.” Id. at 10. And it provides, in capital letters, that “any . . . personal injury claim or medical malpractice claim arising out of or involving the residency of the resident at the facility is subject to” the mandatory arbitration agreement. Id. at 11.

The Agreement also states that it “shall be governed and construed in accordance with” Pennsylvania law, and that it “shall be binding and inure to the benefit of each of the undersigned parties and their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns.” Id. at 5.

On the penultimate page of the Agreement, just above two lines for signatures, is the statement, “Resident . . . acknowledge[s] that they have read and understand the terms of the mandatory, binding arbitration clause, that the terms have been explained to them by a representative of the Facility, and that they have had an opportunity to ask questions about such clause.” Id. at 11.

On the last page of the Agreement are three signatures. Id. at 12. One signature line is labeled “Resident” and is signed by Ms. Coleman. Ibid. There is also a signature on a line labeled “Witness” and a signature on a line for an “Authorized Representative” of St. Francis Center. Ibid.

Ms. Coleman was a resident of St. Francis Center from 2014 to 2017. SAC ¶ 14. St. Francis Center maintained progress notes regarding her condition there. See Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.'s Opp'n”) Ex. C (Dkt. #43-4). The four progress notes dated between September 2015 and February 2017 state that Ms. Coleman was at St. Francis Center for “LTC placement, ” which defendants do not dispute means long-term care placement. Id. at 1; see Pl.'s Opp'n at 6 (Dkt. #43).

Records of the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services reflect that Ms. Coleman was discharged from St. Francis Center to a hospital in Pennsylvania in August 2017. See Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. B at 5 (Dkt. #43-3). Ms. Coleman died at the hospital's hospice unit from injuries caused by septicemia, septic shock, ulcers, bacterial infections, renal failure due to dehydration, pneumosepsis, malnutrition, and severe muscle deconditioning, among other conditions. SAC ¶ 20. Plaintiff was later appointed administratrix of Ms. Coleman's estate. Id. ¶ 2.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, and later the operative second amended complaint, alleging that Ms. Coleman's injuries were caused by defendants' failure to provide her with adequate medical and nursing care. See generally Compl. (Dkt. #1); see SAC ¶¶ 20, 28, 31-32. Defendants have moved to dismiss the second amended complaint and compel arbitration. See Defs.' Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.' Br.”) at 1, 3-6 (Dkt. #42-10). In the alternative, defendants move to dismiss defendant 1412 Lansdowne Operating based on lack of personal jurisdiction, and to dismiss the case based on forum non conveniens. See Id. at 1, 6-14.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Courts in this circuit commonly construe a motion to dismiss based on an arbitration clause as a motion to compel arbitration. See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 230 (2d Cir. 2016); see also, e.g., Gilbert v. Indeed, Inc., 513 F.Supp.3d 374, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2021); Begonja v. Vornado Realty Tr., 159 F.Supp.3d 402, 405 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). A court may resolve a motion to compel arbitration before addressing a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction or forum non conveniens. See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (“[A] federal court has leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.” (quotations omitted)); see also, e.g., Lewis v. ANSYS, Inc., No. 19-CV-10427, 2021 WL 1199072, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021); In re Residential Cap., LLC, 563 B.R. 756, 766 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016); Ramasamy v. Essar Glob. Ltd., 825 F.Supp.2d 466, 467 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

When deciding a motion to compel arbitration, courts apply a “standard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary judgment.” Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted); see Gonder v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 144 F.Supp.3d 522, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). On such a motion, “the court consider[s] all relevant, admissible evidence submitted by the parties and contained in pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74 (quotations omitted). A trial is necessary “[i]f there is an issue of fact as to the making of the agreement for arbitration, ” but “where the undisputed facts in the record require the matter of arbitrability to be decided against one side or the other as a matter of law, ” a court may “rule on the basis of that legal issue and avoid the need for further court proceedings.” Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 229 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), a “written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. This provision “establishes a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012) (quotations omitted); see Arciniaga v. Gen. Motors Corp., 460 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is difficult to overstate the strong federal policy...