Butler v. Windsor

FRANZ BUTLER, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM WINDSOR, et al., Defendants.

Case No.: PWG-13-883

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND Southern Division

Dated: June 9, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Franz Butler was near 7-Eleven on Marcy Avenue in Prince George's County with two friends, holding a beverage in a paper bag, when two Prince George's County police officers approached him, searched him, and asked him to sit on the ground. According to Butler, the beverage was an iced tea and, other than questioning the need to sit down, he obeyed the officers. According to Officers William Windsor and Richard Reynolds, the beverage was malt liquor; Butler was intoxicated and belligerent; and he attempted to flee repeatedly, struck one officer, and refused to sit on the ground. The officers arrested Butler, employing some degree of force, and he filed this lawsuit, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state tort claims. I must determine whether to grant summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, Officers Windsor and Reynolds and Prince George's County, on any of Plaintiff's claims,¹ and whether to allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to plead satisfaction of the LGTCA² notice requirement.

I will grant Plaintiff's unopposed Motion to Amend, provided that the facts support such an amendment, and I will deny Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts II-VI and IX and X, insofar as it is based on Plaintiff's failure to comply with the LGTCA. But, I will grant Defendants' Motion on the claims against the County in Counts II, III, IV, IX and X, on the basis of governmental immunity and, because Plaintiff failed to state a Monell³ claim, I will grant Defendants' Motion as to Count VII and direct Plaintiff to submit briefing on the viability of Counts I and VIII against the County. Because genuine disputes exist as to material facts, I will deny Defendants' Motion on all other grounds as to all claims against the Defendant Officers and with regard to the claim against the County in Count V.

Thus, Counts V and VI and, if the additional briefing provides a basis, Counts I and VIII, are the only counts that remain against the County. Further, the denial of summary judgment as to the claims against the Defendant Officers in Counts II-VI and IX and X and the claims against the County in Counts V and VI is without prejudice to submission of a second motion for summary judgment within thirty days of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, if he files one, or thirty days from the date of this Memorandum Opinion, if Plaintiff does not amend. The second motion for summary judgment may rest only on Plaintiff's failure to comply with the LGTCA, should Defendants have support for such an assertion.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties' recollections of the events of June 7, 2012 differ greatly. In support of their version of the events on June 7, 2012, Defendants cite the Statement of Probable Cause that Officer Reynolds filed, Defs.' Mem. Ex. A, ECF No. 24-1, which describes Plaintiff as holding a can of alcohol and intoxicated to the point that he was "stumbling" and "bumped into another citizen." Id. at 1. Additionally, Officer Reynolds reported that Plaintiff was so belligerent that he refused to stay for a pat down search, "struck [Officer Reynolds] on the chest," attempted to flee repeatedly, and "refused all orders" to sit on the ground. Id. at 1-2; see also Reynolds Dep. 42: 1-5, 47:7-15, Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 1, ECF No. 25-1. But, in reviewing the evidence related to a motion for summary judgment, the Court considers the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); George & Co., LLC v. Imagination Entm't Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 391-92 (4th Cir. 2009); Dean v. Martinez, 336 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (D. Md. 2004).

In the light most favorable to Plaintiff, on the date in question, he "got a bag of chips and a soda to drink" at 7-Eleven and started "walking up the hill on Marcy Avenue" with a friend and "someone else." Butler Dep. 45:4-8, Defs.' Mem. Ex. B, ECF No. 24-1. Plaintiff testified that he had Arizona Iced Tea, not alcohol, in the paper bag. Id. at 51:1-20. He recalled, id. at 46:1-20:

[T]he police came out of nowhere and they approached me and asked me for my ID and [Officer Reynolds] told me to go towards the car and to put my hands on the car, on the hood and he searched me, and I asked him what he - why he pulled me over and he said - I can't remember what he said, and after he searched me and pat me, he told me to sit down on the ground ... . I felt that I was - I felt that I had no business being pulled over. They told me sit on the ground. I felt I didn't need - I shouldn't of had to sit on the ground and he asked again to sit on the ground and he said it - he said it more, more, meaner. I said, "For what?" And I remember I said," For what?" And I guess I didn't sit on the ground fast enoughand he came to me and he forced me and tackled me on the ground and another police officer [Officer Windsor] came out of nowhere and he jumped me, and he jumped me and I went to the hospital.

He testified that he refused to "get on the ground," but said that it was not true that he ran or hit the officer. Id. at 56:2-21.

Officer Reynolds acknowledged that, when Plaintiff repeatedly attempted to flee, he "grabbed [Butler] by the arm" and "attempted an arm bar take down," which caused Plaintiff to fall, and later brought Plaintiff to the ground again. Stmt. 1-2. Although Officer Reynolds stated that Plaintiff "continued to struggle to break free" and that Officer Windsor "assisted in getting the arrested into custody," id. at 2, he did not describe the force used in effecting the arrest. Plaintiff claims that they "kicked, punched, and generally assaulted" him. Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 2. Specifically, he alleges that they "intentionally, maliciously, willfully, wantonly, and recklessly struck the Plaintiff in the face, head, arms, legs, stomach, back and neck." Id. ¶ 20.

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is proper when the moving party demonstrates, through "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A); see Baldwin v. City of Greensboro, 714 F.3d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 2013). If the party seeking summary judgment demonstrates that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to identify evidence that shows that a genuine dispute exists as to material facts. See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The existence of only a "scintilla ofevidence" is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). Instead, the evidentiary materials submitted must show facts from which the finder of fact reasonably could find for the party opposing summary judgment. Id.

A. Count VII - Prince George's County

Count VII is a § 1983 claim against the County only. Compl. 8. Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on this count because "Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead his claim for an unconstitutional pattern or practice," relying instead on "speculative statements and legal conclusions," and, despite the completion of discovery, Plaintiff has no "fact-specific averments . . . establishing his cause of injury" to supplant the "bald allegations advanced by Plaintiff in his Complaint." Defs.' Mem. 4-5. Plaintiff insists that Paragraphs 37-39 of his Complaint "are sufficient[] to support a §1983 claim against the Defendant Prince George's County, Maryland." Pl.'s Opp'n 4-5. Paragraphs 37-39 state:

Paragraph 37. Prior to June 7, 2012, the Prince George's County Police Department which is owned operated and otherwise controlled by Prince George's County, Maryland developed and maintained policies or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons in Prince George's County, Maryland, which caused the violation of the Plaintiff's rights in this action.

Paragraph 38. It was the policy and/or custom of the Prince George's County Police Department to inadequately and improperly investigate citizen complaints of police misconduct, and Prince George's County, Maryland instead tolerated acts of misconduct.

Paragraph 39. It was the policy and or custom of the Prince George's County Police Department to inadequately supervise and train its police officers, including the Defendant Officers Reynolds and Windsor, thereby failing to adequately discourage further constitutional violations on the part of its police officers. Prince George's County, Maryland and the Prince George's County Police Department did not require appropriate in-service training or retraining of officers who were known to have engaged in police misconduct.

The County, as a unit of local government, is a "'person[]'" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as stated in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354, 368 (Md. 1999). But, "[u]nder Monell, a municipality's liability "arises only where the constitutionally offensive actions of employees are taken in furtherance of some municipal 'policy or custom.'" Walker v. Prince George's Cnty., Md., 575 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984)); see Rockwell v. Mayor of Balt, No. RDB-13-3049, 2014 WL 949859, at *11 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2014) (citing Walker). Thus, a Monell claim is a form of § 1983 action under which a municipality, such as the County, is liable "where a policymaker officially promulgates or sanctions an unconstitutional law, or where the municipality is deliberately indifferent to...