Burley v. Arnold

IVAN BURLEY #315059, Plaintiff, v. JASON ARNOLD, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:21-cv-00326

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division

July 22, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELI RICHARDSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Ivan Burley, a pretrial detainee at the Davidson County Sheriff's Office in Nashville, Tennessee, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No 1) and an application to proceed as a pauper (Doc. No. 4). Plaintiff brings this action against Sumner County, the City of Portland, the 18th Judicial District Drug Task Force, and Jason Arnold, a Portland Police Department detective and Drug Task Force member. (Doc. No. 1 at 2-3, at 5-6.) This action is before the Court for an initial review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. And as explained below, this action will be stayed pending the resolution of ongoing state criminal proceedings arising from Plaintiff's April 2021 arrest.

I. Application to Proceed as a Pauper

The Court may authorize a prisoner to file a civil suit without prepaying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff's application is accompanied by a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement (Doc. No. 4 at 3-4), and it appears that Plaintiff cannot pay the full filing fee in advance. Accordingly, Plaintiff's application will be granted, and the $350.00 filing fee will be assessed as directed in the accompanying order. 28 U.S.C § 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Review

The Court must dismiss the Complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). The Court also must liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

A. Allegations and Claims

Plaintiff alleges that the City of Portland, Tennessee, is within Sumner County and that both the City and the County contract with the 18th Judicial District Drug Task Force (“Drug Task Force”). (Doc. No. 1 at 9.) In early 2019, Plaintiff filed a separate (and still pending) federal civil rights action in this Court against Sumner County, the Drug Task Force, and Jason Arnold. (Id. at 5-6); see Burley v. Sumner Cnty. 18th Jud. Dist. Task Force, No. 3:19-cv-00118.^[1] In the instant lawsuit, Plaintiff alleges that Arnold was “the lead investigator in the 2015 [criminal] case at the root of the pending 2019 civil lawsuit.” (Doc. No. 1 at 9.) On March 5, 2021, the Court granted Arnold's motion to dismiss, terminating Arnold as a party to that case. (Id. at 6); Burley, No. 3:19-cv-00118, Doc. No. 59 (Mar. 5, 2021). That case remains pending against Sumner County and the Drug Task Force. See Burley, No. 3:19-cv-00118.

Prior to April 1, 2021, Arnold allegedly procured an “indictment” for Plaintiff's arrest from a Davidson County court without probable cause. (Doc. No. 1 at 5-6.) Around 1:00 p.m. on April 1, law enforcement agencies including the Drug Task force, the Portland Police Department, and the Mt. Juliet Police Department allegedly seized Plaintiff's 2017 Chevrolet Silverado. (Id. at 10.)^[2]Around 4:00 p.m. that same day, according to Plaintiff, law enforcement including Arnold executed a search warrant at Plaintiff's home, detected marijuana, and seized Plaintiff's currency. (Id.) During the search, Arnold allegedly “made a statement regarding his dismissal from the 2019 lawsuit to Plaintiff's fiancé.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that his property was seized “under the pretense of possession of marijuana” even though his vehicle was seized before the detection of marijuana in his home. (Id. at 10.)

Allegedly, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with the following offenses, stemming from a business he owned in 2018: identity theft; theft over $10, 000 and under $60, 000; computer fraud; and money laundering. (Id. at 5-6.) These offenses allegedly occurred in Davidson County, which is 40 miles from the City of Portland. (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff alleges that on April 6, 2021, during a local news interview, Arnold “admitted that he had Plaintiff under his investigation for five years.” (Id. at 10-11.) According to Plaintiff, Arnold also made the allegedly false statement that Plaintiff “was involved with shipping cocaine through the mail.” (Id. at 11.) Allegedly, as a result of these comments, Arnold's pervasive five-year investigation, and Plaintiff's incarceration, Plaintiff's businesses (Priority Properties and Priority Restoration and Remodeling) suffered financially. (Id. at 11, 14.) Plaintiff also alleges that he has suffered serious mental strain from Arnold's constant investigation, causing Plaintiff to seek treatment from mental health professionals and to self-medicate using “marijuana and THC infused product[s].” (Id. at 13.)

Based on Arnold's comment to Plaintiff's fiancé, the distance between Davidson County and Portland, and the close temporal proximity between Arnold's dismissal from the 2019 lawsuit and Plaintiff's arrest, Plaintiff alleges that his arrest without probable cause and the seizure of his property were done in retaliation for the 2019 lawsuit. (Id. at 6, 8, 10.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants have “a financial stake” in the 2019 lawsuit, which demonstrates a “lack of rational basis for [their] action and their animus.” (Id. at 8-9.) In addition, relying on a prior ruling by the Davidson County Chancery Court, Plaintiff alleges that the out-of-jurisdiction seizures of property in both Davidson and Wilson County were improper and violated his rights. (Id. at 11-12.)

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. No. 1 at 5-8, 9-11.) Plaintiff claims that both the City of Portland and Sumner County, which “authorized the [Drug Task Force] to operate within its boundaries, ” have policies of inadequate training and supervision, as well as customs of tolerance for civil rights violations. (Id. at 5.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts, based on Defendant Arnold's alleged comments during the April 6 news interview, that Arnold committed the Tennessee torts of defamation, slander, false light invasion of privacy, libel, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, ^[3] negligence, loss of consortium, and abuse of process.^[4] (Id. at 11-13.)

Plaintiff requests monetary damages and injunctive relief in the form of Arnold's removal from his position and the Drug Task Force being disbanded. (Id. at 15.)

B. Legal Standard

To determine whether the Complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” under the applicable statutes, the Court applies the same standard as under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court therefore accepts “all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, [and] ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)). An assumption of truth does not extend to allegations that consist of legal conclusions or “‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).

C. Discussion

“There are two elements to a [Section] 1983 claim. First, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acted under color of state law. Second, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured under federal law.” Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are premised, in part, on the allegation that Defendants acted in a manner that was inconsistent with a Davidson County Chancery Court order entered in 2018. But the Court has no basis to infer that a 2018 ruling by the Chancery Court governs seizures alleged to have occurred in April 2021. Accordingly, the Court will consider whether Plaintiff has stated colorable Section 1983 claims without regard to the alleged 2018 Chancery Court order.

1. Dismissal of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

First, Plaintiff does not allege the facts necessary to assert a Fifth Amendment claim. The Complaint alleges, without explanation, that the seizure of his property violated his “Fifth Amendment right.”^[5] (Doc. No. 1 at 10.) Even under the lenient standard for reviewing pro se pleadings, Plaintiff cannot rely on a bare assertion of a legal conclusion. Perry v. United Parcel Serv., 90 Fed.Appx. 860, 861 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988)); see also Lee v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n, 951 F.3d 386, 392-93 (6th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted) (explaining it did not satisfy the Federal Rules for a plaintiff to fail to (1) “connect specific facts or events with the various causes of action she asserted” and (2) “separate each of her causes of action or claims for relief into separate counts”). Plaintiff, therefore, fails to state a Fifth Amendment claim.

Plaintiff also asserts a “class of one” equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. No. 1 at 9-10.) In support, he alleges that Defendants targeted and harassed him by initiating legal proceedings when there was “no indication or probable cause to believe that there was ongoing criminal activity.” (Id. at 10.) “To state a violation of equal protection based on a ‘class-of-one' theory, a plaintiff must...