C.G. v. J.H.

193 A.3d 891

C.G., Appellant

v.J.H., Appellee

No. 2 MAP 2018

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: May 15, 2018

Decided: September 21, 2018

Craig Barry Bluestein, Esq., for Academy of Adoption and Assisted Reproduction Attorneys, Indiana, Amicus Curiae.

Helen Eileen Casale, Esq., Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, for American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Pennsylvania Chapter, Amicus Curiae.

Leonore F. Carpenter, Esq., Temple University School of Law, Rebecca Gail Levin, Esq., Tiffany Lynn Palmer, Esq., Jerner & Palmer, P.C., for Appellant.

John Caleb Bee, Esq., Steven S. Hurvitz, Esq., McQuaide Blasko, Julia Cronin Rater, Esq., McQuaide Blasko Attorneys at Law, for Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY

In Pennsylvania, standing requirements limit who may seek physical or legal custody of a child to the following individuals: (1) a parent; (2) a person who stands in loco parentis to the child; or (3) under certain conditions, a grandparent of the child who does not stand in loco parentis. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324. We granted allowance of appeal to explore whether a former same-sex, unmarried partner of a biological parent may have standing to pursue custody either as a parent or as a person who stood in loco parentis to the Child, and to what extent post-separation conduct is relevant in an in loco parentis analysis.

I.

Appellant C.G. and Appellee J.H. were a same-sex couple living together in Florida. In October 2006, J.H. gave birth to Child. Child was conceived via intrauterine insemination using an anonymous sperm donor. J.H. is the biological mother of Child. C.G. shares no genetic connection with Child, and did not adopt Child.¹ Following Child's birth, the couple continued to live together for approximately five years before separating. J.H. and Child moved to a separate residence in Florida in February 2012, and they relocated to Pennsylvania in July 2012.

On December 8, 2015, C.G. filed a custody complaint seeking shared legal and partial physical custody of Child alleging she "acted (and acts) as a mother to the minor child as well, as the minor child was conceived by mutual consent of the parties, with the intent that both parties would co-parent and act as mothers to the minor child." Custody Compl., 12/8/15, at ¶ 3. She averred further that "[i]t is in child's best interests and permanent welfare to have a relationship with both parents." Id. at ¶ 7. C.G. continued that she "mutually agree[d] to have a child with [J.H.], and both participated in selecting a sperm donor in order for [J.H.] to conceive their minor child." Id. C.G. claimed she served daily as Child's mother from the time of conception and birth until 2011 by, for example, appearing at pre-natal appointments, participating in the birth of Child, and cutting his umbilical cord. See id. With respect to her relationship with Child following the dissolution of her relationship with J.H., C.G. claimed that J.H. began withholding Child from C.G. in February 2012,² allowing only once a week contact, despite C.G.'s requests for more; J.H. moved Child to Pennsylvania without notifying or consulting C.G.; C.G. has had minimal and inconsistent contact with Child, via telephone and one physical contact since J.H. and Child relocated to Pennsylvania; J.H. represented to C.G. she could have more regular contact with Child following the parties' settling financial matters attendant to their separation, but following the parties' resolution of those matters, J.H. did not permit C.G. to see or have contact with Child. See id.

On January 6, 2016, J.H. filed preliminary objections to the complaint asserting that C.G. lacked standing to bring an action for any form of custody under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324 because C.G. is not a parent, does not and did not ever stand in loco parentis to Child, and is not a grandparent. See Prelim. Objections, 1/6/16, at ¶¶ 7-11. J.H. disputed that Child was conceived by mutual consent with the intent to co-parent. Rather, she contended that "the decision to have a child was solely that of [J.H.] ... [C.G.] made it clear to [J.H.] that [C.G.] did not want another child (having two children of her own from a prior relationship) and that [J.H.] would bear responsibility for the child she conceived[.]" Id. at ¶ 12. J.H. continued that she bore all costs of Child with the exception of limited situations in which C.G. contributed "minimally," and "since the child's birth [J.H.] has acted as the sole parent for the child. [C.G.'s] involvement was solely that of [J.H.'s] girlfriend from the child's birth until November 2011[.]" Id. Additionally, she asserted that pursuant to C.G.'s desire not to be a parent to Child, J.H. "made all decisions regarding the child's education, medical care, growth and development, and attended to all of his daily, educational and medical needs with the exception of limited times during which [C.G.] babysat for [J.H.]" Id. J.H. claimed that, in December 2011, C.G. asked J.H. to move out of the shared residence by February 2012 because C.G. wanted to continue a romantic relationship with a woman with whom she was having an affair. See id. J.H. agreed that she and Child moved out of the house in February 2012, and moved to Pennsylvania in July of that year. See id. She additionally agreed that C.G. "has spoken with the child only minimally and seen him only one time, which was in March 2014." Id. She continued that since the move, C.G. has not provided financial support to Child except for one week of camp and one month of before and after school care, and has occasionally sent nominal gifts. See id. She sought dismissal of the complaint based on legal insufficiency and lack of capacity to sue. See Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4) and (5).

C.G. filed a response to the preliminary objections on January 25, 2016, in which she claimed standing as a parent under Section 5324(1) or "at the very least" as a person in loco parentis to Child under Section 5324(2). See Response to Prelim. Objections, 1/25/16, at ¶¶ 7-11. She generally disputed the factual representations in J.H.'s preliminary objections in support of her own account of the decision to conceive and parent Child. See id. at 12.

The trial court held hearings over three days at which a number of witnesses testified and conflicting evidence was presented. Consistent with the assertions in the complaint and responses, the gravamen of the parties' respective presentations was C.G.'s participation in the conception, birth, and raising of Child, the intent of the parties with respect thereto, and the perception others held of the household or family dynamic. For example, C.G. testified she and J.H. "planned to have a child together[;]" that J.H. did not begin the process of trying to become pregnant until C.G. consented; the couple would look for donors together on a donor site; and she considered Child her son from the time he was born. N.T., 4/12/16, at 38-55. Following his birth, C.G. described her relationship with Child as a parent/child relationship. See id. at 103. J.H., by contrast, testified the decision to have a child was hers alone, she did not consider C.G. to be a parent to Child, or hold her out to others as such. See N.T., 2/5/16, at 28-29 ("[C.G. did not want a child[,]" but "tolerated the idea" of J.H. having one.); see also N.T., 4/12/16, at 207-08 ("I wanted to have a child. [C.G.] did not want that, and I let her know I made an appointment with a fertility doctor, and I was moving forward with that for myself."); id. at 222 ("I am [Child's] mom, and [C.G.] is not.").

In all, the trial court heard from 16 witnesses, offering differing testimony on issues bearing on the parties' relationship between and among J.H., Child, C.G., and her daughters (who were, at the relevant time, college age), the intent of the parties prior to and after Child's conception and birth, and parental duties performed for Child. C.G. offered a number of witnesses supporting her position that she acted as a mother to Child and that she and J.H. undertook jointly to conceive and raise child. See, e.g., N.T., 2/5/16, 85-91 (C.G.'s daughter, Christine Comerford, testifying she understood J.H. and C.G. were having a baby together, she was told the Child was her brother, C.G. performed day-to-day activities for Child including picking him up from school, bathing him, and preparing meals); id. at 118-130 (C.G.'s daughter, Lauren Comerford, testifying she understood her mother and J.H. were having a baby together, her mother tended to Child and attended his activities as he grew older, and they took vacations together as a family); N.T., 6/20/16, at 123-28 (Terri Michaels, friend and work colleague of C.G., former colleague of J.H., testifying she understood J.H. and C.G. were having a baby together, C.G. would arrange for Terri and her daughter to babysit Child, and she observed C.G. perform parental duties such as preparing Child's meals, playing with him, or correcting him). J.H., by contrast, offered a number of witnesses who testified that J.H. decided unilaterally to have a child and was Child's primary caregiver. See, e.g. , N.T., 4/12/16, at 7-11 (Katina Gray, one of Child's babysitters in Florida, testifying J.H. hired her and would discuss Child's needs with her and perceiving C.G.'s involvement with Child akin to "a babysitter"); N.T., 6/20/16, at 17-22 (Dr. Alicia Chambers, J.H.'s friend, testifying to her discussions with J.H. about her commitment to becoming a mother despite the fact that C.G. "didn't want that," "wanted to be free[,] and had her own children" and her understanding that C.G. did not want to have a child. She explained that C.G. and J.H. had an arrangement "that this was [J.H.'s] child, and therefore, [J.H.] was going to do the work that was involved..."); N.T., 6/20/16, at 48 (J.H.'s brother testifying "it was clear" C.G. did not desire to have a baby, J.H. performed the parental caretaking of Child, and...