Byington v. State

981 N.W.2d 193

Bunny Annette BYINGTON, Appellant,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

A20-1441

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: October 26, 2022

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Michael D. Leeser, Assistant County Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota, for respondent.

OPINION

HUDSON, Justice.

This appeal requires us to determine whether a district court in a postconviction proceeding may order the refund of restitution that the defendant has paid because of a conviction when that conviction has been invalidated, and no retrial will occur. In 2009, appellant Bunny Annette Byington was convicted of one count of coercion—threat to expose a secret or disgrace, Minn. Stat. § 609.27, subd. 1(4) (2020). As part of Byington's sentence, the district court ordered her to pay fines, fees, and restitution.

Byington later filed a petition for postconviction relief. When Minn. Stat. § 609.27, subd. 1(4) was declared facially overbroad and unconstitutional in another case, State v. Jorgenson , 946 N.W.2d 596, 600 (Minn. 2020), Byington asked the district court to vacate her conviction and sentence. Relying on Nelson v. Colorado , 581 U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1257–58, 197 L.Ed.2d 611 (2017), which held that "a State may not impose anything more than minimal procedures on the refund of exactions dependent upon a conviction subsequently invalidated," she further asserted that she was entitled to a refund of all restitution payments made because of her invalid conviction. The district court granted Byington's petition in part by vacating her conviction and sentence. But it denied her request for a refund of restitution, concluding that it lacked authority to do so, in part because "there is no legal vehicle under Minnesota law, in the context of a criminal case, to provide reimbursement of restitution." The court of appeals affirmed, holding that "nothing in the postconviction statute governing this matter authorizes a court to refund restitution," and that "the source of a court's authority to return restitution is the Minnesota Incarceration and Exoneration Remedies Act," (MIERA), Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362 –.368 (2020), which requires a timely petition—which Byington never filed—seeking an order that the person is eligible for compensation based on exoneration.

We granted review on whether a postconviction court has authority to refund restitution that a defendant paid on an unconstitutional conviction, or whether MIERA is the only procedure for receiving a refund of restitution paid. We conclude that in a postconviction proceeding, a district court has the authority under the postconviction statute, Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2020), to order the State to refund restitution that the defendant has paid because of a conviction when that conviction has been invalidated, and no retrial will occur. We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

On July 1, 2009, respondent State of Minnesota charged Byington with two felony counts of coercion, Minn. Stat. § 609.27, subd. 1(4), and one felony count of attempted coercion, Minn. Stat. §§ 609.27, subd. 1(4), 609.275 (2014). The State alleged that Byington obtained $7,000 from the victim under the threat of revealing their relationship to his wife and local church leadership. During the same time, Clay County Social Services (CCSS) conducted a fraud investigation, which revealed that Byington received $5,831.44 in fraudulent overpayments of public assistance benefits when she did not report the money that she had received from the victim as income.

On September 4, 2009, Byington pleaded guilty to one felony count of coercion. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and not to pursue fraud charges, and Byington agreed to pay restitution to both the victim and CCSS. The victim and CCSS submitted affidavits of loss and requests for restitution. The district court sentenced Byington to 1 year and 1 day in prison, with execution stayed for 10 years, and placed her on probation. It also ordered her to pay $585 in fines, $7,000 in restitution to the victim, and $5,831.44 in restitution to CCSS. Byington made periodic restitution payments and satisfied her fines with community service. On October 30, 2019, Byington was discharged from probation.

After Byington completed probation, the court of appeals held that Minn. Stat. § 609.27, subd. 1(4) was facially overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. State v. Jorgenson (Jorgenson I ), 934 N.W.2d 362, 375 (Minn. App. 2019). Following the court of appeals decision, Byington filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief seeking to vacate her conviction and sentence. We affirmed the court of appeals, agreeing that subdivision 1(4) of section 609.27 is facially overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment, and thus invalid. State v. Jorgenson (Jorgenson II ), 946 N.W.2d 596, 600 (Minn. 2020).

After we issued our decision in Jorgenson II , Byington, with the assistance of counsel, amended her postconviction petition to request that the district court vacate her conviction and sentence and "refund any restitution payments made by her pursuant to the illegal and void sentence." Byington asserted that Nelson v. Colorado , 581 U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1257, 197 L.Ed.2d 611 (2017), creates a substantive right to the refund of restitution she paid because of a conviction that was later invalidated, and that the court is thus obligated to order her a restitution refund. The State agreed that Byington's conviction should be vacated, but it argued that she was not entitled to a refund of restitution.

The district court granted in part and denied in part Byington's petition for postconviction relief. In light of Jorgenson II , the district court granted Byington's request to vacate her conviction and sentence. Regarding her request for a refund of restitution, the district court acknowledged that under Nelson , "it would appear that [Byington] is entitled to a refund of all fines, fees, and restitution paid in this case, as these obligations were all imposed as part of the sentence stemming from [Byington]’s conviction." Nevertheless, the district court concluded that "the issue of who specifically must pay back the restitution money, and how that payment is secured, is beyond the scope of this case and beyond the authority of this court."

The district court found it "important to note that the Nelson case focused on Colorado's statutory scheme" for exonerated defendants to obtain restitution. But according to the district court, "[u]nder Minnesota law, there is no such statutory scheme," nor was there any "legal vehicle under Minnesota law, in the context of a criminal case, to provide reimbursement of restitution." Although the district court agreed that it had the authority to require a "refund of fines, fees, and other judicial branch retained monies," it concluded that it "lack[ed] the authority to impose any legal obligations on the part of non-parties (i.e. the victims), or Order a party in the case (the prosecuting authority) to pay out monies it never received in the first place." As a result, the court vacated Byington's restitution order and ordered the refund of any monies paid by her that were applied "to fines, fees, or judicial branch retained monies." The district court also vacated any "civil judgment" that "has been entered solely by virtue of the Restitution Order in this matter." The court, however, denied Byington's request that she receive a refund of the amounts that she paid to the victims in restitution.

In a nonprecedential opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the district court. Byington v. State , No. A20-1441, 2021 WL 2406681, at *1 (Minn. App. June 14, 2021). First, the court of appeals determined that nothing in the postconviction statutes, Minn. Stat. §§ 590.01 –.06 (2020), under which Byington's present action was brought, authorizes a court to refund fines, fees, or restitution. Byington , 2021 WL 2406681, at *1.

Second, the court of appeals rejected Byington's contention that Nelson "unequivocally grants a district court the authority" to refund restitution. Id. at *2. Instead, the court of appeals stated that Nelson ’s "conclusion was premised on the determination that Colorado's exoneration-compensation statute imposed too many procedural hurdles to comport with due process" and thus "did not establish a broad substantive right to the automatic refund of restitution payments made pursuant to an invalidated conviction." Id. Accordingly, the court of appeals reasoned, "[ Nelson ] is not an independent source of authority upon which a district court may order the return of restitution." Id.

Third, the court of appeals instead identified the Minnesota Incarceration and Exoneration Remedies Act (MIERA), Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362 –.368, as "the source of a court's authority to return restitution." Byington , 2021 WL 2406681, at *2. But the court of appeals observed that "Byington did not obtain or even seek an order that she is eligible for compensation based on exoneration." Id. The court of appeals thus declined to consider the constitutionality of MIERA, finding that "[t]he district court did not have the opportunity to consider [Byington's] eligibility under the act, or to consider any arguments as to whether the act passes constitutional muster." Id. Because Byington had not established that she was eligible for MIERA compensation, and because the court of appeals concluded that "nothing in the postconviction statute governing this matter authorizes a court to refund restitution," the court of appeals saw no error in the district court denying her request for a restitution refund. Id.

We...