Byrd v. Grove St. Mgmt. Corp.

VICKIE DIANNE BYRD, Plaintiff, v. GROVE STREET MANAGEMENT CORPORATIONand BARBARA MANOR LLC, Defendants.

No. 6:16-cv-6017(MAT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

June 25, 2018

DECISION and ORDER

I. Introduction

Vickie Dianne Byrd ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, instituted this action against Grove Street Management Corporation and Barbara Manor LLC (collectively, "Defendants"),¹ alleging, inter alia, discrimination based on race and disability in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. ("the FHA"), and violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 39) pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 12(c)").

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff rented an apartment owned by Barbara Manor Apartments, LLC ("Barbara Manor") in Rochester, New York, with a lease term that expired on October 31, 2015. As the end of the lease term approached, KTB Capital LLC d/b/a Grove Street Management ("Grove Street"), the property manager, notified Plaintiff that her lease would not be renewed and that she would need to vacate the apartment at the conclusion of the lease term. Plaintiff declined to comply with Grove Street's request, and remained in the apartment beyond the expiration of her lease term.

Barbara Manor subsequently initiated an eviction proceeding against Plaintiff on November 10, 2015, in New York State, Monroe County Court. See Barbara Manor Apartments, LLC v. Byrd, No. 2015-12545 (Monroe Cty. Ct. 2015).² The Monroe County Court awarded judgment in favor of Barbara Manor on November 24, 2015, and issued a warrant of eviction against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a "Verified Complaint Article 15 of the Executive Law of the State of New York (Human Rights Law)" (Docket No. 43, ECF p. 12 of 53) with the New York State Department of Human Rights ("NYSDHR"), alleging that she was subjected to discrimination because of her "disability, race/color, opposed discrimination/retaliation, creed, sex, national origin, marital status, age." Plaintiff had received a letter from Defendants datedSeptember 17, 2015, indicating that her lease would not be renewed. Plaintiff accused Defendants of "retaliating against [her] because [she] filed a case against them last year on December 29, 2014 and [she] won[,]" and that "[t]hey are treating [her] disparagingly and harassing [her] constantly." Plaintiff indicated that she is "a single a Baptist 51 year old African American, female with physical disabilities." Plaintiff accused Defendants with violating "Title VIII of the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA), as amended." Plaintiff submitted a copy of the letter acknowledging receipt of her Verified Complaint but not a copy of the final decision, if any, issued by the NYSDHR.

Plaintiff commenced this action on January 11, 2016, by filing a Complaint (Docket No. 1). She subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 33), which Defendants answered (Docket No. 34).

III. Procedural Status

Following limited discovery and an unsuccessful mediation session (Docket No. 30), the parties appeared on March 8, 2018, for a status conference (Docket No. 40), before Magistrate Judge Jonathan W. Feldman. Judge Feldman acknowledged that Defendants had filed the pending motion pursuant to Rule 12(c) rather than Rule 56, but opined that Defendants should have included a "Notice to Pro Se Litigant - Rule 56 Motions for Summary Judgment" with their moving papers. Defendants subsequently served a copy of the Notice on Plaintiff by regular first class mail on March 13, 2018.

Plaintiff filed a Response (Docket No. 42) and a Supplemental Response (Docket No. 43), neither of which were served on Defendants. Defendants filed a Reply (Docket No. 44) on June 1, 2018, in which they assert that it would be premature to treat their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as a Motion for Summary Judgment because, inter alia, Plaintiff has asserted new allegations in her Response and the parties have not yet completed discovery. (Docket No. 44 (citing Docket No. 42 at ECF p. 3)). Defendants reiterate that they are asking the Court to rule only on the sufficiency of the pleadings. The Court agrees that the motion, which urges dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine³ and res judicata, can be determined pursuant to the standards applicable under Rule 12(c).

IV. Rule 12(c) Standard

In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts "'employ[ ] the same standard applicable to dismissals pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).'" Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Johnson v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (alterations in original; internal quotation marks omitted in original). Thus, accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal citation andquotation marks omitted). To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the plaintiff's complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id.

For purposes of deciding motions under Rule 12(b)(6), and by extension, Rule 12(c), "the complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference." Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (quoting Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c) ("A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes."). "Even where a document is not incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint 'relies heavily upon its terms and effect,' which renders the document 'integral' to the complaint. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Int'l Audiotext, 62 F.3d at 72).

V. Discussion

A. Overview of Plaintiff's Claims

1. The FHA

The FHA prohibits discrimination across a spectrum of housing-related activities, including the provision of brokerage services, real estate transactions, and housing sales and rentals. See42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606. Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, the FHA makes it "unlawful—

(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

. . .

(f)(1) To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of—

(A) that buyer or renter,

. . .

(2) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of

—(A) that person . . . ."

42 U.S.C. § 3604 ("Section 3604").

Plaintiff alleges that she wanted to renew her lease and attempted to make the necessary payment, but Defendants declined to either renew her lease agreement or accept her payment, and commenced an ejectment proceeding against her. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants intended to discriminate against her based on her race and disabled status, and also sought to retaliate against her for having successfully rebutted their prior attempt to evict her in 2014. Plaintiff accuses Defendants of failing to make necessaryrepairs that she had requested and suggests that this also represents discrimination based on her race and disabled status, as well as retaliation for exercising her rights. As a result of the eviction, Plaintiff personally suffered injuries and sustained injuries to her personal property. Although Plaintiff does not specify the subsection under which her claims fall, they appear to align most closely with subsections (a), (b), and (f).

The Court also construes Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint as attempting to assert a claim under Section 3617 of the FHA. This section provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 3617 ("Section 3617"). Courts in this Circuit and elsewhere have found that an eviction proceeding can constitute an adverse action under Section 3617. E.g., Reyes v. Fairfield Properties, 661 F. Supp.2d 249, 267 n. 10 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "conclud[ing] that an eviction proceeding could constitute an adverse action under [42. U.S.C.] section 3617") (citing Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Although the retaliatory conduct in this case involved only threats of eviction, which were never carried out, we find [plaintiff] sufficiently alleged an adverse action, at least atthis early pleading stage.") (further citations omitted)); see also DeSouza v. Park W. Apartments, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-01668(MPS), 2018 WL 2990099, at *11 (D. Conn. June 14, 2018) (plaintiff fulfilled adverse action element of prima facie case based on defendant's "initiation of eviction proceedings in June of 2014, along with its submissions of affidavits of noncompliance in September of 2014 and March of 2015") (citing, inter alia, Wentworth v....