Burch v. P.J. Cheese, Inc.

935 F.Supp.2d 1259

Ryan D. BURCH, Plaintiff,

v.P.J. CHEESE, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 2:09–cv–1640–SLB.

United States District Court,

N.D. Alabama,

Southern Division.

March 27, 2013.

Thomas F. Talty, Thomas Talty & Associates, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

R. Scott Hetrick, Adams & Reese LLP, Mobile, AL, William K. Hancock, Adams & Reese LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN, Chief Judge.

This case is currently before the court on defendant P.J. Cheese Inc.'s (“defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment, (doc. 43).¹ Upon consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (doc. 43), is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Credibility determinations,the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are left to the jury, and, therefore, evidence favoring the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Nevertheless, the non-moving party “need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference.” Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir.1999) (citing Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n. 12 (11th Cir.1988)).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS²

A. GENERAL BACKGROUND

Ryan D. Burch (“plaintiff”), an African American male, began working for defendant in 1999. (Doc. 8–1 ¶ 1; see doc. 1 ¶ 18; doc. 19 ¶ 18.) Plaintiff became General Manager at defendant's Fairfield, Alabama restaurant in September 2004. (Doc. 43–1 at 38:1–3 & 41:6–19.) At all times material to this lawsuit, plaintiff reported to Area Supervisor Robert Offner (“Offner”). (Doc. 43–3 at 10:16–18.) Plaintiff was the only African American General Manager reporting to Offner. (Doc. 43–1 at 114:7–9.)

B. PLAINTIFF'S FIRST TERMINATION

On July 18, 2007, plaintiff's brother was murdered not far from the Fairfield restaurant. (Doc. 8–1 ¶ 3; doc. 43–1 at 55:19–23.) Plaintiff witnessed his brother lying dead at the murder scene. (Doc. 8–1 ¶ 3.) After learning of the incident, Offner instructed plaintiff to take an unspecified amount of time away from work. (Doc. 43–3 at 73:7–12 & 146:9–12.) Plaintiff was absent from work from July 19, 2007, through August 5, 2007. (Doc. 48–1 at 3.) Offner classified plaintiff's absences as vacation time and sick leave to ensure that plaintiff would remain paid during his time off. (Doc. 43–3 at 73:17–74:4.)

Plaintiff returned to work on August 6, 2007. (Doc. 48–1 at 3.) Plaintiff worked seven consecutive days through August 12, was scheduled off the following four days, and was scheduled to return to work on August 17. ( Id.) Although having already returned to work, Offner left plaintiff a message on August 9, telling him that he had received the maximum amount of bereavement leave plus an additional three weeks off, and that he was “expected to be at the restaurant on Saturday at the scheduled time, on time, [in] uniform, ready to run the restaurant.” (Doc. 48–3 at 5–6.) Offner warned plaintiff, “Failure to do so will result in your termination. And I will be looking for your keys if you cannot come back in that capacity.” ( Id. at 6.)

On August 16, 2007, “everything” regarding his brother's death “crashed down” on plaintiff, and he sought medical treatment at American Family Care. (Doc. 43–1 at 138:6–9; see doc. 79–9 at 1–3.) The attending physician was Dr. Thomas Dodd (“Dr. Dodd”). ( See doc. 79–9 at 1–3.) Dr. Dodd diagnosed plaintiff with sinus congestion, nasal allergies, anxiety, disturbances of emotion, insomnia, and depression. ( Id. at 1 & 3.) Dr. Dodd noted on plaintiff's Patient Information form: “want p[atient] to take family medical leave due to death in family about a month ago.” ( Id. at 3.) Dr. Dodd gave plaintiff a signed note titled Certificate of Physician. ( Id. at 6.) Dr. Dodd wrote “Family Medical Leave” under the section “Physician's Comments,” and “9/16/07” under the section “Return to Regular Work.” ( Id.) When asked why Dr. Dodd recommended taking a month away from work, plaintiff testified:

Well, the doctor examined me. He said I was very stressed. The situation was a difficult situation. I couldn't sleep. I was very paranoid. And so he said—asked me pretty much how long I had been on the job, which I told him I had been—been there for a while. And he said, you need to take this time off. I'm going to write you an excuse. You get the Family Medical Leave forms that you need. That was it.

(Doc. 43–1 at 69:4–14.) Dr. Dodd prescribed plaintiff Xanax, but plaintiff did not fill the prescription because he was afraid to take the medication. ( Id. at 69:15–22; doc. 79–9 at 3.) ³

Later that afternoon, plaintiff called McCain Gallahar (“Gallahar”), an assistant in defendant's Human Resources Department, and requested the paperwork necessary for taking leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). ( See doc. 48–1 at 3.) Gallahar then sent an email to defendant's Director of Human Resources, Monica Williams (“Williams”), asking her to provide plaintiff with FMLA application forms. ( Id.)

After speaking with Gallahar, plaintiff had an in-person discussion with Offner about taking FMLA leave until September 16, 2007. (Doc. 8–1 ¶ 3.) Plaintiff informed Offner that he had visited the doctor's office and that the doctor had instructed him to take 30 days away from work. (Doc. 43–1 at 66:23–67:3.) Plaintiff attempted to give Offner his doctor's excuse, but Offner “didn't want to see it.” ( Id. at 67:4–6 & 77:14–16.) Although plaintiff was not scheduled to work on August 16, Offner told plaintiff that he should hand over his store keys unless he was in uniform and prepared to work according to company standards. ( Id. at 67:4–10; doc. 8–1 ¶ 4; see doc. 48–1 at 3.) Plaintiff replied that he needed to take care of himself and follow the doctor's instructions. (Doc. 43–1 at 67:8–9; doc. 8–1 ¶ 5.) Dissatisfied, Offner asked for plaintiff's store keys indicating that he was terminated. (Doc. 43–1 at 64:10–65:4, 67:8–10 & 77:13–19; doc. 8–1 ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff called Human Resources to explain what had happened between him and Offner. (Doc. 8–1 ¶ 6.) He “was told [the decision] was up to Mr. Offner.” ( Id.) Gallahar sent a follow-up email to Williams, stating that “Ryan Burch has terminated his position with our company, please do not send out FMLA papers.” (Doc. 48–1 at 4.)

C. PLAINTIFF IS REHIRED

Following the events of August 16, 2007, plaintiff continued to request FMLA application forms from Human Resources “in hopes of getting [his] job back.” (Doc. 8–1 ¶ 7.) On August 20, 2007, plaintiff spoke with Gallahar about acquiring the necessary paperwork, and Gallahar told plaintiff that Williams had already mailed the documents. (Doc. 48–3 at 3–5.) A week passed without plaintiff receiving the application forms, and plaintiff contacted Gallahar again on August 28, asking whether Human Resources had mailed the forms and whether he was still employed. ( Id. at 8–11.) Gallahar told plaintiff that Williams was responsible for sending the forms, that she would speak with Williams again, and that it was her understanding that Offner terminated his employment. ( Id.) After another two weeks passed without receiving the paperwork, plaintiff wrote a letter to Williams, Gallahar, Offner, and Operating Partner Scotty Scott regarding his employment status. (Doc. 43–1 at 111, Def.'s Ex. 8.) Plaintiff stated:

I am writing concerning ... my employment with the company.... I feel that I've not done anything wrong to be terminated. I've talked to [Gallahar] several time[s] and ask[ed] for my FMLA papers and I haven't received them and I have talked to the Operating Partner Scotty Scott and he said he would give me a return phone call after he investigated what happened but I'm concerned because I haven't received a call or mail from anyone ... I am ready to come back to work.

( Id.)

On September 18, 2007, Offner received plaintiff's letter and informed Williams that he was willing to rehire plaintiff in a lesser capacity as an Assistant General Manager. (Doc. 48–1 at 8.) On September 19, 2007, Offner called plaintiff, told him that he had not managed the Fairfield restaurant according to company standards, and that he could return to work as an Assistant General Manager at defendant's Adamsville restaurant. (Doc. 48–3 at 11–16; doc. 8–1 ¶ 10.) Plaintiff considered the decision unfair, but he accepted the offer nonetheless because he needed a job. (Doc. 48–3 at 13; doc. 8–1 ¶ 11.)

Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) later that afternoon, charging defendant with race discrimination by paying higher salaries to white General Managers and by denying his requests to fill General Manager vacancies at restaurants located in “better areas.” (Doc. 1 at 19.) Williams received notice of the charge on October 4, 2007, ...