C.H. ex rel. C.H. v. Northwest Indep. Sch. Dist.

277 Ed. Law Rep. 268

815 F.Supp.2d 977

C.H., a minor child, by next friends C.H. and G.H., Plaintiffs,

v.NORTHWEST INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:09–cv–117.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division.

Sept. 30, 2011.

Myrna Bernice Silver, Myrna B. Silver, Attorney at Law, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs.

William M. Buechler, Cynthia Schwartz Buechler, Buechler & Associates, Austin, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE RECORD AND GRANTING THE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE RECORD

RICHARD A. SCHELL, District Judge.

Before the court is an appeal from the decision of a Texas Education Agency (TEA) special education hearing officer. The Plaintiffs, the parents of C.H., a child diagnosed with dyslexia, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and a speech impairment, filed a due process hearing request with the TEA, complaining that Northwest Independent School District (the District) denied C.H. a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) and requesting various forms of relief, including placement in a private school. After a three day hearing on the matter, a TEA hearing officer found for the District and denied the Plaintiffs' requests for relief. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed this suit, appealing the decision of the hearing officer. Both parties have filed motions for judgment on the administrative record. See Dkt. 28 (District's motion); Dkt. 30 (the Plaintiffs' motion). As will be explained below, the court finds that the Plaintiffs' motion should be denied and the District's motion granted.

I. Background

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq., requires school districts receiving federal funds to implement procedures and policies that assure that disabled students receive a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1), 1415(a). To ensure that a student receives a FAPE, parents and school districts collaborate to develop an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) that is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” R.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 607 F.3d 1003, 1008 (5th Cir.2010) (quotation and citation omitted). In Texas, the committee responsible for preparing an IEP is known as an Admissions, Review, and Dismissal Committee (ARDC).

C.H. enrolled as a second grade student in the District at the beginning of the 2004–2005 school year. Prior to that time C.H. attended school in California, where he had been identified as having ADHD and a speech impairment. Administrative Record (AR) pgs. 4784–95. On August 13, 2004, the District conducted an ARDC meeting to process C.H.'s transfer into the District. At this initial meeting, the committee established a temporary schedule of special education services for C.H., and the District received consent from C.H.'s parents to conduct a Full Individual Evaluation (FIE) of C.H. Thirty days later, on September 13, 2004, the ARDC met again and the District adopted a special education evaluation of C.H. that had been conducted nine months earlier by C.H.'s California school district.¹ Consistent with the California evaluation, the District identified C.H. as eligible for special education services due to his ADHD and speech impairment and scheduled him for special education services in language arts, content mastery and speech therapy. AR pg. 4753.

At a February 16, 2005 ARDC meeting, the committee decided that the District would conduct a FIE of C.H. The FIE was conducted on May 19, 2005, and reviewed at an ARDC meeting on May 25, 2005. The District found that the evaluation results were inconclusive as to whether C.H. suffered from a learning disability such as dyslexia (in addition to having ADHD).

In November of 2005, C.H. was evaluated privately at the Scottish Rite Hospital, and an ARDC meeting was held on January 3, 2006, to discuss the results of the Scottish Rite evaluation. The evaluation diagnosed C.H. with dyslexia and recommended that the District provide C.H. with a reading program for children with developmental dyslexia. AR pg. 985. The District adopted the Scottish Rite evaluation, and C.H. was placed in the District's Reading Attainment Program (RAP) for the 2006 spring semester. The RAP dyslexia program was discontinued before the 2006 fall semester began. At an ARDC meeting on August, 28, 2006, the District gave the Plaintiffs two options for replacing his participation in the discontinued RAP program, and the Plaintiffs elected for C.H. to receive a daily dyslexia curriculum one-on-one with a reading specialist.

At the August 28, 2006 ARDC meeting it was also decided that C.H.'s speech therapy would be reduced at the recommendation of his speech therapist. Then, on December 4, 2006, the District conducted an updated language assessment of C.H. See AR pgs. 4583–88. The assessment was discussed at an ARDC meeting on December 11, 2006, however no changes were made to C.H.'s speech regimen as a result of the updated assessment.

In March of 2007, C.H. was accepted for the following school year into the Hill School, a private school in Grapevine, Texas, Tr. Vol. I pgs. 251–52, and he enrolled in the Hill School the following month, id. at 252. Despite his enrollment in the Hill School, however, C.H. continued to attend school in the District.

At the request of the parents, the ARDC met on May 4, 2007. Both parents attended the meeting and they were accompanied by two advocates. In addition to requesting various documents from the District pertaining to C.H., the parents expressed their concern that C.H.'s dyslexia had not been adequately addressed by the District and that the District had not provided him with a FAPE. AR pg. 4522. The parents requested that the District pay for C.H. to attend the Hill School in exchange for denying him a FAPE for three years. Id. at 4523. The ARDC reconvened on August 27, 2007, but the parents did not attend the meeting. C.H. was officially withdrawn from the District on the same day.

Except for the August 27, 2007 ARDC meeting, at least one of C.H.'s parents attended every ARDC meeting held while C.H. was enrolled in the District. Tr. Vol. II pg. 277. And according to testimony from the due process hearing, the parent who attended the ARDC meetings actively participated in them. Tr. Vol. III pg. 77.

Under the IDEA, the parents of a disabled child may file a complaint “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or education placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education [FAPE] to such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). On July 12, 2007, the parents filed a request for a due process hearing with the TEA, see AR pgs. 894–98, and a hearing was held on September 24–26, 2008. On December 12, 2008, the hearing officer issued her decision, finding that C.H. had not been denied a FAPE and denying C.H.'s requests for relief. See AR pgs. 6–23.

Under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2),

Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsection (f) or (k) who does not have the right to an appeal under subsection (g), and any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under this subsection, shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.

On March 12, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed this action under § 1415(i)(2), appealing the decision of the hearing officer.

II. Standard of Review

“Under the IDEA, a federal district court's review of a state hearing officer's decision is virtually de novo.... The hearing officer's findings should be accorded due weight, but the district court must arrive at an independent conclusion based on a preponderance of the evidence.” Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 808 (5th Cir.2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Parties bringing an action under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) may request that the court review evidence in addition to the administrative record; but when, as here, the parties make no such request, the court decides the case on the administrative record alone. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C).

The free and appropriate public education that is offered through an IEP “need not be the best possible one, nor one that will maximize the child's educational potential; rather, it need only be an education that is specifically designed to meet the child's unique needs, supported by services that will permit him to benefit from the instruction.” Adam J., 328 F.3d at 808 (quotation and citation omitted). This is because the IDEA “guarantees only a basic floor of opportunity, consisting of specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Yet the educational benefit conferred “cannot be a mere modicum or de minimis,” rather it “must be meaningful and likely to produce progress.” Id. at 808–09 (quotation and citation omitted).

“The role of the judiciary is not to second-guess the decisions of school officials or to substitute their plans for the education of disabled students with the court's. Instead, the court's role is limited to determining whether those officials have complied with the IDEA.” R.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 607 F.3d 1003, 1010 (5th Cir.2010) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “[t]he IDEA creates a presumption in favor of a school district's educational plan, placing the burden of proof, by preponderance of the evidence, on the party challenging it.” Id. at 1010–11.

“If the court finds that the state has not provided an appropriate educational placement, the court may require the school district to reimburse the child's parents for the costs of sending the child to an appropriate...