Burda v. Korenman

1

STEVEN BURDA Appellant v. ALLA KORENMAN A/K/A ALLA BURDA

STEVEN BURDA Appellant v. ALLA KORENMAN A/K/A ALLA BURDA

STEVEN BURDA Appellant v. ALLA KORENMAN A/K/A ALLA BURDA

STEVEN BURDA Appellant v. ALLA KORENMAN A/K/A ALLA BURDA

Nos. 1609 EDA 2022, 1747 EDA 2022, 1748 EDA 2022, 1749 EDA 2022

No. J-A05001-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

July 31, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered June 1, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s) 2010-26928, 2010-26928 - Seq. 1705, 2010-26928 - Seq. 1706 2010-26928 - Seq. 1707

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM

LAZARUS, J.

Steven Burda (Father) appeals, pro se, from the orders,^[1] entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, in this child support matter. After our review on panel reconsideration,^[2] we reverse, in part, and remand with instructions.

Father and Alla Korenman a/k/a Alla Burda (Mother) were married in 2010. They are the parents of two minor children, E.B., born in December 2008, and A.B., born in July, 2010. The parties were divorced by decree, dated September 14, 2012, which incorporated an arbitration award for child support and alimony, payable by Father to Mother.^[3] See Arbitration Award, 9/4/12. The arbitration award provided that Father's child support obligation could be modified if either party acquired greater earning capacity than that determined by the arbitrator. See id. at 15. On October 5, 2012, Father filed a "Petition to Vacate Child Support, Alimony and to Address Credits" with the Domestic Relations Section of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County. The Honorable Wendy Demchick-Alloy summarized the subsequent procedural history as follows:

The hearing officer who reviewed the petition found that conditions had changed, but rather than vacating [Father's] support obligation, she increased it to $2,002.39 [from $1,371.00] per month for the period beginning January 1, 2013 and continuing indefinitely. [Father] filed exceptions to the hearing officer's report and recommended order and demanded a hearing de novo. At that time, the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas had adopted a procedure that gave litigants non-record hearings before the support hearing officer and a de novo [hearing] on exceptions. For reasons that do not expressly appear on the record, the court did not hold a hearing or adjudicate [Father's] exceptions. The list of docket entries leads the undersigned to infer that one of the reasons is the volume of applications filed by [Father],^[4] but none of the judges to whom this action was previously assigned stated on the record why the court did not hold the de novo hearing.

Opinion by Judge Demchick-Alloy, 6/16/22, at 2-3 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

Thereafter, Father filed a complaint in support and, on November 13, 2014, the support hearing officer held a hearing. The hearing officer calculated Father's child support obligation as $1,275.77, approximately $100 less than the original obligation. Father again filed exceptions, and he demanded a de novo hearing with respect to both the 2014 recommended order ($1,275.77) and 2013 recommended order ($2,002.39). Again, "[f]or reasons that do not appear of record, the court did not hold a de novo hearing." See id. at 3 (emphasis added).

On November 28, 2014, Father filed a petition for reimbursement pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.26(b) (Support Order. Enforcement. Stay of Proceedings. Special Relief) and 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(f) (Equity power and jurisdiction of the court), referring to his 2014 exceptions. Once again, "[f]or reasons that do not expressly appear on the record, the court did not hold the hearing." Opinion by Judge Demchick-Alloy, 6/16/22, at 4 (emphasis added).

On August 26, 2020, the Honorable Carolyn Carluccio entered an order directing a hearing officer to hear evidence with respect to the parties' support obligations from 2013 through 2019 and to file a report and recommended order with respect to each of those years. See Order, 8/26/20.^[5]

The hearing officer held hearings on March 15, 2021 and June 24, 2021. On July 28, 2021, the hearing officer filed a report, which provided calculations of the parties' earning capacities, adjustments to the basic child support obligation, and deviations for each of the relevant time periods, as well as recommended orders, as follows:

Jan. 1, 2013 - Aug. 8, 2013: $1,733.98 /month

Aug. 9, 2013 - Dec. 31, 2013: $1,751.09/month

Jan. 1, 2014 - Dec. 31, 2014: $2,097.56/month

Jan. 1, 2015 - Dec. 31, 2015 $1,684.18/month

Jan. 1, 2016 - Dec. 31, 2016 $1,171.00/month

Jan. 1, 2017 - Dec. 31, 2017 $1,076.74/month

Jan. 1, 2018 - Dec. 31, 2018 $1,411.98/month

Jan. 1, 2019 - May 28, 2019 $1,489.61/month

May 29, 2019 - Dec. 31, 2019 $1,225.63/month

Jan.1, 2020 - Dec. 31, 2020 $ 771.28/month

Jan. 1, 2021- Mar. 5, 2021 $ 903.64/month

Mar. 6, 2021 - Forward ^[6] $ 969.34/month

Report and Recommended Orders, 7/28/21.^[7]

Father filed exceptions on August 11, 2021. On May 2, 2022, Judge Demchick-Alloy heard argument on Father's exceptions and, on June 1, 2022, entered an order denying those exceptions.^[8] On that same date, the court entered an order denying Father's "Preliminary Objections,"^[9] denying Father's "Motion for Sanctions" and "Motion for Summary Judgment,"^[10] and denying Father's "Motion for Sanctions for "Mother's Willful Disobedience."^[11] Father filed timely appeals from those orders. The court also ordered the Domestic Relations Section to audit Father's account in response to Father's petition for recovery of support overpayment and to reduce his support obligation in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(f)(1) if the audit uncovered an overpayment. That order was not appealed.^[12]

Father raises eleven issues for our review, which we have summarized as follows:

Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in:

1. Denying Father's motion for default judgment;

2. Denying Father's preliminary objections to Mother's answer and counterclaim;

3. Failing to schedule a hearing on Father's motion for sanctions for Mother's defective pretrial statement;

4. Failing to rule on Father's motion for sanctions where evidence showed Mother violated provision 5 of 2/24/15 order;

5. Overruling Father's objections during the May 2, 2022 hearing;

6. Ignoring law and legal process (contempt/sanctions) where evidence showed Mother violated provision 5 of 2/24/15 order;

7. Ignoring law and legal process by "making up numbers for support calculation purposes-or pulling numbers from thin air-for support exceptions hearing" where there was no support for such and allowing Mother reimbursement for activities/memberships going back to 2013;

8. Adopting master's recommendation;

9. Making Father pay for "wild and unnecessary activities or cost of memberships to synagogue or community center" going back to 2013;

10. Refusing to listen to Father's argument and "simply siding everything with the Mother" without any finding of facts;

11. Allowing Mother not to file pretrial statement and permit Mother's exhibits despite Father's objections.

Appellant's Brief, at 8-11 (reworded for clarity).

The standard governing our review of a child support order is follows:

[T]his Court may only reverse the trial court's determination where the order cannot be sustained on any valid ground. We will not interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill will, discretion has been abused. In addition, we note that the duty to support one's child is absolute, and the purpose of child support is to promote the child's best interests.

M.E.W. v. W.L.W., 240 A.3d 626, 634 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Furthermore, this Court

must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record, as our role does not include making independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, this Court must defer to the trial judge who presided over the proceedings and thus viewed the witnesses firsthand.

When the trial court sits as fact[-]finder, the weight to be assigned the testimony of the witnesses is within its exclusive province, as are credibility determinations, [and] the court is free to choose to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. [T]his Court is not free to usurp the trial court's duty as the finder of fact.

Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Brotzman-Smith v. Smith, 650 A.2d 471, 474 (Pa. Super. 1994) (assessment of credibility of witnesses is within province of trial court and court is free to weigh evidence presented).

"The principal goal in child support matters is to serve the best interests of the children through the provision of reasonable expenses." E.R.L. v. C.K.L., 126 A.3d 1004 1006 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Generally, a court determines child support using the support guidelines. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1 to 1910.16-7 (subsequently amended eff. Jan. 1, 2022). "[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that the guideline calculated support obligation is the correct support obligation." Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1(d); see also Ileiwat v. Labadi, 233 A.3d 853, 861 (Pa. Super. 2020). Cf. Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1(d)(1) ("The presumption is...