Burns v. Cooper

270 A.3d 1130 (Table)

Jamiylah BURNS

v.Blakeley COOPER, Appellant

No. 895 EDA 2021

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed December 9, 2021

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:

Blakeley Cooper (Appellant) appeals from the order entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, denying his motion to strike a judgment entered in favor of Jamiylah Burns (Appellee).¹ Appellant previously appealed from the judgment itself, and this Court affirmed in a published opinion. Burns v. Cooper , 244 A.3d 1231, 1233 (Pa. Super. 2020), appeal denied , 252 A.3d 235 (Pa. 2021). Now, Appellant contends: (1) the trial court had no "subject matter jurisdiction" to enter the underlying judgment because Appellee had no causes of action for tortious interference with a contract or defamation; and (2) the trial court failed to determine, as a matter of law, whether the alleged defamatory statement at issue was an opinion. Because we conclude this appeal is frivolous, we affirm the order on appeal, and remand the case to the trial court for the imposition of attorneys’ fees and costs upon Appellant's counsel.

The relevant facts and procedural history underlying the November 1, 2019, judgment were summarized by this Court in a prior opinion as follows. In December of 2015, while Appellant and Appellee were involved in a contentious divorce, Appellee visited family in Washington, D.C. Burns , 244 A.3d at 1233. During that visit, her car was broken into and valuables were stolen. Id. She reported the incident to both the police and her insurance carrier, Erie Insurance Company (Erie). Id. Because the insurance policy was in the names of both Appellee and Appellant, Erie "required Appellant to join in the claim." Id. at 1234. Appellant, however, refused to do so, and told Erie's claim representative he did not believe the incident occurred. Id. He further stated "Appellee ‘was a liar who could not be trusted[.]’ " Id. at 1237. As a result, the claim representative referred the matter to Erie's fraud investigation section. Id. at 1234, 1238. During the ensuing investigation, Appellee was required to take time off work, sit for a deposition, and retain counsel. See id. at 1239-40.

On June 13, 2016, Appellee filed the underlying lawsuit, asserting claims for defamation and tortious interference with a contract against Appellant, and breach of contract and bad faith against Erie. Sometime after the action was filed, Erie paid Appellee's insurance claim, and the claims against Erie were either settled or dismissed before trial. Burns , 244 A.3d at 1234 n.3.

In July of 2018, Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting Appellee failed to present any facts to support her allegations. See Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/16/18, at 1. In his brief accompanying the motion, Appellant argued, inter alia , the alleged defamatory statement was "simply ... his opinion of what had occurred" and, therefore, not actionable. See Appellant's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/16/18, at 17-18. The trial court denied Appellant's motion by order entered October 30, 2018.² Relevant herein, the court determined Appellant's statement, that Appellee "was a liar who could not be trusted[,]" was capable of a defamatory meaning. Order, 10/30/18, at 2 n.3.

The case against Appellant proceeded to a jury trial. On June 20, 2019, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee on both counts. See Verdict Sheet, 6/20/19, at 1. The jury awarded Appellee $55,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 1-2. Appellant filed a timely post-trial motion, followed by an appeal to this Court.³

On appeal, Appellant raised the following three claims: (1) the trial court erred when it failed "to determine before trial, and as a matter of law, whether any statements made by [him] were capable of a defamatory meaning[;]" (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict for defamation because Appellee "failed to prove ‘the statement's recipient — the insurer — understood the statement to have a defamatory meaning[;]" and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict for tortious interference with a contract because the insurer paid Appellee's claim, and thus, she had no actual damages. See Burns , 244 A.3d at 1235, 1237, 1239 (footnote omitted).

This Court affirmed the judgment in a published opinion. With respect to Appellant's first claim, the panel determined the trial court did not "shirk[ ] its duty[,]" but rather properly "considered in the first instance whether the challenged statement was capable of having a defamatory meaning as a question of law when it ruled on Appellant's summary judgment motion." Burns , 244 A.3d at 1237. Next, the panel concluded the evidence supported the jury's determination that "the defamatory meaning of Appellant's statement was understood by Erie representatives." Id. at 1238. The Burns Court reasoned that Erie conducted a "full investigation into whether Appellee's claim was fraudulent" in response to Appellant's statement to an Erie representative that Appellee "was a liar who could not be trusted." Id.

With regard to Appellant's third claim — which challenged the jury's verdict for tortious interference with a contract — the panel concluded "the jury could reasonably find Appellee suffered ‘actual damage’ as a result of Appellant's defamatory statement, notwithstanding the fact that Erie eventually paid out on Appellee's insurance claim." Burns , 244 A.3d at 1239. These damages included, but were not limited to, the additional attorney's fees she incurred due to the fraud investigation. Id. at 1240. Appellant petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for allocatur review, which was denied on April 6, 2021. See Burns , 252 A.3d 235.

Meanwhile, Appellee sought to execute on the judgment in the trial court. On June 8, 2020, she filed a praecipe for writ of execution. Thereafter, on December 21, 2020, Appellee filed a motion requesting the trial court compel Appellant to provide responses to previously served interrogatories in aid of execution of the judgment. See Appellee's Motion to Compel [Appellant's] Discovery Responses, 12/21/20. The trial court granted Appellee's motion by order entered March 16, 2021.

On April 1, 2021 — five days before the Supreme Court denied his petition for allocatur review of his prior appeal — Appellant filed, in the trial court, the underlying motion to strike both the November 2019 judgment and the court's March 16th order. See Appellant's Motion to Have Judgment (Filed November 1, 2019) and Order Dated March 16, 2021 Stricken, 4/1/21. Appellant averred the trial court improperly permitted the jury to determine whether his statement was an opinion (which is not actionable), when the court itself should have made that determination as a matter of law. See id. at 2-4. Because this action "was outside [the trial court's] subject matter jurisdiction[,]" Appellant insisted the judgment was "void," and could be stricken at any time. Id. at 4-5. Accordingly, despite this Court's affirmance of the judgment on appeal, he moved to strike both the judgment, and in turn, the court's March 16th order compelling him to answer Appellee's interrogatories in aid of execution on that judgment.

The trial court denied Appellant's motion the next day. See Order, 4/2/21. This timely appeal follows.⁴

Appellant raises three questions on appeal:

1. A tortious interference with a contract requires that the contract not be performed. In this case, the contract was performed, yet the trial court entered judgment for tortious interference with the contract. Could the trial court enter such judgment?

2. If a statement that is alleged to be defamatory is an opinion, the statement (opinion) is not actionable. In this case, [Appellee] admits that [Appellant's] statement is an opinion, yet the trial court entered judgment for defamation. Could the trial court enter such judgment?

3. When a statement is alleged to be defamatory, the trial court must determine, as a matter of law, whether the statement is an opinion because an opinion is not actionable. In this case, the trial court did not make such determination; instead, the trial court had such determination (of law) made by the jury, which action led to judgment for defamation. Could the trial court have such determination (of law) made by the jury?

Appellant's Brief at 4.

Preliminarily, we emphasize that the appeal before us is not from the underlying judgment. Rather, this Court affirmed the judgment in our August 2020 opinion.⁵ See Burns , supra . Instead, Appellant appeals from the post-appeal order of the trial court denying his motion to strike the judgment, ostensibly for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As we discuss infra , however, Appellant is merely attempting to get a "second bite of the apple" in the courts.

A trial court may grant a petition to strike a judgment "only for a fatal defect or irregularity appearing on the face of the record." Digital Commc'ns Warehouse, Inc. v. Allen Invs., LLC , 223 A.3d 278, 284 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

"[A] petition to strike is not a chance to review the merits of the allegations of a complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is aimed at defects that affect the validity of the judgment and that entitle the petitioner, as a matter of law, to relief."

Id. at 285 (citations omitted). See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Copley Qu-Wayne Assocs. , 683 A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. 1996) ("[I]f the truth of the factual averments contained in [the] record are disputed, then the remedy is by a proceeding to open the judgment and not to strike.").⁶ Our review of an order denying a motion to strike a judgment "is limited to a determination of whether the record as filed by the party [seeking to uphold the] judgment is sufficient to sustain the judgment." First Union Nat. Bank v. Portside Refrigerated Servs., Inc. , 827 A.2d 1224, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2003).

Here, Appellant contends the ...