C. Other Seizures of Evidence
1. Not Requiring Probable Cause ("Special Needs," etc.)
Maryland v. King, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (The defendant was arrested for menacing a group of people with a shotgun and charged in a state court with assault. While being processed in a county booking facility, booking personnel used a swab to take a sample of the defendant's DNA from his cheek pursuant to provisions of the Maryland DNA Collection Act (Act). In part, the Act authorizes law enforcement authorities to collect DNA samples from "an individual who is charged with . . . a crime of violence or an attempt to commit a crime of violence; or . . . burglary or an attempt to commit burglary." Furthermore, the Act limits how the collected DNA can be used. Specifically, it states "[o]nly DNA records that directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and stored. No purpose other than identification is permissible." Almost a month later, the defendant's DNA record was uploaded to the Maryland DNA database. Three weeks after that, the defendant's DNA profile was matched to the DNA sample collected in an unsolved rape case. After the DNA was matched to the defendant, detectives presented the forensic evidence to a grand jury, which indicted him for rape. The defendant subsequently moved to suppress the DNA match arguing that the Act violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court upheld the statute as constitutional and, after pleading not guilty to the rape charges, the defendant was convicted. In deciding the defendant's appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals struck down as unconstitutional portions of the Act that authorized the collection of DNA from felony arrestees. In reaching its decision, the appellate court concluded that the DNA swab was an unreasonable search because the defendant's expectation of privacy was greater than the State's interest in identifying him. In appealing the appellate court's decision, the State argued that the search authorized by the Act was reasonable because the substantial government interest in identifying arrestees outweighed the minimal intrusion of the DNA swab. HELD: When officers arrest a suspect for a serious offense and that arrest is supported by probable cause, it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the officers to take a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA, for identification purposes, during booking. The ultimate measure of whether a search of a suspect is in line with the Fourth Amendment is "reasonableness." In determining whether a search is reasonable, a court must weigh the promotion of the legitimate state interest in conducting the search, against the degree to which the search violates the individual's privacy. In some cases, general or individual circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable. In those circumstances, either the public interest is of such a magnitude that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required. Alternatively, the individual to be searched is already on notice that a search will be conducted. In the case at bar, the State has a substantial and legitimate interest in identifying individuals that it is holding in custody. By comparison, the intrusion posed by the cheek swab in collecting the defendant's DNA is a minimal one. The collection of the sample involves virtually no risk of trauma or pain, and the information gathered from the DNA sample is limited to only what is necessary for identification of the individual. Furthermore, because the individual is being taken into custody, they have a diminished expectation of privacy and are already subject to relatively extensive searches of their person and effects. As such, the governmental interest in this case outweighs any privacy expectations held by the defendant, and the appellate court's finding that portions of the Act were unconstitutional was in error).
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeloaders of County of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (Plaintiff was arrested after a traffic stop by a New Jersey State Trooper who ran a computer check and determined defendant had an outstanding bench warrant for failure to appear at a hearing for not paying a fine. He was initially placed in a county detention center and subsequently moved to a correctional facility before it was determined he had already paid his fine. At the intake of both facilities, he was required to disrobe, was thoroughly examined, including in his body openings and under his genitals. After being released, he filed a §1983 civil rights action claiming he could not be subjected to such invasive searches unless the officials had reason to believe he was concealing drugs, weapons, or other contraband. The federal District Court ruled strip-searching nonindictable arrestees without a reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment and, as such, plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment. The United States Court of appeals for the Third Circuit reversed holding the jail procedures were reasonable. The plaintiff requested certiorari, which was granted. HELD: In assessing the propriety of the intake procedures, deference will be given to the discretion of jail officials in their making a judgment as to what is necessary unless there is a showing their policies are unnecessary or unjustified. Correctional authorities have a significant security interest in assuring arrestees entering their jail population have been thoroughly searched for removal of concealed weapons and other contraband that poses a danger to officials and other inmates. Also, screening the jail population at intake for contagious diseases as well as injuries or wounds requiring medical attention is a concern. Signs of gang affiliation are identified in order to contain street gang confrontation. Finding illicit drugs or alcohol that may make an inmate aggressive or lead to violent confrontation between inmates over possession and ownership is likewise a legitimate issue. In addition, preventing officials at intake from searches of those charged with minor offenses is not workable for a variety of reasons, including the difficulty associated with making a determination of which arrestees pose a risk of introducing unwanted items into the facility. In conclusion, legitimate penological interests justify the type of searches which plaintiff experienced. As such, there was no violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights).
Safford v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (Respondent was a thirteen-year-old student at a middle school within the petitioner school district and had been suspected in the past of being part of a group that had brought alcohol into a school dance. The administration of the middle school was told by a student that other students were bringing contraband into the school, and that this student had become ill after taking pills given to him by a classmate. A week later, this student turned over a white pill, later determined to be prescription strength Ibuprofen, to an assistant principle and implicated a friend of the respondent. When the friend was removed from class, she was in possession of a day planner containing contraband and was carrying more Ibuprofen and a blue pill, later determined to be an over-the-counter anti-inflammatory, in her pocket. The friend claimed the pills came from the respondent. When confronted, the respondent admitted to owning the day planner, but claimed to have lent it to the friend. She denied any knowledge of the pills. The respondent consented to a search of her backpack by the assistant principle and an administrative assistant. The search revealed nothing. Under instructions from the assistant principle to search the respondent's clothes, the administrative assistant took the respondent to the school nurse's office, where the administrative assistant and the nurse asked the respondent to remove her outerwear, including her shoes and socks. The administrative assistant and the nurse then asked the respondent to remove her T-shirt and pants, to pull her bra out and shake it, and to pull out the elastic on her underwear. In the process, the respondent's breasts and pelvic area were exposed, but no contraband was found. The respondent's mother filed suit on the respondent's behalf against the school district, the assistant principle, the administrative assistant, and the school nurse for violating the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights in carrying out a strip search. The petitioners argued that they enjoyed qualified immunity under Saucier v. Katz, 53 U.S. 194 (2001). The District Court granted summary judgment. A panel for the Ninth Circuit originally affirmed, however, the court sitting en banc reversed, holding that the strip search was unjustified under New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), and that, applying Katz, the respondent's rights had been "clearly established at the time of the search." The court did, however, affirm summary judgment for the administrative assistant and the nurse, "since they had not acted as independent decisionmakers [sic]." The petitioners appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. HELD: The strip search of respondent was unreasonable; however, the applicable standard was not well established at the time of the search and the individual school officials do enjoy qualified immunity. Under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Fourth Amendment's usual standard of probable cause to believe an offence has been committed in order to justify the reasonableness of a search requires that the officer possess knowledge of facts that "raise a 'fair probability' or a 'substantial chance' of discovering evidence of criminal activity." Under T.L.O., searches within the school context require a lesser burden of reasonable suspicion involving "a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing." Searches pursuant to a reasonable suspicion will be upheld "when the measures adopted are reasonably...
