C.R. Eng. v. Labor Comm'n

501 P.3d 109

C.R. ENGLAND and Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, Petitioners,

v.LABOR COMMISSION and Mansoor Hakem, Respondents.

No. 20200181-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed October 15, 2021

Christin Bechmann and Jeffrey A. Callister, Attorneys for Petitioners

Ryan J. Schriever and W. Andrew Penrod, Attorneys for Respondent Mansoor Hakem

Judge Gregory K. Orme authored this Opinion, in which Judges Ryan M. Harris and Ryan D. Tenney concurred.

Opinion

Orme, Judge:

¶1 C.R. England and its insurer, Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, petition for judicial review of the Utah Labor Commission's order directing it to pay temporary total disability (TTD) benefits to Mansoor Hakem. Hakem filed what he styled a "cross-appeal" seeking further TTD benefits. We decline to address Hakem's purported cross-appeal because our rules of appellate procedure and the relevant statutory provisions do not allow for cross-petitions in proceedings for judicial review of agency action. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider Hakem's "cross-appeal," which was filed more than 30 days following entry of the final order. On the merits of England's petition, we set aside the Commission's order directing England to pay TTD benefits because the order was not supported by substantial evidence and instruct the Commission to reconsider its order consistent with the guidance in this opinion.

BACKGROUND¹

¶2 On June 9, 2015, Hakem was injured while working for England.² Hakem then filed a claim with England for TTD benefits.³ It is not clear in the record, however, when England began paying these benefits. On October 2, 2015, England made an offer of light-duty work to Hakem, which Hakem rejected on October 14, 2015. Despite this rejection, England claims to have continued paying TTD benefits totaling $54,510 to Hakem. At some point in 2016, it appears that England discontinued making TTD benefit payments. Again, the timing of this discontinuation is not entirely clear in the record, and this is the focus of England's petition for review.

¶3 In December 2016, Hakem filed a claim with the Commission seeking TTD benefits from June 10, 2015, until the date on which he achieved maximum medical improvement. In its answer to Hakem's claim, England asserted that it had already paid Hakem $54,510 in TTD benefits, but it failed to include any dates for those payments. In September 2018, the matter proceeded to a hearing before an administrative law judge (the ALJ). During the hearing, England orally affirmed that it made TTD benefit payments to Hakem. First, it asserted that it paid TTD benefits to Hakem "until he was released at maximum medical improvement," and later it argued that "[Hakem] is requesting TTD benefits from June 10, 2015, through the present," even though England "paid ... these benefits through October." These are the only two references England made during the hearing to its prior payments of TTD benefits, and England did not provide, as far as we can tell from the record, any evidentiary support for these assertions or even specific dates of payment. All England asserted was that it paid benefits through "October," without specifying a year. To confuse matters more, at the end of the hearing Hakem informed the ALJ that he was now claiming TTD benefits "from October 14, 2015, to a date of medical stability." This time period included many months during which England claimed to have already paid TTD benefits.

¶4 The ALJ then referred the case to a medical panel and subsequently denied further TTD benefits to Hakem. In his order, however, the ALJ seems to have confused the dates in question. The ALJ began the order by first stating, with our emphasis, that "[t]he panel's opinion will assist the Court in determining the relevant question of whether [Hakem] retained the ability to perform any work after October 2, 2016 ." The ALJ continued, again with our emphasis, that

[b]ased on the different opinions, the Court referred this issue to a medical panel in order to assist the Court in determining whether [Hakem] could return to light-duty work or if he was restricted from all work at any point after October 2, 2015 .

The medical panel determined [Hakem] did not have a biomechanical impairment in function, but he was limited in his ability to function due to his pain and required light duty [restrictions] after October 2, 2015 .... Therefore, because light-duty work was made available to [Hakem] and he failed to accept the work, he is not entitled to total disability compensation after October 13, 2014 .

¶5 Hakem sought review of the ALJ's order by the Commission. The Commission affirmed the ALJ's order but amended it, sua sponte, in an attempt to fix the ALJ's apparent confusion about the operative dates. It stated that the ALJ's

decision to deny Mr. Hakem [TTD benefits] seems to be based on CR England's proffer of light-duty work on October 2, 2015, and his effective refusal of such assignment. [The ALJ] then sought to ensure Mr. Hakem's ability to perform light-duty work as of that date by posing such question to the medical panel, but erroneously describing the date as 2016 rather than 2015. Despite this error, [the ALJ] relied on the panel's opinion that Mr. Hakem could work light duty as evidence that the proffer of such work from CR England was appropriate.

The parties have not attempted to bring these errors to light on review. Instead their present dispute focuses on the medical panel's conclusions.

The Commission further explained:

After considering the evidence on this point, the Commission agrees with [the ALJ] that Mr. Hakem has not established entitlement to [TTD] benefits beginning October 14, 2015, as CR England had made a proffer of light-duty work to him by that date. However, Mr. Hakem is entitled to [TTD] benefits for certain periods during which he was not able to perform even light-duty work.

¶6 The Commission concluded, after reviewing Hakem's medical records, that Hakem was released from all work by his doctor on February 3, 2016, and then released only for light-duty work on June 15, 2016. The Commission thus ordered England to pay Hakem $14,899.40 in TTD benefits for that February-to-June time period. England then filed a request for the Commission to reconsider its order, arguing that its decision to award TTD benefits to Hakem from February 3, 2016, to June 14, 2016, was "not supported by sufficient evidence" and "erroneously sets aside [the] findings of ... [the ALJ] based on a typographical error." On January 29, 2020, the Commission denied the motion, stating that substantial evidence existed from Hakem's medical records to show that Hakem was released from all work from February 3, 2016, to June 14, 2016, and should receive benefits for that time period.

¶7 On February 26, 2020, within 30 days of the Commission's final order, England filed a petition for review in this court. Hakem then purported to file a "cross-appeal" on March 5, 2020, asserting error with the ALJ's and the Commission's decisions regarding the offer for light-duty work and the denial of further benefits on that basis.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶8 Hakem raises multiple issues in his cross-petition. But we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider the petition. "Questions about appellate jurisdiction are questions of law." See Zion Village Resort LLC v. Pro Curb U.S.A. LLC , 2020 UT App 167, ¶ 21, 480 P.3d 1055 (quotation simplified). And because we determine that we lack jurisdiction to consider it, we are required to dismiss Hakem's petition. See id.

¶9 England asserts that the Commission erred in granting TTD benefits to Hakem for the period of February 3, 2016, to June 14, 2016, because England had already paid those benefits to Hakem, resulting in Hakem receiving a double benefit. Because this is a factual issue, we review the Commission's order for substantial evidence. Utah Am. Energy Inc. v. Labor Comm'n , 2021 UT App 33, ¶ 12, 484 P.3d 1195. "A decision is supported by substantial evidence if there is a quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Ivory Homes, Ltd. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n , 2011 UT 54, ¶ 11, 266 P.3d 751 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction Over Hakem's Cross-Appeal

¶10 The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) governs judicial review of state agency action. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-101 to -601 (LexisNexis 2018). UAPA states that "[a] party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued[.]" Id. § 63G-4-401(3)(a). And "[t]o seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court." Id. § 63G-4-403(2)(a). Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in turn, states that "[w]hen a statute provides for judicial review by or appeal to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals of an order or decision of an administrative agency, ... a party seeking review must file a petition for review ... within the time prescribed by statute[.]" Utah R. App. P. 14(a). Rule 18 further directs that "[a]ll provisions" of the rules of appellate procedure "are applicable to review of decisions or orders of agencies, except that Rules 3 through 8 are not applicable." Id. R. 18. Thus, rule 4, which allows parties to cross-appeal in appeals arising from judicial proceedings, does not apply to proceedings for review of agency decisions. See id. R. 4(d); Watson v. Labor Comm'n , 2020 UT App 170, ¶ 1 n.1, 480 P.3d 353 (noting that "because the rules of appellate procedure do not allow for a cross-petition in the administrative context, akin to a cross-appeal in a judicial proceeding, each party must file its...