C. D. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No 103 of Lincoln Cnty. Okla.

1

C.D., a minor, by and through his parent and next friend, CHARLETTE EASTER, Plaintiff, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 103 OF LINCOLN COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, a/k/a PRAGUE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a/k/a PRAGUE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant.

No. CIV-22-1034-SLP

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma

August 28, 2024

ORDER

SCOTT L. PALK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Brief in Support [Doc. No. 12] filed by Defendant Prague Public Schools (“the School District”).

Plaintiff has responded, see [Doc. No. 14], and the School District has replied, see [Doc. No. 16]. For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. Background^[1]

The School District employed Billy Joe Smith as a teacher for 32 years. Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 8] ¶ 14. Mr. Smith groomed male students and “preyed on” them “[w]hile on the School District grounds and during school hours.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 12. On March 11 2019, Plaintiff, a minor student, “made an outcry that Mr. Smith had raped him,” triggering an investigation into the teacher.^[2] Id. ¶ 15. During the investigation, a second boy came forth with similar allegations against Mr. Smith. Id. ¶ 17. Law enforcement officers then interviewed Mr. Smith, who died by suicide less than 12 hours later. Id. ¶ 19. After that, the Lincoln County District Attorney “set up a coordinated community response team to identify potential victims and provide counseling and other services.” Id. ¶ 20. As a result, “multiple people” came forward with similar allegations against Mr. Smith. Id.

Plaintiff has sued the School District for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), and for creating a hostile educational environment pursuant to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Count II). The School District has moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Although Plaintiff responded to the Motion, the majority of that five-page document simply summarizes and quotes from the Amended Complaint rather than providing substantive legal arguments.

II. Governing Standard

A complaint is subject to dismissal if it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility, in the context of a motion to dismiss, requires a litigant to plead facts which allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

When analyzing a complaint under this standard, the Court first identifies “the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth,”-i.e., legal conclusions and bare assertions. Id. at 679-81. It then evaluates the remaining factual allegations “to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 681. Accordingly, “mere ‘labels and conclusions,' and ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action' will not suffice; a plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim.” Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Although “Plaintiff is not required to set forth a prima facie case for each element, [he] is required to set forth plausible claims.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2012). “While ‘[s]pecific facts are not necessary,' some facts are.” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). Pleadings that do not allow for at least a “reasonable inference” of the legally relevant facts are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Discussion

A. Section 1983 Claims

In his first cause of action, Plaintiff claims the School District violated his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides that any person acting under color of state law who “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” Plaintiff seeks redress under § 1983 for violations of his substantive due process and equal protection rights, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and his Fourth Amendment rights.

1. Substantive Due Process

First, Plaintiff alleges that the School District deprived him of his “fundamental rights to physical safety and to be free from the infliction of unnecessary emotional pain and humiliation.” Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 8] ¶ 28. The School District seeks dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing Plaintiff has not “allege[d] facts which tend to show that action by the District Board of Education, or a custom or practice” caused the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Def.'s Mot. [Doc. No. 12] at 10. The Court agrees.

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint includes a considerable list of purported Fourteenth Amendment violations. He claims “[t]he School District denied Plaintiff his rights to Due Process and Equal Protection of the Law by” (1) “[f]ailing to enact and implement adequate policies concerning sexual harassment, misconduct and abuse;” (2) “[f]ailing to remove Smith;” (3) “[f]ailing to prevent male students from being alone with Smith;” (4) “[f]ailing to investigate Smith properly, before and after these referenced allegations;” (5) “[f]ailing to hire, train, supervise, and retain Smith properly;” (6) “[f]ailing to adequately train and supervise its employees;” and (7) “[e]xhibiting deliberate indifference to the sexual misconduct exhibited by Smith.” Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 8] ¶ 30. Similarly, he claims “[t]he School District has an unconstitutional custom or policy of” (1) “[f]ailing to report criminal misconduct;” (2) “[f]ailing to investigate criminal misconduct;” (3) “[d]iscounting the credibility of the allegations of students,” and (4) “[f]ailing to adequately train and supervise employees with regard to the investigation and reporting of sexual abuse of adolescents.” Id. ¶ 31.

The only Defendant in this case is the School District, which is a local governmental entity. See Ware v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 492, 902 F.2d 815, 817 (10th Cir. 1990). The mere fact that one of the School District's employees injured Plaintiff is not sufficient to establish a constitutional violation cognizable under § 1983. See Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1188 (10th Cir. 2010). “Rather, a municipality is responsible only for (1) actions taken by subordinate employees in conformity with preexisting official policies or customs and (2) actions taken by final policymakers ....'”

Whitson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm 'rs of Cnty. of Sedgwick, 106 F.4th 1063, 1066-67 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Seifert v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte Cnty./Kansas City, 779 F.3d 1141, 1159 (10th Cir. 2015)). The parties agree the School District's board of education has final policy making authority. See Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 8] ¶ 27; Def.'s Mot. [Doc. No. 12] at 11; see also Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 5-117(14). Plaintiff does not plead any facts related to actions taken by the board, however.

So to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to plausibly demonstrate “(1) that a [School District] employee committed a constitutional violation; and (2) that a [School District] policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.” Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 419 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Myers v. Oklahoma Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1320 (10th Cir. 1998). As to the second element, “[a]n official policy or custom may take many forms, including ‘a formally promulgated policy, a well-settled custom or practice, a final decision by a municipal policymaker, or deliberately indifferent training or supervision.'” Blueberry v. Comanche Cnty. Facilities Auth., 672 Fed.Appx. 814, 816-17 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013)). “Although the existence or nonexistence of such a policy, practice, or custom is a question of fact for the jury, it is not a fact that can be baldly asserted at the pleading stage.” Abila v. Funk, No. CV 14-1002 JB/SMV, 2016 WL 9021834, at *17 (D.N.M. Dec. 14, 2016) (citations omitted).

As an initial matter, many of the allegations in the Amended Complaint “are not entitled to the assumption of truth because they are entirely conclusory.”^[3]Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 756 (10th Cir. 2010). Sweeping away those conclusory allegations, the Amended Complaint alleges that: (1) Mr. Smith groomed and “repeatedly preyed on male students” during school hours and on school grounds, (2) “Plaintiff made an outcry that Mr. Smith had raped him,” (3) “[d]uring the law enforcement investigation a second boy, this one in foster care, them [sic] came forward wth [sic] similar allegations,” (4) following the establishment of the “coordinated community response team . . . [m]ultiple people responded and came forward to report being abused by Smith,” and (5) Mr. Smith died by suicide less than 12 hours after meeting with law enforcement. [Doc. No. 8] ¶¶ 9, 15, 17, 19-20.

...