Butler v. Ford Motor Co.

1

CONNISHA BUTLER, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, and STEPHAN MALLOY, Defendants.

No. 21-cv-01244

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

September 23, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Franklin U. Valderrama, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Connisha Butler (Butler) alleges that while employed by Defendant Ford Motor Company (Ford), she was subjected to sexual harassment by her coworker, Defendant Stephen Malloy (Malloy). Butler filed a six-count Complaint against Ford and Malloy (collectively, Defendants) in the Circuit Court of Cook County. R. 1-1, Compl.^[1] In relevant part, the Complaint includes five counts directed at Ford: sexual harassment (Count I), sex discrimination (Count II), and retaliation (Count III), all based on the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101, et seq., as well as an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (Count IV), and one count of violating the Illinois Gender Violence Act (Count VI). Ford removed the case to federal court. R. 1. Before the Court is Ford's motion to dismiss Counts I, IV, and VI of the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 14, Mot. Dismiss. For the reasons that follow Ford's partial motion to dismiss is granted.

Background

Butler is a woman who began her employment with Ford as a Short-Term Supplemental Employee Operator (STS Operator) on September 17, 2018. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 15.^[2] Butler's coworker Malloy, is a man who worked as an Operator at Ford. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Ed Young (Young) supervised both Butler and Malloy. Id. ¶ 18.

On December 11, 2018, while Butler was working, Malloy attempted to ask Butler if her name was on the attendance sheet. Compl. ¶ 27. Butler, however, due to the noise in the plant did not hear Malloy. Id. Since Butler did not hear Malloy, she crossed the line on the floor to work on a different car. Id. ¶¶ 27, 28. Immediately after Butler crossed the line on the floor, Malloy walked in front of her, berated Butler for crossing the line, and told Butler to go back to working on the other car. Id. ¶ 28. Malloy yelled in Butler's face, “You bitches on this line be tweaking!” Id. ¶ 29. Butler was afraid and feared that Malloy was about to attack her because of his tone and aggressive language. Id. ¶ 30. Butler told Malloy he was being disrespectful and asked him to stop yelling at her. Id. ¶ 31. Malloy responded that Butler would not have a job after the holiday shutdown anyway. Id. ¶ 32. While yelling at Butler, Malloy told Butler multiple times that if she reported him to Labor Relations, she would not have a job. Id. ¶ 34.

Eventually, Anastasia LNU^[3] (Anastasia), a supervisor, came over and attempted to calm Malloy down. Compl. ¶ 35. Without investigating the events that transpired, Anastasia told Butler she should not have upset Malloy and accused Butler of saying something that would have set Malloy off. Id. Eventually Malloy was sent home, and Butler continued working. Id. ¶ 36. Butler told her union representative that she wanted to make Labor Relations aware of what happened, but the representative told her things would not work out the way she wanted them to. Id. ¶ 37.

Butler reported the incident to Briana Bryant (Bryant) at Labor Relations on December 12, 2018. Compl. ¶¶ 39-40. Bryant told Butler that it was the first time Labor Relations was hearing of the incident. Id. ¶ 40. Bryant promised Butler that Labor Relations would investigate her complaint. Id. ¶ 72. Ford has an antiharassment policy and a progressive disciplinary policy. Id. ¶¶ 42, 74. The antiharassment policy provides that it is expected that “all employees will be respectful of others, both Ford and non-Ford personnel, at all times. Harassment, which includes language or conduct, which may be derogatory, intimidating or offensive to others, based on race, religion, color, age, sex, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, or veteran status, is prohibited by the nondiscrimination and anti-harassment policies.” Id. ¶ 88.

Malloy was issued a thirty (30) day suspension for his involvement in the December 11, 2018 altercation. Compl. ¶ 75. Butler, for her part, was terminated for violating Ford's anti-harassment policy on December 20, 2018, even though she had never received a verbal or written warning prior to the incident with Malloy. Id. ¶¶ 73-74.

Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only contain factual allegations, accepted as true, sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

Analysis

I. Sexual Harassment under IHRA (Count I)

In Count I, Butler asserts a claim of sexual harassment under the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), 775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. The IHRA prohibits both employment discrimination based on a person's sex and sexual harassment in the workplace. 775 ILCS 5/1-102(A)-(B). The IHRA makes it a civil rights violation for “any employer, employee, agent of any employer, employment agency or labor organization to engage in sexual harassment ....” 775 ILCS 5/2-102(D). “Illinois courts apply the federal Title VII framework to IHRA claims.” Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Butler asserts that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. To state a claim based on a hostile work environment, Butler “must allege that ‘(1) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (2) the harassment was based on her sex, (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the condition of her employment and create a hostile or abusive atmosphere, and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.'” Kibbons v. Taft Sch. Dist. 90, 563 F.Supp.3d 798, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (quoting Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930, 940 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Ford moves to dismiss Count I, arguing that Butler fails to allege facts that she was subjected to sexually harassing conduct that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to have created a hostile work environment under the IHRA.^[4] Specifically, Ford asserts that Butler's isolated verbal encounter with Malloy does not rise to the level of a hostile work environment. R. 15, Memo. Dismiss at 5. As an initial matter, Ford contends that, with the exception of the term “bitches,” there is no indication that the alleged conduct, the yelling, pointing and remarks about job status was anything but gender-neutral. Id. Ford maintains that the one-time use of the word “bitches” was an isolated incident that cannot be considered severe or pervasive under Seventh Circuit case law. Id. at 5, 6 (citing Jibson v. Northeast Ill. Regional Commuter Railroad Corp., 2020 WL 5365975 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2020); Saboya v. Segerdahl Group Graphics, 169 F. Supp. 3d 794 (N.D. Ill. 2015)).

Butler responds that she has adequately pled a sexual harassment cause of action. R. 17, Resp. at 5. Butler insists that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter Butler's work environment because she was terminated after complaining about the incident. Id. at 5. As for Saboya, Butler asserts that Ford's reliance on that case is misplaced because that case was decided at summary judgment, after an evidentiary record had been established, not on a motion to dismiss. Id at 7.

To state a claim for hostile work environment, the alleged harassment must be “both subjectively and objectively so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment.” Whittaker v. N. Illinois Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Objective offensiveness is “determined by evaluating ‘the totality of the circumstances,' which include ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.'” Kibbons, 563 F.Supp.3d at 807 (quoting Alamo v. Bliss, 864 F.3d 541, 549-50 (7th Cir. 2017)).

While an isolated incident of harassment can create an objectively hostile work environment if it is sufficiently egregious or severe, see Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 808 (7th Cir. 2000), “employers generally do not face liability for off-color comments, isolated incidents, teasing, and other unpleasantries that are, unfortunately, not uncommon in the workplace.” Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., 911 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Similarly, “occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo of coarse or boorish workers generally does not create a work environment that a reasonable person would find intolerable.” Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).

Here the Court finds that, even accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true, as it must, Butler has failed to allege that...