Butcher v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc.

JUSTIN BUTCHER and JENNIFER BUTCHER, husband and wife,Residents of Big Stone Gap, Virginia, Plaintiffs, v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation,ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation,and SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, LLC, a Louisiana Corporation, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:20-CV-74

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

April 15, 2021

(Judge Kleeh)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Pending before the Court is Defendant Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.'s ("Halliburton") Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 60]. The matter is fully briefed and ripe for decision. For the reasons discussed herein, the motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Justin Butcher (sometimes hereinafter "Justin Butcher" or "Butcher") is a resident of Appalachia, Wise County, Virginia. Amend. Compl., ECF No. 56, at ¶ 2. Butcher alleges he worked for Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. ("Halliburton") in Pennsboro, Ritchie County, West Virginia. Id. He was based out of Halliburton's Zanesville, Ohio yard. Id. at Ex. 8. At the time of the injury giving rise to this litigation, Butcher was working at a customer's location - Defendant Antero Resources Corporation ("Antero") - in Ritchie County, West Virginia. Id.

Butcher suffered a workplace injury on April 30, 2018 while working on Antero's Petroleum Pad 3225, again, in Ritchie County, West Virginia. Specifically, Butcher alleges he was performing general maintenance on a Q10-high pressure pump and injured his hand when he reached into a pot. Id. at ¶17.

The number of days Butcher spent working within the borders of the state of West Virginia is a significant issue here. Those dates are addressed in the Amended Complaint and established by Halliburton's payroll records and the affidavit of Jessica Knittle, HSE Manager. ECF Nos. 61-1 and 61-2. Again, he commenced employment with Halliburton in Ohio on February 6, 2018. From that start date through March 13, 2018, Butcher was either training (i.e., working) in Ohio or had scheduled time off. On March 14, 2018, Butcher worked on the aforementioned well pad in Ritchie County, West Virginia. From March 23, 2018 through April 5, 2018, he was either on vacation or had scheduled time off. Butcher returned to Ritchie County, West Virginia for work on April 6, 2018 and worked there through April 17, 2018. He had time off from work from April 18, 2018 through April 23, 2018. Butcherresumed work on the Ritchie County well pad on April 24, 2018 and worked there through the date of injury, April 30, 2018.

Plaintiffs allege Justin Butcher was assigned or physically present in West Virginia for 48 calendar days. Some of those days represent days where Plaintiff did not perform work or was on scheduled vacation. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint scarcely addresses the issue but does not allege Justin Butcher performed work in excess of thirty (30) days within the borders of West Virginia. Plaintiff's Response Brief argues, multiple times, he worked in West Virginia EXACTLY thirty (30) days. Halliburton's aforementioned exhibits count Butcher's days performing work in West Virginia at 28.

Plaintiff Butcher alleges a number of causes of action against Defendants. Halliburton's motion focuses on the claims for injury in violation of West Virginia Code § 23-4-2 otherwise known as a deliberate intent claim (Count III), workers compensation discrimination in violation of West Virginia Code § 23-5A-1 et seq. (Count VI) and workers' compensation fraud (also, Count VI).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Parties may present that defense via motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss lies with the party asserting jurisdiction. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gilkison, No. 5:05CV202, 2009 WL 426265, at *2 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 19, 2009).¹ No presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating the merits of the jurisdictional claims. Id. at *2.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move for dismissal upon the ground that a complaint does not "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). A court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

A court should dismiss a complaint if it does not contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A motion to dismiss "does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 942, 952 (4th Cir. 1992).

A motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint, Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2006), considered with the assumption that the facts alleged are true, Eastern Shore Mkts, Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). And the legal sufficiency of a complaint is measured by whether it meets the standards for a pleading stated in Rule 8 (providing general rules of pleading), Rule 9 (providing rules for pleading special matters), Rule 10 (specifying pleading form), Rule 11 (requiring the signing of a pleading and stating its significance), and Rule 12(b)(6) (requiring that a complaint state a claim upon which relief can be granted).

Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009)

C. Application

Halliburton urges the Court to proceed under Rule 12(b)(1) challenging this Court's jurisdiction. However, Halliburton'smotion under this procedural avenue is misplaced. "A court must have the power to decide the claim before it (subject-matter jurisdiction) and power over the parties before it (personal jurisdiction) before it can resolve a case." Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., -- U.S. --, 137 S. Ct. 553, 562 (2017) (internal citation omitted). Although Halliburton argues (and as this Court concludes) Plaintiff Justin Butcher cannot seek relief under W. Va. Code § 23-4-2, the question of whether this Court has the authority or power to decide such a question - the core of a subject matter jurisdiction challenge - can hardly be disputed. Plaintiffs originally filed this matter in this Court and alleged jurisdiction was proper under "29 [sic] USCA §1332." ECF No. 1 at ¶ 12. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint [ECF No. 56], the operative pleading currently before the Court, alleging the same jurisdictional predicate - that this matter represents "a dispute between citizens of different states, wherein the amount in controversy, including costs, exceeds the jurisdictional threshold of $75,000." ECF No. 56 at ¶ 12. At no point has any party challenged whether the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 have been satisfied.²

Instead, Halliburton advances the argument that because Plaintiff Justin Butcher cannot avail himself of the protections of West Virginia workers' compensation law, including the deliberate intent statute, this Court somehow lacks jurisdiction. The argument confuses the issue. "It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 642-43 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)(analyzing jurisdictional challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as opposed to § 1332). The Rule 12 challenge to Plaintiffs' claims is better phrased as one of plausibility even if the question is if Justin Butcher is covered by the statutes he cites in his Amended Complaint. This Court most certainly has the legal authority to answer that question. Thus, the Court views the pending motion through the Rule 12(b)(6) prism.

In a related vein, Plaintiffs seek shelter under Rule 56 because, as they contend, the reference to exhibits transforms Halliburton's motion to one seeking summary judgment. The Court disagrees. As the Fourth Circuit has noted, courts are notrequired to "accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences ... Nor must [courts] accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit." Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)).³

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff Butcher asserts multiple claims against Halliburton made subject of the pending motion. The Court addresses each in turn.

A. Butcher's Statutory Deliberate Intent Claim Fails Because He Is Not Entitled To Recover Benefits for Injury, Disease or Death Under West Virginia Workers' Compensation Law.

Butcher initially asserts a claim for injury against Halliburton, his employer, for alleged violation of West Virginia Code § 23-4-2, or "deliberate intent." ECF No. 56 at ¶¶ 44-50. Butcher seeks the usual array of damages. Id. at ¶ 49....