Bus. Asset Relocation, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 814,

BUSINESS ASSET RELOCATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. TEAMSTERS LOCAL 814, A/W INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOODOF TEAMSTERS, AFL-CIO, an unincorporated association; JASON IDE, individuallyand as President of Teamsters Local 814; BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCILOF GREATER NEW YORK, an unincorporated association; GARY LABARBERA, individuallyand as President of Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater New York;THE TRUSTEES OF THE MASONIC HALL AND ASYLUM FUND; and HAROLD WISSING, Defendants.

14-CV-0098 (RRM) (VMS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 27, 2015

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, United States District Judge.

Business Asset Relocation, Inc. ("BAR") is a moving company whose employees are represented by Local 1212, USWA ("Local 1212"). In mid-November of 2013, BAR arrived at 71 West 23 rd Street in New York City to provide moving and storage services to AECOM Technology Corporation ("AECOM") in connection with its move out from that building. Upon its arrival, BAR was prohibited from entering the building, and Harold Wissing, the building manager, explained that the Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater New York ("BCTC") had instructed him not to allow BAR into the building. As BAR was unable to enter the building, AECOM eventually used a different company whose workers were represented by Local 814, IBT ("Local 814"), a member of the BCTC.

BAR alleges that BCTC and Local 814 engaged in unfair labor practices under theNational Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") by unlawfully forcing AECOM to break its contract with BAR and assign the work instead to a moving company whose employees are represented by Local 814. BAR also alleges that Wissing and the building owner, The Trustees of the Masonic Hall and Asylum Fund ("Trustees") (together, the "Landlord Defendants"), committed tortious interference with its contract with AECOM. The defendants filed several motions to dismiss the claims.¹

Because BAR sufficiently alleges that BCTC threatened Wissing with the twin goals of forcing AECOM to stop doing business with BAR and assigning the work instead to a Local 814-affiliated company, BCTC's motion to dismiss is granted in part (with respect to the section 8(b)(4)(A) claim) and denied in part (with respect to the section 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(b)(4)(D) claims) and. However, BAR fails to sufficiently allege that Local 814 engaged in unfair labor practices, and Local 814's motion to dismiss is therefore granted. Lastly, BAR fails to sufficiently allege that AECOM breached its contract with BAR, and the Landlord Defendants' motion to dismiss the claim of tortious interference with a contract is therefore granted.

BACKGROUND²

A. Factual Background

BAR is a commercial moving and storage company that operates within the greater New York City area. (See Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at ¶ 7.) BAR employees are represented by Local 1212, (see id. at ¶ 17), while Local 814, another labor organization, represents employees of other moving and storage service employers, including several of BAR's competitors. (See id. at ¶¶ 9, 20.) Local 814 is a member of BCTC, a labor organization that maintains its principalplace of business at 71 West 23rd Street (the "Premises"). (See id. at ¶¶ 13, 22, 23.) BAR alleges that BCTC has openly supported Local 814's efforts to persuade individuals to stop doing business with its competitors,³ and BCTC's president, defendant Gary LaBarbera, has publicly declared that Local 814 is the only moving and storage union it recognizes. (See id. at ¶¶ 22, 46.)

AECOM occupied the eleventh and twelfth floors of the Premises for several months in 2013. (See id. at ¶ 25.) On October 28, 2013, AECOM contracted with BAR to provide moving and storage services in connection with its move out of the building. (See id. at ¶¶ 26-27.) BAR alleges that the Trustees, who own the Premises and employ Wissing, knew about this contract. (See id. at ¶ 28.) On November 13 or 14, 2013, when BAR arrived at the Premises to begin its work, agents of the Trustees prohibited it from entering the building, saying that the Premises was a "union building," that BAR was "not the union," and that BCTC "owned" the building. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-32.)

BAR President Glenn Preslier then spoke with Wissing, who explained that the Trustees "would not provide elevator service" to BAR because BAR was not a member of the BCTC, and the Trustees feared that BCTC would take action against the Premises, including establishing a picket line that would make it impossible for the building to operate. (See id. at ¶ 34.) When Preslier told Wissing that BAR was "union," Wissing replied "not the right union, apparently." (Id. at ¶ 36.) He further explained that the problem was not with BAR, but instead with AECOM. (See id. at ¶ 39.) According to BAR, the "problem" Wissing had with AECOM was its contract with BAR, whose employees were represented by Local 1212, a competitor of Local 814. (Id. at ¶ 40.) As a result of Wissing's refusal to allow BAR to enter the building, AECOMreassigned some of the work initially contracted to BAR to a Local 814 affiliate. (See id. at ¶ 41.) On or about November 20, 2013, Preslier spoke with a principal of a Local 814 contractor, who told him that the contractor had encouraged Local 814 to pressure BCTC to take action to remove BAR from the job. (See id. at ¶ 43.)

B. Procedural Background

In its complaint, BAR asserts three causes of action against Local 814 and BCTC, alleging unfair labor practices under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 187, specifically under sections 8(b)(4)(A), 8(b)(4)(B), and 8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA. BAR's fourth cause of action asserts tortious interference with a contract against the Trustees, Wissing, LaBarbera, and Jason Ide, the president of Local 814.⁴ The defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), alleging that BAR failed to sufficiently plead the elements of either a section 8(b)(4) or a tortious interference with contract claim. The defendants' motions are granted in part and denied in part for the reasons that follow.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

1. Rule 12(b)(6)

For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In order to plead "facial plausibility," a plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard ofplausibility does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate "probability," but requires a showing of "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). To that end, the reviewing court "must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true," however the court is "not bound to accept as true a[ny] legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.

2. Section 303

Section 303 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 187, provides a private right of action to persons affected by unfair labor practices under section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). See C&D Restoration, Inc. v. Laborers Local 79, No. 02-CV-9448, 2004 WL 1878789, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2004).

a. Section 8(b)(4)(A)

Section 8(b)(4)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to (i) induce or encourage an employee to cease working for his or her employer, or (ii) threaten, coerce, or restrain any person in an industry affecting commerce, when "'an object thereof is . . . forcing or requiring an employer . . . to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by [section 8(e) of the Act].'" NLRB v. Local 32B-32J SEIU, 353 F.3d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A)); see also Blyer v. Pratt Towers, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 136, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("A strike by a union to compel an employer to agree to violate section 8(e) constitutes a violation by the union of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A)."). Section 8(e), in turn, makes it unlawful "forany labor organization and any employer to enter into any . . . agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases . . . or agrees to cease . . . doing business with any other person." 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). It was enacted with the goal of outlawing agreements between unions and employers, regardless of whether the union takes any action to pressure the employer to enter into or abide by such an agreement. See Carrier Air Conditioning Corp. v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 1178, 1185 (2d Cir. 1977). "By prohibiting certain secondary activity based on 'express or implied' agreements, section 8(e) intended to close a loophole in section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) through which unions used 'hot cargo' clauses to 'exert subtle pressures upon employers to engage in 'voluntary' boycotts.'" Sheet Metal Workers, Local Union No. 91 v. N.L.R.B., 905 F.2d 417, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Nat'l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n, 386 U.S. 612, 634 (1967)); see also NLRB v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders' Union Local 531, 623 F.2d 61, 65 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Section 8(e) aims at contractual provisions . . . [and] prohibits only those provisions establishing secondary union pressures."). In other words, "implied" was inserted to encompass those situations in which employers were "voluntarily" boycotting certain contractors on the basis of pre-existing contractual provisions in agreements they had with unions. Courts have termed such agreements...