Burke v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability and Bonds

Joseph Burke v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability and Bonds et al.

No. 129044

No. SUCV2013-04297

Superior Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk

August 27, 2014

Filed November 28, 2014

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Edward P. Leibensperger, Justice of the Superior Court.

Plaintiff Joseph Burke, seeks judicial review of a November 8, 2013 decision by the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (" the Board"), affirming a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (" the Registrar") to permanently revoke Burke's driver's license. Burke moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, § 14 and Mass.R.Civ.P 12(c). After a review of the record and oral argument Burke's motion will be DENIED for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

The record before the Board contained the following facts. Born in June 1979, Burke obtained a driver's license in January 1996. Between 1996 and 2000, Burke was cited, and found responsible for, five separate speeding incidents. He also was found responsible for a surchargeable accident in November 1996. His driver's license was suspended for 30 days in August 1996 as a result of the speeding violations. In 2000, Burke was the driver in two separate incidents of driving under the influence of liquor (" OUI") as described below.

On February 27, 2000, Burke drove his motor vehicle off the road and into a cement wall. Upon police investigation, Burke was charged with OUI. On May 1, 2000, Burke admitted to sufficient facts for the charge of OUI. The court found sufficient facts but continued the matter without a finding (CWOF) until May 1, 2001. Burke was sentenced to probation for one year with terms that included a 180-day loss of license and an assignment to an alcohol education program. On January 11, 2001, Burke was found in violation of his probation as a result of the fatal motor vehicle accident described in the next paragraph. The CWOF was revoked and a sentence was entered. He was sentenced to serve 18 months in the House of Correction.

While his driver's license was revoked as a result of the February 27, 2000 accident, Burke committed another OUI on August 6, 2000, this time with fatal consequences. Burke lost control of a car while driving home from a party at 5:30 a.m. He drove the car across the road, rolled it over several times and struck a tree. Burke's passenger, Patrick Connolly, died later that day from injuries sustained in that accident. Burke was found by the police at the scene to be drunk. He was placed under arrest for OUI, second offense operating a motor vehicle after his license had been revoked, speeding, and marked lanes violation. Burke was later indicted by a grand jury on multiple charges arising from the accident including manslaughter, motor vehicle homicide while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, OUI, second offense, and operating after his license was suspended.

On December 28, 2000, Burke pleaded guilty to manslaughter, OUI, second offense, and operating after his license was suspended. The other indictments were nolle pross'ed or filed. Burke was sentenced to two and one-half years in the House of Correction for each conviction and ordered to serve at least three years. The court also imposed probation which required Burke not to use alcohol or controlled substances, attend counseling, undergo random testing, and wait ten years before he could apply for a driver's license reinstatement. In 2006 and 2009, Burke asked the court to modify the terms of his probation but the court denied both requests.

The record reflects that on January 3, 2001, an abstract was mailed to the Registry of Motor Vehicles (" Registry"). This was done pursuant to G.L.c. 90, § 27. At the hearing before the Board, the Registrar stated that in 2001 the Registry received notice only that the motor vehicle homicide charge was nolle pross'ed, and that Burke was convicted of the OUI, second offense. In connection with this motion, however, Burke supplied a copy, certified by Norfolk Superior Court, of the January 3, 2001 abstract. The abstract shows that the Registry was informed that Burke was convicted of motor vehicle manslaughter, as well as OUI, second offense and operating after a suspended license. The Registrar moved to strike the copy of the abstract on the ground that it was not submitted to the Board at the hearing. I allowed Burke to supplement the record with the copy of the abstract.

On November 28, 2003, the Registrar informed Burke, in writing, of a revocation of his driver's license. In the document, the Registrar referenced only the OUI and license suspension from the August 6, 2000 incident, and the earlier OUI from the February 27, 2000 incident. Burke's conviction for manslaughter was not noted. Citing only the convictions described in the document, the Registrar revoked Burke's driver's license for two years.

On December 6, 2005, the Registrar notified Burke that he was now eligible to have his right to operate a motor vehicle reinstated.

According to the Registrar, she became aware of the manslaughter conviction arising from the August 6, 2000 accident on August 16, 2013. Burke contests that statement on the basis of the abstract from 2001 that he has now submitted, post-hearing before the Board, to the court. I find, based on the copy of the abstract, that the Registrar was notified of the manslaughter conviction in 2001. The Registrar's letter of suspension dated November 28, 2003, suggests, however, that for some unexplained reason, the Registrar did not consider the manslaughter conviction at the time she revoked Burke's license for two years on November 28, 2003.

When Burke applied for a driver's license in August 2013, the Registrar sent Burke a letter, dated August 16, 2013, referencing Burke's conviction for manslaughter. As a result of that conviction, the Registrar noted that " your license/right to operate a commercial motor vehicle is revoked for 15 years . . ." Burke appealed the Registrar's action. While the appeal was pending, the Registrar conducted a further investigation and review of Burke's driving history and criminal record. Based on its review, the Registrar, on October 29, 2013, notified Burke that his license was revoked for his lifetime because of the manslaughter conviction. In addition, the Registrar notified Burke that another ground for his lifetime ban from obtaining a driver's license was the Registrar's determination that Burke was an immediate threat to public safety, under G.L.c. 90, § 22(a), if he were to be given a driver's license.

Burke's appeal proceeded to a hearing before the Board on November 7, 2013. Following the hearing, at which Burke was represented by counsel, the Board affirmed the Registrar's action. The Board noted that it reserved its right to supplement the statement of reasons for its affirmation if judicial review of its decision was sought. Burke commenced this action on December 9, 2013. On March 12, 2014, the Board issued a 23-page Statement of Reasons for Decision (" the Decision"). In the Decision, the Board concluded that Burke's driving privileges should be revoked for his lifetime based upon the application of G.L.c. 90, § 24(1)(c)(4), as it existed at the time of Burke's conviction for OUI, second offense. In addition, the Board found that Burke's license should be revoked for life because he was an immediate threat to public safety under G.L.c. 90, § 22(a).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, § 14, the court must uphold the Board's Decision unless the Decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Registrar of Motor Vehicles v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds, 382 Mass. 580, 591, 416 N.E.2d 1373 (1981). The court gives substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of those statutes with which it is charged with enforcing. " Deference is particularly appropriate when the statute in question explicitly grants broad rule-making authority to the agency, contains an ambiguity or gap, or broadly sets out a legislative policy that must be interpreted by the agency." Souza v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 462 Mass. 227, 229, 967 N.E.2d 1095 (2012) (citations omitted). In addition, " [t]he court shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G.L.c. 30A, § 14(7). As the party appealing the administrative decision, Burke, bears the burden of demonstrating the Decision's invalidity. Merisme v. Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 470, 474, 539 N.E.2d 1052 (1989).

B. Challenges to the Board's Decision

Burke's several challenges to the Board's decision may be put into three categories. First, the Board allegedly erred in the application of law to the facts of his case. Second, the Board's Decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Third, the Board's Decision was arbitrary and capricious. As described below, resolution of the first challenge--alleged error of law--provides the basis to reject all other challenges. That is because application of the statutory framework to the uncontested facts demonstrates that the Board had no choice but to revoke Burke's privilege to obtain a driver's license for his lifetime.

1. The Board properly imposed a lifetime revocation of Burke's privilege to obtain a driver's license.

The Legislature has, since 1939, consistently required the Registrar to revoke for life the license of anyone who kills another person with a motor vehicle during a second OUI. The statute...