Burt v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of R.I.

654 F.Supp.3d 103

Sean BURT and Logan Thomson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND, Defendant.

C.A No. 1:20-cv-00295-JJM-LDA

C.A. No. 1:20-cv-00465-JJM-LDA

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

Signed January 31, 2023

Robert J. Caron, Providence, RI, Blake G. Abbott, Pro Hac Vice, Poulin, Willey, Anastopoulo, LLC, Charleston, SC, Eric M. Poulin, Pro Hac Vice, Roy T. Willey, IV, Pro Hac Vice, Paul J. Doolittle, Pro Hac Vice, Anastopoulo Law Firm, Charleston, SC, Jason A. Ibey, Kazerouni Law Group, APC, St. George, UT, Todd M. Friedman, Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, Woodland Hills, CA, for Plaintiff Logan Thomson.

Abbas Kazerounian, Pro Hac Vice, Kazerouni Law Group, APC, Costa Mesa, CA, Jason A. Ibey, Pro Hac Vice, Kazerouni Law Group, APC, St. George, UT, Thomas E. Wheeler, Pro Hac Vice, Law Offices of Todd M. Law, P.C., Woodland Hills, CA, Todd M. Friedman, Pro Hac Vice, Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, Woodland Hills, CA, Peter N. Wasylyk, Law Offices of Peter N. Wasylyk, Providence, RI, for Plaintiff Sean Burt.

C. Russell Bengtson, Bengtson & Jestings, LLP, Providence, RI, Crystal L. Nix-Hines, Pro Hac Vice, Marina Lev, Pro Hac Vice, Shon Morgan, Pro Hac Vice, T. Scott Mills, Pro Hac Vice, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Pro Hac Vice, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Court Chief Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant Board of Trustees of the University of Rhode Island's ("URI" or the "University") Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 69.

I. BACKGROUND

This case represents one of many previously consolidated actions (for ruling on their motions to dismiss) in which students alleged that various Rhode Island universities' decisions to transition from in-person to remote academic experiences in response to the COVID-19 pandemic breached the contract that exists between student and university under Rhode Island law. See Burt v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of R.I., 523 F. Supp. 3d 214 (D.R.I. 2021). Here, two students, Sean Burt and Logan Thomson, seek to recover from URI three types of fees for themselves, and ultimately a whole class of students at the University.¹ ECF No. 1 (20-465); ECF No. 22 (20-295). These fees are the: Student Services Feel² Technology Fee; and Health Services Fee. ECF No. 71 at 11-13. At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for a tuition refund but let their claims to recover various fees proceed. Burt, 523 F. Supp. 3d at 228. Defendants now claim that, after discovery, the evidence does not sufficiently demonstrate that URI's Student Catalog made specific enough promises that these fees guaranteed exclusively in-person experiences. ECF No. 69-1 at 5.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controls in deciding whether a party is entitled to summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. More particularly,

the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When deciding whether the Court should grant summary judgment, the Court must "view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Barbour v. Dynamics Rsch. Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1995). As alluded to, there must first be no genuine issues of material fact. "Mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). Thus, the issue must be genuine and material. See id. "In this context, 'genuine' means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party . . . . '[M]aterial' means that the fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Additionally, the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law [if] the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court decides this latter element of the summary judgment standard by evaluating "whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

URI makes three main arguments in support of summary judgment. See ECF No. 69-1 at 14-24. First, URI argues that its catalog did not promise that payment of these fees would entitle students to specific on-campus activities or services. Id. at 16-18. Second, URI argues that its refund policy expressly negates any refunds of fees to which students might otherwise be entitled. Id. at 18-19. Third, URI argues that, even if it did breach its contract with students, the contract would be unenforceable under the doctrines of impossibility and frustration. Id. at 23-24. The Court considers each argument in turn.

A. The Student Catalog and Specific On-Campus Activities or Services

Under Rhode Island law, a contract exists between a student and her university based on the "reasonable expectations" created by the language found in documents such as the student handbook. Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); Gorman v. St. Raphael Acad., 853 A.2d 28, 34-35 (R.I. 2004) (citations omitted). URI primarily contends that these materials represent only that these fees would be used to support the various services mentioned, not that these fees were paid in exchange for access to specific in-person services. ECF No. 69-1 at 16-18. The University also contends that there are no representations that students were entitled to exclusively in-person services in exchange for payment of these fees. ECF No. 73 at 6-8. The most relevant document is URI's Student Catalog, which contains statements about the various fees. See ECF No. 69-5, Ex. A (hereinafter "URI Catalog"). The Court will thus examine these representations related to each fee at issue.

1. Student Services Fee

The Student Catalog states that, "[t]he student services fee covers the cost of the Memorial Union, transportation, Fitness and Wellness Center, and capital projects. The undergraduate [student services] fee supports funds that are distributed to the Student Senate for a wide variety of student programs and activities." Id. at 14. As URI notes, the key language here is that the fee "covers the cost of the Memorial Union, transportation, Fitness and Wellness Center, and capital projects . . . . [And] supports . . . a wide variety of student programs and activities." Id. (emphasis added). While the first sentence in the quote refers to specific campus amenities, the latter sentence does not carry such specificity. The relevant question thus becomes whether this statement creates a reasonable expectation that this fee will be put toward campus uses to which students would have expected to have in-person access throughout the entire semester. Plaintiffs argue that these documents make specific mentions of facilities, such as the Anna Fascitelli Fitness & Wellness Center (collectively, with the other athletic facilities, the "Fitness Center") and Memorial Union, which create a reasonable expectation that payment of this fee permits them access to such facilities throughout the semester. ECF No. 71 at 11, 15. URI counters that these fees did go toward student activities—albeit virtual activities in some cases—for which they were intended. ECF No. 69-3 at ¶¶ 17-18. URI also notes that its materials suggest only that the fee would cover the costs of these physical facilities, not guarantee students in-person access to them. See URI Catalog at 14 (using the broader language of "covers" and "supports"). Further, even if there were a reasonable expectation of in-person services, URI submits that there can be no reasonable expectation that it would provide these services exclusively in-person throughout the semester. ECF No. 73 at 6-8.

As an initial matter, the evidence undisputedly shows that URI put the funds from the Student Activity Fee³ toward various student activities. See, e.g., ECF No. 69-4, Exs. A, B (providing evidence of virtual events that URI held for student entertainment). These uses might be seen as "student programs and activities." URI Catalog at 14. For example, magician and URI alum, Mat Franco, performed virtually for the student body. Id., Ex. A. Actor Will Ferrell and writer, director, and producer Judd Apatow also had appeared virtually before students. Id., Ex. B. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, it would not have been unthinkable to have any random few guests (e.g., not a graduation speaker or guest of other such magnitude) appear virtually for various reasons such as scheduling. Moreover, URI—and...