Burns v. Hines

1

TREVOR BURNS, Plaintiff, v. SARAH HINES, Assistant District Attorney, and UNKNOWN N.Y.C. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION OFFICIALS, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.

No. 21-cv-9469 (ER)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

March 29, 2023

OPINION & ORDER

EDGARDO RAMOS, U.S.D.J.

Trevor Burns, proceeding pro se, brought this action against Assistant District Attorney Sarah Hines and Unknown N.Y.C. Department of Correction Officials (collectively “Defendants”) on November 8, 2021. Doc. 1. He asserted First and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and he sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as punitive damages. Id. In brief, the claims concern ADA Hines' alleged failure to produce exculpatory information during his prosecution and her purported scheme to fabricate evidence to secure his conviction and shield it from collateral attacks. See id. at 6-18 ¶¶ 1-71.

Before the Court is Hines' motion to dismiss. Docs. 26, 28. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts underlying this action are discussed in the Court's November 16, 2022, Opinion and Order denying Burns' discovery motion pursuant to Rules 56(f) and 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.^[1] Burns v. Hines, No 21 Civ. 9469 (ER), 2022 WL 16963607, at *1-5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2022). They are largely reproduced here in light of Hines' pending motion to dismiss.

A. Factual Background

Trevor Burns was arrested in April 1996 for the murder of Corey Henderson. Doc. 1 at 6 ¶ 3. A jury convicted Burns of murder in the second degree in June 1997. Doc. 28 at 8. At his trial, Davon Kelly,^[2] a witness for the prosecution, testified that he knew Burns and witnessed the shooting that led to Henderson's death. Doc. 1 at 7-8 ¶¶ 12-19; see also Doc. 27-1 at 6-9, 16. Kelly, along with another witness, identified Burns as one of the shooters. Doc. 1 at 8 ¶ 17; see also Doc. 27-3 ¶ 17. Following Burns' conviction, the state court sentenced him to a term of 25 years to life in prison. Doc. 1 at 24 n.2. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See People v. Burns, 18 A.D.3d 397 (2005), aff'd 6 N.Y.3d 793 (2006).

Approximately 18 years after his conviction, Burns claimed that he learned the following:

In April 2015, while incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility located in Stormville, New York, plaintiff read a [sic] article in the New York Post, pertaining to an individual being shot immediately upon his release from prison after serving fifteen (15) year [sic]. Plaintiff immediately recognized the victim[,] Simmons[,] as defendant's star witness [Kelly] who testified against plaintiff on June 3 and 4, 1997. . . .

Doc. 1 at 8-9 ¶ 21. In other words, Burns claimed that he recognized the photo of Simmons, realized that the prosecution actually called Simmons to the stand to impersonate Kelly, and falsely framed him for Henderson's murder. According to Burns, Hines “engaged in collusion . . . . coach[ing] Simmons on her theory of the case [and] providing him with manufactured facts.” Id. at 7-8 ¶¶ 14-15.

In support of his claims, Burns acquired a sworn affidavit from Davon Kelly. Doc. 1 at 44-45. In relevant part, the affidavit states the following about Burns' prosecution:

4) The Manhattan ADA . . . asked me to come to Court and testify that I saw Trevor Burns at the murder scene. I told her I couldn't do that because I did not see him there.

5) At no point did I ever go to Court and testify or give any statements about Trevor Burns or related to his case or trial in any way.

Id. at 44 ¶¶ 4, 5. Burns' contentions about the purported perjured testimony, supported by Kelly's affidavit, formed the basis for several of the state and federal collateral attacks on his conviction.^[3]

As relevant to the claims now before the Court, Judge Arlene D. Goldberg of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, issued a decision and order in March 2017 denying one of Burns' N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 440.10(1) motions, which contained allegations similar to the ones asserted in this case. See Doc. 27-1. Specifically, the motion was “premised on grounds of actual innocence, prosecutorial misconduct, newly discovered evidence,” including the affidavit from Davon Kelly alleging that he did not in fact testify at Burns' trial, and “the claim that the defendant was deprived of his right to confront witness [Davon] Kelly . . . .” Id. at 4-5. Importantly, the Court concluded that there was sufficient proof that Davon Kelly did indeed testify at Burns' trial.^[4] Id. at 16.

Critically, it noted that “[Davon] Kelly's claim in his affidavit that he was never produced to testify is belied by the Department of Corrections inmate movement history log which shows that he was transported from a facility at Riker's Island to New York Supreme Court on June 3, 1997,” among other evidence.^[5] Id. at 16-18.

Hines opposed all of Burns' prior challenges and continues to dispute Burns' contentions regarding the authenticity of Kelly's testimony. See generally Docs. 28, 30, 36, 51. She specifically defers to the “numerous post-conviction motions” and habeas corpus proceedings wherein “two different New York State Supreme Court justices” and federal judges “resoundingly rejected” Burns' claims about Kelly's testimony. Doc. 36 at 6. Hines also cites to the evidence that she raised in those proceedings. For example, she references the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”) records that confirmed that Kelly, who was incarcerated during Burns' trial, was the person produced by DOC and who indeed testified at Burns' 1997 trial. See, e.g., Doc. 36 at 6; Doc. 28 at 8. She also cites to fingerprint reports that similarly confirm Kelly's identity. See Doc. 28 at 8.

B. Procedural History

Burns filed the instant complaint on November 8, 2021. Doc. 1. He asserted several claims that center around Hines' purported “collusion” to procure the perjured testimony of an imposter witness and her alleged efforts to hide those actions after the fact by fabricating false prisoner movement logs showing that Kelly, not the imposter, was indeed produced at trial. See generally Doc. 1 at 1-22 ¶¶ 1-92. A summons was issued on December 1, 2021, Doc. 5, and Hines appeared on December 30, 2021, Doc. 8.

Thereafter on January 10, 2022, Hines filed a letter motion in anticipation of her motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Doc. 10 at 1. The Court granted Hines leave to file the motion to dismiss, Doc. 23, and Hines filed the motion on March 28, 2022, see Docs. 26, 28. In it, Hines asserted that Burns' suit is time-barred, subject to dismissal pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and absolute immunity doctrines, precluded by the Heck^[6] and Rooker-Feldman^[7] doctrines, and otherwise fails to state a claim. See generally Doc. 28. Hines attached multiple exhibits to her motion, including documents from the several state and federal habeas corpus proceedings raised in the complaint. See Doc. 27, Exs. A-E.^[8]

Burns then filed a discovery motion on April 29, 2022. See Docs. 30, 31. He requested a continuance to conduct discovery pursuant to Rules 56(f) and 56(d). Doc. 30. The Court instructed Hines to file a response to Burns' discovery requests, and stated that Burns would be given an opportunity to separately respond to Hines' motion to dismiss.

Doc. 35 at 2. Hines responded to the discovery requests on June 6, 2022. Doc. 36. The response was served by mail the same day. Doc. 37.

Thereafter, Hines filed a letter indicating that Burns had failed to file a timely reply and asking the Court to deem Burns' discovery motion fully briefed on July 26, 2022. Doc. 38. The Court granted that request. Doc. 40.

On November 16, 2022, the Court issued an Opinion and Order denying the discovery motion and directing Burns to respond to Hines' motion to dismiss by January 16, 2023. Doc. 41. Burns timely filed his opposition on December 19, 2022, Doc. 42, and thereafter filed a supplemental memorandum in opposition of Hines' motion to dismiss on December 27, 2022, Doc. 46. Hines replied on January 18, 2023. Doc. 51.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

The Court must dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the Court “lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(1)). The party asserting subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists by a preponderance of the evidence. Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113). The Court accepts all material factual allegations in the complaint as true, Morrison, 547 F.3d at 170 (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Johnson, 461 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2006)), but it does not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's jurisdictional allegations, Frisone v. Pepsico, Inc., 369 F.Supp.2d 464, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court may consider evidence outside of the pleadings to resolve the disputed jurisdictional fact issues. ZappiaMiddle E. Constr. Co. Ltd. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Morrison, 547 F.3d at 170 (citing Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113). The Court should refrain from drawing inferences in favor of the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. People United for Child. Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F.Supp.2d 275, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citation omitted).

When the issue before the Court involves a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the Court must consider the Rule 12(b)(1) motion first, ...